Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

During a single criminal episode, defendant Scott Kyger cut the necks of two people with a razor blade. For that, the state charged him with two counts of attempted aggravated murder under ORS 163.095 (2015) and ORS 161.405 (2015). Defendant was convicted of both counts. The question his appeal raised for the Oregon Supreme Court's review was whether the state charged a viable theory of attempted aggravated murder. Defendant contended that the existence of “more than one murder victim” was a circumstance that had to exist for a person to be guilty of aggravated murder; that it did not exist here because neither victim died; and that defendant’s intentional conduct did not amount to attempted aggravated murder because a person could not “attempt” to commit a circumstance element of an offense. In defendant’s view, the allegations supported, at most, charges for attempted murder. The trial court and the Court of Appeals disagreed with defendant. Finding no reversible error in the trial or appellate courts' judgments, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Kyger" on Justia Law

Defendant Erik Meiser, who was diagnosed with schizophrenia and a co-occurring antisocial personality disorder, contended the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in its understanding of the evidence required to establish that he was guilty except for insanity (GEI) with respect to charges of murder. The parties agreed schizophrenia was a “mental disease or defect” within the meaning of ORS 161.295, and they agreed that defendant’s co-occurring antisocial personality disorder was a “personality disorder” within the meaning of the statute. But they disagreed about whether ORS 161.295 required proof that defendant experienced the requisite incapacity solely “as a result of” his schizophrenia, and not in any part as a result of his co-occurring antisocial personality disorder. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded the legislature intended to specify that a co-occurring disorder that was solely a personality disorder was excluded from the “mental disease or defect” that forms the basis for a GEI defense, but the legislature did not intend to require proof that a co-occurring personality disorder played no causal role in bringing about the requisite lack of substantial capacity. "That conclusion resolves the issue on which we allowed review, but it leaves unresolved additional legal and factual questions regarding defendant’s proof of causation and incapacity." The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to address those questions. View "Oregon v. Meiser" on Justia Law

Relators asked the Oregon Supreme Court for extraordinary relief: an alternative writ of mandamus directing the Secretary of State to withdraw her orders that disqualified their initiative petitions from appearing on the November 2022 general election ballot, order expedited briefing in this mandamus matter, and issue an expedited decision and a peremptory writ, which would give them the time that they deem necessary to complete the remaining steps to ensure that their petitions are placed the ballot. The Court denied relief, finding "In a circumstance like this, in which petitioners propose a change in Oregon law but their petition is disqualified by the secretary, petitioners’ efforts may be delayed, but they are not foreclosed." View "Oregon ex rel Ofsink v. Fagan" on Justia Law

Defendants Rocklyn Shiffer and Gina McKinney were each charged in independent cases with an assault offense requiring proof that the defendant knowingly caused physical injury to another person. Defendant Shiffer opted for a bench trial and argued that the trial court had to find that he knew that his actions would result in serious physical injury before finding him guilty. Defendant McKinney’s case went to a jury, and she requested instructions that would have required the state to prove that she knew her actions would result in the requisite physical injury. Unlike the defendant in Oregon v. Owen, 369 Or 288 (2022), Shiffer and McKinney did not argue at trial that, at minimum, the criminal negligence mental state attached to the injurious result element. Citing Oregon v. Barnes, 986 P2d 1160 (1999), both trial courts rejected their arguments, and in McKinney’s trial, the court declined to give her requested instructions and instead gave instructions focusing on her knowledge of the nature of her conduct. The Court of Appeals affirmed each of their assault convictions. On review, each defendant argued the trial court erred. Defendants reasserted their arguments made at trial that a knowing mental state should have attached to the physical injury element, a conclusion the Oregon Supreme Court rejected in Owen. Additionally, each defendant made the unpreserved argument that, if the knowing mental state did not apply to the physical injury element, then the minimum culpable mental state should be criminal negligence. In Owen, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the resultant physical injury element of the second-degree assault offense required a culpable mental state and, therefore, the state had to prove that the defendant was at least criminally negligent with respect to the physical injury. As a result, the Court's decision in defendants’ cases initially was concerned with whether the holding in Owen extended to each defendant’s unpreserved argument on review that the result element of assault must have an associated culpable mental state. The Court exercised discretion to review the error in each case under plain-error review, and concluded that the error in each case was not harmless. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and in part vacated the judgment of conviction in each case. View "Oregon v. McKinney/Shiffer" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted defendant Matthew Owen on two counts of second-degree assault for knowingly causing physical injury to another person by means of a dangerous weapon. Citing Oregon v. Barnes, 986 P2d 1160 (1999), the trial court instructed the jury that the state had to prove defendant’s knowledge of the assaultive nature of his actions, and the court declined to give defendant’s requested instructions that would have required the state to prove his mental state concerning the injuries that resulted from his actions. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On review, defendant contended the trial court erroneously instructed the jury. Defendant argued Barnes was incorrectly decided and that the state had to prove either: (1) that he knew that his actions would cause the victim physical injury; or, alternatively, (2) that he knew that his actions were assaultive and that, at least, he negligently caused physical injury by failing to be aware of the risk that his actions would cause such injury. The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with defendant’s alternative argument and, in part, overruled Barnes. However, because the Court concluded that the instructional error was harmless in this case, it affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "Oregon v. Owen" on Justia Law

