Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant David Bartol was sentenced to death for aggravated murder; review by the Oregon Supreme Court was direct and automatic. Defendant made numerous challenges to both his conviction and sentence. The Court rejected all but one challenge to his sentence, based on Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution, which prohibited disproportionate punishments. After defendant was convicted and sentenced, the legislature enacted Senate Bill 1013 (2019), which, among other things, reclassified the criminal conduct that had constituted “aggravated murder,” which could be punished by death, to “murder in the first degree,” which could not be punished by death. Given that determination, the Supreme Court concluded that, although the legislature did not make SB 1013 retroactive as to sentences imposed before its effective date, maintaining defendant’s death sentence would violate Article I, section 16. Therefore, the Court affirmed defendant’s conviction but reversed his death sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. View "Oregon v. Bartol" on Justia Law

After defendant Randall Kragt pled guilty to three counts of first-degree sodomy (Counts 1, 3, and 5), the trial court sentenced him: for Count 1, 60 months in prison; for Count 3, 100 months in prison, concurrent with Count 1; and, for Count 5, 100 months in prison, consecutive to Count 3. For all three counts, the court initially imposed a single post-prison supervision (PPS) term of 240 months, minus the time defendant served in prison. As a result, defendant was effectively sentenced to 200 months in prison and, assuming he served the full term, 40 additional months of PPS. After defendant was released from prison, the trial court amended the part of the judgment of conviction that had imposed a single PPS term. Defendant appealed, arguing the trial court had erred by amending the judgment without notice and a hearing. The Court of Appeals agreed with that argument and reversed. On remand, defendant argued that ORS 144.103(1) required the trial court to impose a single PPS term for all three counts, as the court had done initially, before amending the judgment. The trial court disagreed and entered a judgment that imposed three PPS terms: 180 months for Count 1, 140 months for Count 3, and 140 months for Count 5. Defendant appealed again, arguing that ORS 144.103(1) required a single term of PPS regardless of the number of counts. In a per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals rejected that argument, relying on its decisions in Norris v. Board of Parole, 238 P3d 994 (2010), rev den, 350 Or 130 (2011), and Delavega v. Board of Parole, 194 P3d 159 (2008). Defendant petitioned for review by the Oregon Supreme Court, which was allowed. The question presented was whether, when sentencing a person convicted of multiple qualifying sex offenses, ORS 144.103(1) requires a trial court to impose a separate term of PPS for each count or whether that statute, instead, requires the trial court to impose a single term of PPS that covers all counts. The Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court. As did the Court of Appeals, the circuit court's judgment was vacated based on a different sentencing issue than the one presented on review, and the matter remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals decision in Kragt II (467 P3d 830 (2020)). View "Oregon v. Kragt" on Justia Law

Rami Khalaf (“taxpayer”) was in the business of buying products for customers in the United Arab Emirates, primarily all-terrain vehicles (ATVs). He sought to claim certain business deductions on his 2013 income tax return. As relevant here, those included travel expenses that taxpayer had incurred on trips to the Emirates, and the cost of a dune buggy that taxpayer had purchased for use as a demonstration model. The Department of Revenue rejected those deductions. The Tax Court agreed with the department on those points, holding that the travel expenses were not deductible, because they were not sufficiently documented, and that the dune buggy was not deductible because it counted as inventory. Taxpayer appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Tax Court's judgment. View "Khalaf v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Two juvenile dependency cases raised an issue of the scope of a juvenile court’s temporary emergency jurisdiction under ORS 109.751, which was part of Oregon’s enactment of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). Parents were residents of Washington who were living temporarily at a motel in Oregon. The juvenile court asserted temporary emergency jurisdiction over their 15-month-old son after police, investigating the death of his infant brother, found him living in squalid and dangerous conditions in the motel room. The court later entered several dependency judgments concerning that child as well as another child later born to Parents in Washington. Parents challenged the juvenile court’s authority under ORS 109.751 or any other provision of the UCCJEA to issue dependency judgments making their two children wards of the court in Oregon. On Parents’ appeals, the Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court, holding that the juvenile court had properly exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction as to both children under ORS 109.751 and did not exceed its temporary emergency jurisdiction when it issued dependency judgments as to the children. Only mother filed a petition for review, which the Oregon Supreme Court allowed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court’s denial of mother’s motions to dismiss the dependency petitions, because the juvenile court had temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to enter dependency judgments as to the children. However, the juvenile court exceeded the scope of its temporary emergency jurisdiction, and therefore we vacate certain parts of the dependency judgments. As a result, the appellate court was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Dept. of Human Services v. J. S." on Justia Law

