Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, defendant Jason Van Brumwell was convicted by jury on two counts of aggravated murder, for which he was sentenced to death. Defendant later brought a post-conviction relief action, and the post-conviction court ordered a new sentencing proceeding. While the post-conviction case was on appeal, the Oregon legislature enacted SB 1013, which, among other things, revised Oregon’s murder statutes to narrow the crimes that could be punished by death. Relevant here, under SB 1013, the form of murder alleged in Count 1 of defendant’s indictment, murder after having been convicted of aggravated murder previously, was classified as “murder in the first degree,” and the form of murder alleged in Count 2, murder committed while confined in a correctional facility, was classified as “murder in the first degree.” But a murder committed with both of those aggravating circumstances was now classified as “aggravated murder.” The parties agree that, because the post-conviction court ordered a new penalty-phase hearing that had yet to occur, SB 1013’s changes to the definitions of the different forms of murder applied to this case. But the parties disagreed about the effect of those changes. This case came before the Oregon Supreme Court on the State's motion to determine whether it could appeal the trial court order that granted defendant’s motion to preclude imposition of the death penalty and, if so, whether the appeal had to be brought to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the State could appeal the order, and that the appeal had to be brought to the Supreme Court. View "Oregon v. Brumwell" on Justia Law

Defendant Dennis Davidson was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole under for his convictions for public indecency, a Class C felony, because he had been sentenced for felony sex crimes at least twice before sentencing for the current crimes. The Oregon Supreme Court held that that sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate as applied to defendant’s offenses, and it remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. The trial court concluded on remand that it was permitted to sentence defendant to any term of imprisonment short of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under ORS 137.719, in the circumstances, the trial court was required to impose a departure sentence in conformity with Oregon’s felony sentencing guidelines. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Oregon v. Davidson" on Justia Law

At issue in this post-conviction case was petitioner Steve Franke’s attempt to prove that his criminal trial counsel provided constitutionally inadequate and ineffective assistance by failing to object that an expert diagnosis of child sexual abuse was inadmissible in the absence of corroborating physical evidence. Although the objection would have been contrary to controlling Court of Appeals precedent at the time of petitioner’s 2001 criminal trial, the Oregon Supreme Court later held that the rules of evidence required exclusion of a diagnosis of sexual abuse if it was not based on physical evidence, effectively overruling the Court of Appeals precedent. To survive summary judgment, petitioner offered evidence that some criminal defense attorneys in 2001 viewed the Court of Appeals precedent as vulnerable, were raising the kind of challenge to sexual abuse diagnoses that ultimately succeeded, and were recommending that practice to other criminal defense attorneys. Petitioner contended the evidence would have allowed him to establish that the exercise of reasonable skill and judgment obligated his attorney to raise a similar objection, or at least that his attorney’s failure to raise the argument was the product of a failure to adequately prepare and familiarize himself with the state of the law. Both the post-conviction court and the Court of Appeals held that petitioner’s claim failed as a matter of law. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the argument that ultimately succeeded in Southard was not so obviously correct in 2001 that the exercise of reasonable skill obligated attorneys to raise the argument, and petitioner’s evidence did not permit a different conclusion. But the Supreme Court disagreed that petitioner’s claim could be resolved on summary judgment; the evidence created genuine issues of material fact that, if resolved in petitioner’s favor, could establish the failure by petitioner’s attorney to raise a Southard-type challenge to the sexual abuse diagnosis was the product of an unreasonable failure to investigate and familiarize himself with the state of the law to the extent appropriate to the nature and complexity of the case. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' judgments and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. Franke" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review centered on whether a truck driver (claimant) who sustained injuries while driving a truck that he leased directly from a trucking company, with restrictions that prohibited him from driving the truck for the use of any other company, was a “subject worker” within the meaning of ORS 656.027 such that the trucking company was required to provide workers’ compensation insurance coverage for claimant’s injuries. SAIF and Robert Murray, the owner of Bob Murray Trucking (BMT), a for-hire carrier, sought review of the Court of Appeals’ opinion affirming the final order of the Workers’ Compensation Board: that claimant was a subject worker of BMT under the workers’ compensation laws and did not qualify for the exemption to “subject worker” status contained in ORS 656.027(15)(c). To this the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the Workers’ Compensation Board’s final order. View "SAIF v. Ward" on Justia Law

Defendant Kevin Gord, Jr. fired a gun at a vehicle with two occupants, neither of whom died. He was charged with, among other crimes, two counts of attempted aggravated murder. He unsuccessfully demurred to those counts of the indictment, arguing that the state had not charged a viable theory of attempted aggravated murder because the death of “more than one murder victim” in the same criminal episode was a circumstance element of the crime defined in ORS 163.095(1)(d), and because a circumstance element could not be “attempted.” At trial, defendant was acquitted of both counts of attempted aggravated murder but was convicted of other crimes. On appeal, despite the acquittal, defendant challenged the denial of his demurrer, arguing that that denial prejudiced him because it allowed for the admission of evidence relevant to the counts of attempted aggravated murder that may not have been admissible if trial had been limited to the other counts in the indictment. The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed based on its decision in Oregon v. Kyger, 471 P3d 764 (2020). The Oregon Supreme Court concluded defendant’s argument was without merit. Because the circuit court did not err in denying the demurrer, the Supreme Court deemed it unnecessary to address defendant’s remaining arguments concerning prejudice. The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court were affirmed. View "Oregon v. Ford" on Justia Law

