Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The state charged defendant Homer Lee Jackson, III with the murder of four victims, who were killed over the span of 10 years. DNA consistent with defendant’s was found at the scene of each crime. Before trial, the state moved to cross-admit the crime scene evidence, arguing that the evidence from all four crime scenes, including the DNA evidence, was relevant to each of the four charged crimes. In support of that argument, the state relied on the doctrine of chances. The trial court denied the state’s motion to cross-admit the crime scene evidence. The state petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for direct interlocutory review of the trial court’s order, contending that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence from the other three crime scenes from defendant’s trial for one of the murders. The state initially argued: (1) the doctrine of chances supplied a theory of relevance for the crime scene evidence concerning the presence of defendant’s DNA near the bodies of three other murdered women; and (2) that the doctrine did not depend on prohibited inferences about defendant’s bad character and resultant propensity to commit criminal acts. In accordance with the Oregon Evidence Code, the Supreme Court initially held that the doctrine of chances, standing alone, was insufficient to make the other crime scene evidence relevant to any charged crime. In supplemental briefing, the state alternatively argued that, even if the doctrine of chances did not by itself supply the basis for the relevance of the DNA crime scene evidence, that evidence nonetheless was relevant to facts in its case by articulating a chain of inferences, ending with “defendant was the killer in each murder.” Keeping the state’s articulated purpose and chain of reasoning for introducing the DNA evidence from all four crime scenes at the forefront and again applying requirements of the Oregon Evidence Code, the Supreme Court further held that the state, "stretching the doctrine of chances beyond its limits," failed to link its proposed use of the other crime scene evidence to the fact it wished to prove at trial in a way that did not rely on a prohibited “bad character” inference. Accordingly, the trial court’s order excluding the evidence was affirmed. View "Oregon v. Jackson" on Justia Law

In 1989, defendant Dayton Rogers was found guilty of multiple counts of aggravated murder in six consolidated cases and sentenced to death. In his initial appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed his convictions but reversed his death sentences and remanded for resentencing.The Court reversed sentences of death in this case and remanded for resentencing on two subsequent occasions, most recently in 2012. In his fourth penalty-phase trial, in 2015, defendant again received a sentence of death in each of the consolidated cases. Appeal to the Supreme Court was automatic. Finding that defendant’s death sentences were unconstitutional, the sentences were reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for resentencing. View "Oregon v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were landlords that rented property in the City of Portland. Plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment and injunction action against the city contending, as relevant here, that ORS 91.225 preempted an ordinance passed requiring landlords to pay relocation assistance to displaced tenants in certain circumstances. Plaintiffs argued the ordinance impermissibly created a private cause of action that a tenant could bring against a landlord that violates the ordinance. On review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded ORS 91.225 did not prevent municipalities from enacting other measures that could affect the amount of rent that a landlord charged or could discourage a landlord from raising its rents. The Court further held that ORS 91.225 did not preempt the city’s ordinance. The Supreme Court also rejected plaintiffs’ contention that the ordinance impermissibly created a private cause of action. View "Owen v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

Officers unlawfully seized defendant Kristi DeJong’s residence. Based, in part on information learned during the seizure, they obtained a warrant to search the residence where they discovered evidence of unlawful delivery of methamphetamine. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search, contending that it was inadmissible under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress that evidence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in Oregon v. Johnson, 73 P3d 282 (2003). In this case, the Court of Appeals concluded that defendant’s challenge failed at the first step announced in Johnson: that defendant failed to establish the requisite factual nexus between the unlawful seizure of her residence and the evidence the state discovered during the warranted search. On review, the Supreme Court disagreed with that conclusion and held that defendant established the necessary factual nexus. Further, the Supreme Court concluded the record in this case was legally insufficient to support a finding that the state met its burden at the second step of the Johnson analysis. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' and circuit court's judgments were reversed, and the matter remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. DeJong" on Justia Law

Two juvenile dependency cases were consolidated for the Oregon Supreme Court’s review because they presented the same issue on review: whether the juvenile court’s dependency judgments establishing jurisdiction and wardship over each of parents’ two children exceeded the scope of the court’s temporary emergency jurisdiction under ORS 109.751, one of the statutes in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act as enacted in Oregon. Before issuing its decision in “J.S.II,” the trial court became concerned that these cases might have become moot, because the juvenile court had terminated its jurisdiction and the wardships during the pendency of the appeal. Having considered the parties’ supplemental briefs, the Supreme Court conclude that these cases were not moot. And, for the reasons discussed in J. S. II, the Supreme Court held the juvenile court had authority under ORS 109.751 to issue dependency judgments making the children wards of the court and placing them in foster care, but that it did not have authority to order parents to engage in specified activities to regain custody of the children. View "Dept. of Human Services v. P. D." on Justia Law