Consolidated cases presented a certified question from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The Oregon Supreme Court was asked to determine whether Oregon law precluded an insurer from limiting its liability for uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) benefits on the basis that another policy also covered the insured’s losses. Each plaintiff suffered injuries caused by an uninsured or underinsured motorist, and each plaintiff incurred resulting damages that qualify as covered losses under multiple motor vehicle insurance policies issued by defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm). Each plaintiff alleged a loss that exceeded the declared liability limits of any single applicable policy and sought to recover the excess under additional applicable policies, up to the combined total of the limits of liability. In each case, however, State Farm refused to cover the excess loss, citing a term in the policies that allowed State Farm to limit its liability to the amount that it agreed to pay under the single policy with the highest applicable limit of liability. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that that term made State Farm’s uninsured motorist coverage less favorable to its insureds than the model coverage that the legislature has required and, thus, was unenforceable. View "Batten v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case arose out of the explosion of a hydrogen generator at the campus of HP, Inc., which severely injured plaintiff William Cox. After Cox and his wife filed suit against HP in an Oregon court, HP brought a third-party claim against relator, TÜV Rheinland of North America, Inc (TÜV). HP alleged TÜV—a Delaware company that tests and certified products manufactured by others as conforming to established industry safety standards—had negligently certified the design of the generator at issue in this case. TÜV sought to dismiss HP’s claim against TÜV for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and TÜV sought an alternative writ of mandamus, which the Oregon Supreme Court allowed. There was no suggestion that TÜV had the kind of “continuous operations” within Oregon that were “so substantial and of such a nature” as to give rise to general personal jurisdiction. But there also was no dispute that TÜV had some contacts with Oregon that could support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over TÜV in some case. That posture focused the dispute in this case on the limits of what has been called the “relatedness” requirement of specific personal jurisdiction. The U.S. Supreme Court explored the requirement in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 141 S Ct 1017 (2021), ultimately concluding that Ford’s extensive activities in the forum states created a “relationship among the defendant, the forums, and the litigation” that was “close enough to support specific jurisdiction.” "The Oregon Court surmised the question in this case was whether there was a connection between TÜV’s Oregon activities and HP’s claim against TÜV that was sufficient to permit Oregon to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over TÜV. Under the specific facts of this case, the Oregon Court concluded Oregon lacked personal jurisdiction to resolve HP’s claim against TÜV. Accordingly, it issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss the claim against TÜV. View "Cox v. HP Inc." on Justia Law

The estate of Helene Evans, a deceased Oregon resident, challenged the Oregon Tax Court’s determination that the Department of Revenue lawfully included in Evans’s taxable Oregon estate the principal assets of a Montana trust, of which Evans had been the income beneficiary. Although Evans had a right to receive income generated by those assets during her lifetime and potentially had the right to tap the assets themselves, the estate claimed she had not owned, and did not have control over the assets. Under those circumstances, plaintiff argued, Oregon did not have the kind of connection to the trust assets that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution required for a state to impose a tax on a person, property, or transaction. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that Oregon’s imposition of its estate tax on the trust assets in this case comported with the requirements of due process. It, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the Tax Court. View "Estate of Evans v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Janae Sherman brought child abuse claims against the Oregon Department of Human Services (defendant), alleging that it had negligently failed to protect her from abuse while she was in foster care. Defendant moved to dismiss, claiming it was immune from liability under a provision of the Oregon Tort Claims Act, ORS 30.265(6)(d). Defendant argued that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the provisions of ORS 12.115, a statute of ultimate repose for negligent injury claims. The trial court agreed with defendant, rejecting plaintiff’s argument that ORS 12.117, and not ORS 12.115, applied to child abuse claims and did not bar plaintiff’s claims. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded ORS 12.117 applied to child abuse claims and that ORS 30.265(6)(d) did not provide defendant with immunity. View "Sherman v. Dept. of Human Services" on Justia Law

In the Oregon Supreme Court's first decision in this case (393 P3d 224 (2017) (Hightower I)), it determined the trial court had erred when it denied defendant’s midtrial request to dismiss counsel and represent himself based on a mistaken belief that it did not have the authority to grant such a request. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for “further proceedings.” On remand, the trial court did not order a new trial. The court instead stood by its prior denial of defendant’s midtrial request to self-represent because it stated that it would have reached the same conclusion - based on defendant’s trial disruptions - had it understood it had the discretion to do that. On appeal, defendant argued that the Supreme Court's decision to reverse and remand the initial case for “further proceedings,” without issuing specific limiting instructions, did not permit the trial court to simply provide an alternative explanation for its denial of the request for self-representation, without affording defendant a new trial. The Court of Appeals agreed that defendant was entitled to a new trial on remand and reversed. The State petitioned for review of that decision, and the Supreme Court allowed the petition. Because it agree with the Court of Appeals that defendant was entitled to a new trial on remand, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Hightower" on Justia Law

Taxpayer Level 3 Communications, LLC (Level 3) challenged the Oregon Tax Court’s determination of the real market value of its tangible and intangible property for the 2014-15, 2015-16, and 2016-17 tax years. Level 3 argued that the Tax Court held that the central assessment statutory scheme permitted taxation of the entire enterprise value of the company, contrary to the wording of applicable statutes that permit taxation only of a centrally assessed corporation’s property. According to Level 3, the Tax Court applied that erroneous holding to incorrectly accept the Department of Revenue’s (the department’s) valuations of Level 3’s property for the relevant tax years. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded Level 3 misconstrued the Tax Court’s decision, and the Tax Court did not err by accepting the department’s valuations. Accordingly, the Tax Court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Level 3 Communications, LLC v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law