Relator was a prospective candidate for Oregon governor. After he filed his declaration of candidacy with the Secretary of State, the secretary asked relator for additional information to substantiate that he will “have been three years next preceding his election, a resident within this State,” as required to serve as governor by Article V, section 2, of the Oregon Constitution. Relator submitted additional materials in support of his claim that he met the constitutional eligibility requirement. Upon reviewing those materials, the secretary determined that, although relator had previously been a resident of Oregon, he had been a resident of New York since at least 2000 and he had not reestablished Oregon residency by November 2019. The secretary therefore concluded that relator did not meet the constitutional requirement, and informed him his name would not be placed on the ballot in the primary election. The next day, relator filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the Oregon Supreme Court, asking the Court to direct the secretary to reverse her determination and to instruct county officials to place relator’s name on the ballot. The issues this case presented for the Supreme Court's review were: (1) the meaning of “resident within this State,” as those words are used in Article V, section 2, of the Oregon Constitution; and (2) whether the secretary was required to conclude that relator met that legal standard. The Court concluded that “resident within,” when viewed against the legal context that surrounded the Oregon Constitution’s 1857 ratification, was best understood to refer to the legal concept of “domicile,” which required “the fact of a fixed habitation or abode in a particular place, and an intention to remain there permanently or indefinitely[.] Under that legal concept, a person can have only a single residence at a time." Further, the Court held the secretary was not required to conclude that relator was domiciled in Oregon between November 2019 and December 2020. Although relator challenged the constitutionality of the durational residency requirement in Article V, section 2, that question was not properly considered through a mandamus proceeding. The Court therefore dismissed the alternative writ and denied relator’s petition. View "Oregon ex rel Kristof v. Fagan" on Justia Law

At trial, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, each of which focused on whether documents plaintiff had received from a third party were admissible. Plaintiff argued that the documents qualified for the business records exception (Oregon Evidence Code, "OEC" 803(6)). Defendant disagreed, arguing that, in order for the documents to qualify for the exception, plaintiff had to present evidence, through a qualified witness, about the record-making practices of the businesses that had created the documents, and that plaintiff had failed to do so. The trial court agreed with plaintiff, ruling that, “as long as the documents [were] received, incorporated, and relied upon” by plaintiff, they were “admissible as business records.” Following that ruling, the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and entered a judgment in plaintiff’s favor. Defendant appealed the trial court’s judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. On defendant’s petition, the Oregon Supreme Court allowed review to address what evidence a party must present to establish that documents created by a third party qualified for the business records exception. The Supreme Court held that the party proffering the documents must present evidence of the third party’s record-making practices sufficient to establish, as required by the text of OEC 803(6), that the documents were made close in time to the acts they describe, by (or from information transmitted by) a person with knowledge, as part of a regularly conducted business activity, and pursuant to a regular record-making practice. Because plaintiff failed to present such evidence, the trial court erred in ruling that the documents at issue qualified for the exception. Because that error affected the trial court’s rulings on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and the trial court, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Arrowood Indemnity Co. v. Fasching" on Justia Law

Defendant Charles McCarthy moved to suppress evidence that law enforcement officers obtained during a warrantless search of a truck. Defendant had been driving the truck when officers stopped it for a traffic violation. During the stop, the officers developed probable cause to believe that the truck contained contraband. Although the stop occurred on a weekday afternoon near the county courthouse and the officers had mobile phones and a computer, the officers did not attempt to contact a magistrate to obtain a warrant to search the truck. Instead, they searched it without a warrant. At the time of the search, the truck was lawfully parked in a parking lot and defendant had been arrested. In his motion to suppress, defendant argued that the warrantless search was unconstitutional. The state argued the warrantless search of the truck was justified under the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement. The trial court rejected the state’s argument, reasoning that the automobile exception was premised on the existence of exigent circumstances, and the state had failed to prove that exigent circumstances existed at the time the officers searched the truck. The state appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that, under Oregon v. Brown, 721 P2d 1357 (1986), exigent circumstances were presumed to exist if a vehicle was mobile when it was stopped by the police, regardless of whether there was an actual exigency after that point. Applying Brown’s “ ‘per se exigency rule,’” the Court of Appeals held that all the state was required to show was that the truck was mobile at the time it was stopped by the officers and that the officers had probable cause to search it. The Oregon Supreme Court overruled Brown’s per se exigency rule and held that, in order to justify a warrantless seizure or search of a vehicle based on exigent circumstances, the state had to prove that exigent circumstances actually existed at the time of the seizure or search. Because the state did not do so here, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court correctly granted defendant’s motion to suppress. View "Oregon v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

The question in this case was whether the Secretary of State was required to count the signatures on an initiative petition of voters whose registration was deemed “inactive.” Plaintiffs were supporters of Initiative Petition 50 (2016) (IP 50) who sought to qualify that initiative for the 2016 ballot. After the secretary subtracted the signatures of voters with inactive registration, the petition did not have enough signatures to be placed on the ballot. Plaintiffs brought this action challenging the secretary’s exclusion of those signatures. Plaintiffs argued that voters with inactive registration could sign initiative petitions because, even if their registration was inactive, they were still registered, and therefore remain “qualified voters” within the meaning of Article IV, section 1. The secretary responded that those voters could not sign initiative petitions because voters with inactive registration were not “registered * * * in the manner provided by law,” and they therefore were not “qualified voters” within the meaning of Article IV, section 1. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded, like the secretary, that because voters whose registrations were inactive were not eligible to vote, they were not “qualified voters” within the meaning of Article IV, section 1. Accordingly, the Court held that their signatures on initiative petitions could not be counted, and that the secretary properly excluded them when determining the number of signatures submitted in support of IP 50. View "Whitehead v. Fagan" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case was whether taxpayer, Ooma, Inc., a California company, had sufficient contacts or nexus with Oregon to make it subject to local tax. The Oregon Tax Court concluded that Ooma’s contacts and nexus with Oregon were sufficient to satisfy the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, and granted summary judgment to the Department of Revenue. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Tax Court. View "Ooma, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law