Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Bruce Querbach sought to overturn a final order of the Oregon Department of Human Services (DHS) which determined that reports to DHS that petitioner had abused two children were “founded.” The circuit court, reviewing the order as an order in other than a contested case, assumed that the “reasonable cause to believe” standard in that rule was a “probable cause” standard. After holding a trial to develop the record for review, as required by Norden v. Water Resources Dept., 996 P2d 958 (2000), the circuit court concluded that only two of DHS’s four “founded” determinations could be sustained under that standard. On petitioner’s appeal and DHS’s cross-appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected the circuit court’s application of a “probable cause” standard and, instead employing the “reasonable suspicion” standard that it had used in an earlier, similar case, concluded that not just two, but three of DHS’s “founded” determinations had to be sustained. Appealing to the Oregon Supreme Court, petitioner argued that “probable cause” was the correct standard for determining that a report of abuse is founded and that none of DHS’s “founded” determinations hold up when the record on review was considered under that standard. Petitioner also argued that, given that the circuit court found that the DHS investigation and analysis into the reported abuse was incomplete and flawed in various respects, the “founded” determinations had to be set aside. The Supreme Court rejected those arguments and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that three of the four “founded” dispositions were supported by substantial evidence. View "Querbach v. Dept. of Human Services" on Justia Law

This case centered on the loss of use or function of claimant’s right knee, specifically, reduced range of motion and decreased stability in that knee, that was determined to be entirely related to causes other than claimant’s compensable workplace injury. In addition, claimant had loss of use or function of that same knee, surgical value and chronic condition loss, that was related to the workplace injury. In claimant’s view, she was entitled to the full measure of impairment for all new findings of loss: the reduced range of motion, the decreased stability, the surgical value, and the chronic condition. On judicial review, the Court of Appeals agreed with claimant, holding that “claimant’s impairment ‘as a whole’ included her whole-person impairment, of which the work injury is a material contributing cause, as well as her impairment due to loss of range of motion and stability.” SAIF disagreed and sought review from the Oregon Supreme Court, arguing that findings of loss due entirely to causes other than the compensable injury did not satisfy the statutory definition of “impairment” and, accordingly, should be excluded from an injured worker’s permanent partial disability award. The Supreme Court agreed with SAIF: claimant was not entitled to compensation for the reduced range of motion and decreased stability findings of loss. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the order of the Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. View "Robinette v. SAIF" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Oregon Supreme Court. The question related to the applicability of Oregon’s anti- discrimination laws to a private contractor that provided healthcare services within a jail. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against defendant, a private entity that contracted with the Clackamas County Jail to provide healthcare services to incarcerated persons, alleging that defendant had discriminated against him on the basis of disability, in violation of ORS 659A.142(4). The district court held that defendant was not a place of public accommodation, as defined by ORS 659A.400. The Ninth Circuit asked the Supreme Court to help it to resolve plaintiff’s appeal of the dismissal of his state law claim: “Is a private contractor providing healthcare services at a county jail a ‘place of public accommodation’ within the meaning of Oregon Revised Statutes § 659A.400 and subject to liability under § 659A.142?” The Supreme Court responded in the affirmative. View "Abraham v. Corizon Health, Inc." on Justia Law

Two groups of petitioners challenged the ballot title that the Oregon Attorney General certified for Initiative Petition 41 (2022) (IP 41). IP 41 would add a new section 16 to Article IX of the Oregon Constitution, which would specify that a “public body may not assess a toll” on any part of an Oregon “highway” unless approved by the voters of nearby counties. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that petitioners identified two ways in which the ballot title failed to substantially comply with the statutory requirements. Accordingly, the Court referred the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification. View "Salsgiver/Iannarone v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Defendant Lamar Stanton was charged with three counts of first-degree sexual abuse and two counts of first-degree sodomy. Because defendant was indigent, the trial court appointed counsel to represent him. Over the course of the trial court proceedings, defendant was represented by several different court-appointed lawyers. Defendant expressed frustration with his last-appointed counsel, Lee-Mandlin, and asked her to move to withdraw. Lee-Mandlin filed two motions to withdraw but told the trial court that she was prepared to represent defendant. The court denied the motions, and, after defendant was evaluated at the state hospital and the trial court determined that he was able to aid and assist in his defense, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. The trial court entered a judgment of conviction and sentence, and defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court had erred by proceeding as if defendant had waived his right to court-appointed counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. The Oregon Supreme Court found three motions had been presented with respect to defendant’s representation, and that the trial court should have addressed the three motions separately because they presented different legal questions. Because the trial court did not expressly address these questions, the Supreme Court surmised the trial court could not have concluded defendant expressly waived his right to court-appointed counsel. Consequently, in the context of the multiple pending motions, the trial court’s question to defendant about whether he wanted Lee-Mandlin to withdraw was too ambiguous for defendant’s answer to constitute an intentional relinquishment of his right to court-appointed counsel. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Stanton" on Justia Law