During a single criminal episode, defendant Scott Kyger cut the necks of two people with a razor blade. For that, the state charged him with two counts of attempted aggravated murder under ORS 163.095 (2015) and ORS 161.405 (2015). Defendant was convicted of both counts. The question his appeal raised for the Oregon Supreme Court's review was whether the state charged a viable theory of attempted aggravated murder. Defendant contended that the existence of “more than one murder victim” was a circumstance that had to exist for a person to be guilty of aggravated murder; that it did not exist here because neither victim died; and that defendant’s intentional conduct did not amount to attempted aggravated murder because a person could not “attempt” to commit a circumstance element of an offense. In defendant’s view, the allegations supported, at most, charges for attempted murder. The trial court and the Court of Appeals disagreed with defendant. Finding no reversible error in the trial or appellate courts' judgments, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Kyger" on Justia Law

Defendant Erik Meiser, who was diagnosed with schizophrenia and a co-occurring antisocial personality disorder, contended the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in its understanding of the evidence required to establish that he was guilty except for insanity (GEI) with respect to charges of murder. The parties agreed schizophrenia was a “mental disease or defect” within the meaning of ORS 161.295, and they agreed that defendant’s co-occurring antisocial personality disorder was a “personality disorder” within the meaning of the statute. But they disagreed about whether ORS 161.295 required proof that defendant experienced the requisite incapacity solely “as a result of” his schizophrenia, and not in any part as a result of his co-occurring antisocial personality disorder. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded the legislature intended to specify that a co-occurring disorder that was solely a personality disorder was excluded from the “mental disease or defect” that forms the basis for a GEI defense, but the legislature did not intend to require proof that a co-occurring personality disorder played no causal role in bringing about the requisite lack of substantial capacity. "That conclusion resolves the issue on which we allowed review, but it leaves unresolved additional legal and factual questions regarding defendant’s proof of causation and incapacity." The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to address those questions. View "Oregon v. Meiser" on Justia Law

Relators asked the Oregon Supreme Court for extraordinary relief: an alternative writ of mandamus directing the Secretary of State to withdraw her orders that disqualified their initiative petitions from appearing on the November 2022 general election ballot, order expedited briefing in this mandamus matter, and issue an expedited decision and a peremptory writ, which would give them the time that they deem necessary to complete the remaining steps to ensure that their petitions are placed the ballot. The Court denied relief, finding "In a circumstance like this, in which petitioners propose a change in Oregon law but their petition is disqualified by the secretary, petitioners’ efforts may be delayed, but they are not foreclosed." View "Oregon ex rel Ofsink v. Fagan" on Justia Law

Defendants Rocklyn Shiffer and Gina McKinney were each charged in independent cases with an assault offense requiring proof that the defendant knowingly caused physical injury to another person. Defendant Shiffer opted for a bench trial and argued that the trial court had to find that he knew that his actions would result in serious physical injury before finding him guilty. Defendant McKinney’s case went to a jury, and she requested instructions that would have required the state to prove that she knew her actions would result in the requisite physical injury. Unlike the defendant in Oregon v. Owen, 369 Or 288 (2022), Shiffer and McKinney did not argue at trial that, at minimum, the criminal negligence mental state attached to the injurious result element. Citing Oregon v. Barnes, 986 P2d 1160 (1999), both trial courts rejected their arguments, and in McKinney’s trial, the court declined to give her requested instructions and instead gave instructions focusing on her knowledge of the nature of her conduct. The Court of Appeals affirmed each of their assault convictions. On review, each defendant argued the trial court erred. Defendants reasserted their arguments made at trial that a knowing mental state should have attached to the physical injury element, a conclusion the Oregon Supreme Court rejected in Owen. Additionally, each defendant made the unpreserved argument that, if the knowing mental state did not apply to the physical injury element, then the minimum culpable mental state should be criminal negligence. In Owen, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the resultant physical injury element of the second-degree assault offense required a culpable mental state and, therefore, the state had to prove that the defendant was at least criminally negligent with respect to the physical injury. As a result, the Court's decision in defendants’ cases initially was concerned with whether the holding in Owen extended to each defendant’s unpreserved argument on review that the result element of assault must have an associated culpable mental state. The Court exercised discretion to review the error in each case under plain-error review, and concluded that the error in each case was not harmless. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and in part vacated the judgment of conviction in each case. View "Oregon v. McKinney/Shiffer" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted defendant Matthew Owen on two counts of second-degree assault for knowingly causing physical injury to another person by means of a dangerous weapon. Citing Oregon v. Barnes, 986 P2d 1160 (1999), the trial court instructed the jury that the state had to prove defendant’s knowledge of the assaultive nature of his actions, and the court declined to give defendant’s requested instructions that would have required the state to prove his mental state concerning the injuries that resulted from his actions. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On review, defendant contended the trial court erroneously instructed the jury. Defendant argued Barnes was incorrectly decided and that the state had to prove either: (1) that he knew that his actions would cause the victim physical injury; or, alternatively, (2) that he knew that his actions were assaultive and that, at least, he negligently caused physical injury by failing to be aware of the risk that his actions would cause such injury. The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with defendant’s alternative argument and, in part, overruled Barnes. However, because the Court concluded that the instructional error was harmless in this case, it affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "Oregon v. Owen" on Justia Law