Defendant David Bartol was sentenced to death for aggravated murder; review by the Oregon Supreme Court was direct and automatic. Defendant made numerous challenges to both his conviction and sentence. The Court rejected all but one challenge to his sentence, based on Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution, which prohibited disproportionate punishments. After defendant was convicted and sentenced, the legislature enacted Senate Bill 1013 (2019), which, among other things, reclassified the criminal conduct that had constituted “aggravated murder,” which could be punished by death, to “murder in the first degree,” which could not be punished by death. Given that determination, the Supreme Court concluded that, although the legislature did not make SB 1013 retroactive as to sentences imposed before its effective date, maintaining defendant’s death sentence would violate Article I, section 16. Therefore, the Court affirmed defendant’s conviction but reversed his death sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. View "Oregon v. Bartol" on Justia Law

After defendant Randall Kragt pled guilty to three counts of first-degree sodomy (Counts 1, 3, and 5), the trial court sentenced him: for Count 1, 60 months in prison; for Count 3, 100 months in prison, concurrent with Count 1; and, for Count 5, 100 months in prison, consecutive to Count 3. For all three counts, the court initially imposed a single post-prison supervision (PPS) term of 240 months, minus the time defendant served in prison. As a result, defendant was effectively sentenced to 200 months in prison and, assuming he served the full term, 40 additional months of PPS. After defendant was released from prison, the trial court amended the part of the judgment of conviction that had imposed a single PPS term. Defendant appealed, arguing the trial court had erred by amending the judgment without notice and a hearing. The Court of Appeals agreed with that argument and reversed. On remand, defendant argued that ORS 144.103(1) required the trial court to impose a single PPS term for all three counts, as the court had done initially, before amending the judgment. The trial court disagreed and entered a judgment that imposed three PPS terms: 180 months for Count 1, 140 months for Count 3, and 140 months for Count 5. Defendant appealed again, arguing that ORS 144.103(1) required a single term of PPS regardless of the number of counts. In a per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals rejected that argument, relying on its decisions in Norris v. Board of Parole, 238 P3d 994 (2010), rev den, 350 Or 130 (2011), and Delavega v. Board of Parole, 194 P3d 159 (2008). Defendant petitioned for review by the Oregon Supreme Court, which was allowed. The question presented was whether, when sentencing a person convicted of multiple qualifying sex offenses, ORS 144.103(1) requires a trial court to impose a separate term of PPS for each count or whether that statute, instead, requires the trial court to impose a single term of PPS that covers all counts. The Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court. As did the Court of Appeals, the circuit court's judgment was vacated based on a different sentencing issue than the one presented on review, and the matter remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals decision in Kragt II (467 P3d 830 (2020)). View "Oregon v. Kragt" on Justia Law

Rami Khalaf (“taxpayer”) was in the business of buying products for customers in the United Arab Emirates, primarily all-terrain vehicles (ATVs). He sought to claim certain business deductions on his 2013 income tax return. As relevant here, those included travel expenses that taxpayer had incurred on trips to the Emirates, and the cost of a dune buggy that taxpayer had purchased for use as a demonstration model. The Department of Revenue rejected those deductions. The Tax Court agreed with the department on those points, holding that the travel expenses were not deductible, because they were not sufficiently documented, and that the dune buggy was not deductible because it counted as inventory. Taxpayer appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Tax Court's judgment. View "Khalaf v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Two juvenile dependency cases raised an issue of the scope of a juvenile court’s temporary emergency jurisdiction under ORS 109.751, which was part of Oregon’s enactment of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). Parents were residents of Washington who were living temporarily at a motel in Oregon. The juvenile court asserted temporary emergency jurisdiction over their 15-month-old son after police, investigating the death of his infant brother, found him living in squalid and dangerous conditions in the motel room. The court later entered several dependency judgments concerning that child as well as another child later born to Parents in Washington. Parents challenged the juvenile court’s authority under ORS 109.751 or any other provision of the UCCJEA to issue dependency judgments making their two children wards of the court in Oregon. On Parents’ appeals, the Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court, holding that the juvenile court had properly exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction as to both children under ORS 109.751 and did not exceed its temporary emergency jurisdiction when it issued dependency judgments as to the children. Only mother filed a petition for review, which the Oregon Supreme Court allowed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court’s denial of mother’s motions to dismiss the dependency petitions, because the juvenile court had temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to enter dependency judgments as to the children. However, the juvenile court exceeded the scope of its temporary emergency jurisdiction, and therefore we vacate certain parts of the dependency judgments. As a result, the appellate court was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Dept. of Human Services v. J. S." on Justia Law

Consolidated cases presented a certified question from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The Oregon Supreme Court was asked to determine whether Oregon law precluded an insurer from limiting its liability for uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) benefits on the basis that another policy also covered the insured’s losses. Each plaintiff suffered injuries caused by an uninsured or underinsured motorist, and each plaintiff incurred resulting damages that qualify as covered losses under multiple motor vehicle insurance policies issued by defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm). Each plaintiff alleged a loss that exceeded the declared liability limits of any single applicable policy and sought to recover the excess under additional applicable policies, up to the combined total of the limits of liability. In each case, however, State Farm refused to cover the excess loss, citing a term in the policies that allowed State Farm to limit its liability to the amount that it agreed to pay under the single policy with the highest applicable limit of liability. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that that term made State Farm’s uninsured motorist coverage less favorable to its insureds than the model coverage that the legislature has required and, thus, was unenforceable. View "Batten v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co." on Justia Law