Defendant Jonathan Rusen challenged the trial court’s imposition of consecutive terms of incarceration upon revoking defendant’s probation. Defendant was serving the sentence of probation pursuant to a plea agreement and had stipulated that, if the court revoked his probation, the court could impose consecutive terms of incarceration as sanctions. Defendant had reserved the right, however, to argue that any probation revocation sanctions should be run concurrently. The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant’s challenge to the revocation sanction was reviewable and, on the merits, that the trial court lacked authority in this case to impose consecutive terms of incarceration following revocation of defendant’s probation. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the legislature did not intend ORS 138.105(9) to bar review of challenges to “part of a sentence” when the parties reserved the right to make competing arguments regarding what the court should decide with respect to that part of the sentence. Accordingly, defendant’s challenge to the court’s decision to impose consecutive terms of incarceration was reviewable. On the merits, the Supreme Court concluded that ORS 137.123(2) applied to initial sentencing and, therefore, was compatible with OAR 213-012-0040(2)(a), which applied when a court revokes probation. View "Oregon v. Rusen" on Justia Law

Two sets of electors who were dissatisfied with the Attorney General’s ballot title for Initiative Petition 34 (2022) (IP 34) petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for review. IP 34 was directed at changing Oregon’s process for reapportioning legislative and congressional districts after each decennial census. Both petitions argued the ballot title did not substantially comply with the requirements of ORS 250.035. The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with some of the arguments raised in the petitions and, therefore, referred the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification. View "Mason/Turrill v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

This case involved the State’s direct and interlocutory appeal of an omnibus pretrial order granting numerous defense motions to suppress evidence that the State obtained through wiretaps and search warrants. Defendant Langston Harris was charged with first-degree and second-degree murder, first-degree robbery, promoting prostitution, and other crimes. The murder charges arose from the death of RBH, who was shot outside of his apartment building in the early morning hours of September 20, 2017. The trial court ruled: (1) the wiretaps violated federal law because the applications did not indicate that the elected district attorney personally was even aware of the applications, and (2) roughly two dozen search warrants for cell phone data and social media accounts were invalid for multiple reasons, including that the warrants were overbroad and that, after excising from later warrant applications all information derived from the invalid earlier warrant(s), the State lacked probable cause to support the later warrants. After careful consideration of the trial court record, the Oregon Supreme Court concurred and affirmed those rulings of the trial court. View "Oregon v. Harris" on Justia Law

Defendant Mark Bartlett requested the City of Portland to release three city attorney opinions and one legal memorandum. The parties agreed that the documents were public records, were within the scope of the attorney-client privilege, and were more than 25 years old. The city declined to release the documents, arguing that they were exempt from the public records law because of the attorney-client privilege. The specific question presented for the Oregon Supreme Court’s consideration in this case was whether the four documents that were prepared more than 25 years ago by the Portland City Attorney for the mayor and two city commissioners and that were subject to the attorney-client privilege had to be disclosed under ORS 192.390. The Court concluded those documents had to be disclosed. View "City of Portland v. Bartlett" on Justia Law

During a single criminal episode, defendant Scott Kyger cut the necks of two people with a razor blade. For that conduct, the State charged him with, and he was convicted on two counts of attempted aggravated murder under ORS 163.095 (2015) and ORS 161.405 (2015). The question presented for the Oregon Supreme Court in this this case was whether the State charged a viable theory of attempted aggravated murder. Defendant contended that the existence of “more than one murder victim” was a circumstance that had to exist for a person to be guilty of aggravated murder; that it did not exist here because neither victim died; and that defendant’s intentional conduct did not amount to attempted aggravated murder because a person cannot “attempt” to commit a circumstance element of an offense. In defendant’s view, the allegations supported, at most, charges for attempted murder. The trial court and the Court of Appeals disagreed with defendant. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Kyger" on Justia Law