Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In a workers’ compensation case, the issue presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review centered on the scope of an employer’s obligation under ORS 656.262(7)(c) to reopen a closed claim for processing if a “condition is found compensable after claim closure.” The closed claim at issue here was claimant Randy Simi's accepted right rotator cuff tear, and the conditions giving rise to the dispute were supraspinatus and infraspinatus tendon tears, which claimant asked employer to accept as “new or omitted” conditions. Employer issued a denial specifying that the conditions were not compensable, but, without withdrawing the denial, employer later took the position that the tendon tears were “encompassed” within the originally accepted rotator cuff tear. That change of position caused an administrative law judge (ALJ) to determine that the tendon conditions were compensable and to set aside employer’s denial. According to claimant, that ALJ order triggered employer’s obligation under ORS 656.262(7)(c) to reopen the claim. Employer contended, however, that the legislature did not require reopening if the compensable condition at issue was “encompassed within” the already-accepted conditions, even if the employer also had denied that the condition was compensable. A majority of the Workers’ Compensation Board and a majority of the Court of Appeals panel agreed with employer, and the Supreme Court allowed review to consider this disputed question of statutory interpretation. Based on its examination of the statutory text and context, the Supreme Court concluded the legislature intended employers to reopen compensable claims for processing when a compensability denial was set aside after claim closure, including under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' decision was reversed. View "Simi v. LTI Inc. - Lynden Inc." on Justia Law

In a shareholder derivative action, two issues were presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review: (1) whether the breach of fiduciary duty claims brought by shareholders-plaintiffs Joseph LaChapelle and James Field on behalf of Deep Photonics Corporation (DPC) against DPC directors Dong Kwan Kim, Roy Knoth, and Bruce Juhola (defendants) were properly tried to a jury, rather than to the court; and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying defendants’ motion, made during trial, to amend their answer to assert an affirmative defense against one of the claims in the complaint based on an “exculpation” provision in DPC’s certificate of incorporation. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded the case was properly tried to the jury and that the trial court did not err in denying defendants’ motion to assert the exculpation defense. Therefore the Court of Appeals and the limited judgment of the trial court were affirmed. View "Deep Photonics Corp. v. LaChapelle" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ronald Strasser, whose direct appeal of his conviction, was dismissed by the Court of Appeals as untimely filed, argued in a subsequent post-conviction proceeding that appellate counsel was constitutionally inadequate in failing to request leave to file a late notice of appeal within the applicable 90-day window (although counsel had only been appointed four days before that window closed). Thus petitioner contended he was entitled to a delayed direct appeal. Alternatively, petitioner argued that, insofar as the Court of Appeals had not acted on his request for appointment of appellate counsel until four days before the 90-day deadline for filing a request for late appeal, it had effectively failed to appoint appellate counsel and, therefore, the ordinary bar on bringing claims in a post-conviction proceeding that could have been raised on direct appeal was inapplicable. The post-conviction court rejected both arguments and denied post-conviction relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. On review, the Oregon Supreme Court agreed with the post-conviction court’s determination that appellate counsel was not constitutionally inadequate or ineffective in failing to meet the 90-day deadline in these circumstances. The Supreme Court concluded, however, that the post-conviction court’s determination that petitioner was barred from raising what could have been direct appeal claims in post-conviction was based on an incorrect assumption about the applicable statute, and that it erred in declining to consider those claims. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to the post-conviction court to consider and decide defendant’s claims of constitutional error by the trial court, without regard to the fact that they could have been raised in an appeal. View "Strasser v. Oregon" on Justia Law

Various parties petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for reconsideration of its decision in Allianz Global Risks v. ACE Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 483 P3d 1124 (2021). Petitioner on review Allianz Global Risks US Insurance Company and Allianz Underwriters Insurance Company (“Allianz”), together with respondent on review Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London and Certain London Market Insurance Companies (“London”), petitioned on two grounds: (1) that the court in one place in the opinion incorrectly characterized its earlier cases regarding the duties of an insurer to defend or indemnify its insured; and (2) that the court in several places incorrectly identified a particular entity as the “indemnitor” in several agreements discussed in the opinion. Respondent on review Con-Way filed a petition for reconsideration asserting that the court erred in holding that certain “side” agreements between Con-Way and three of its insurers were to be considered separately from the insurance policies that those companies issued to Con-Way’s subsidiary, Freightliner. The Supreme Court considered the arguments in Con-Way’s petition, and denied it: "The purpose of a rehearing is not to raise new questions or rehash old arguments, but to allow the court to correct mistakes and consider misapprehensions." As to the Allianz/London petition: the Court allowed that petition to make changes as noted. View "Allianz Global Risks v. ACE Property & Casualty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a passenger in a truck driven by Lorenz. The vehicles were traveling on an interstate when it began to hail and rain. A sedan ahead of the truck spun out of control and collided with the front of the truck. The passengers of the sedan required medical assistance; a third vehicle struck the back of the truck, pushing the truck into the sedan. Plaintiff was severely injured. Plaintiff filed a personal injury claim for damages, alleging the drivers of the vehicles, John Turner and Sherri Oliver, had been negligent and that the negligence of each had caused her injuries and damages. She also alleged that Turner and Oliver were underinsured and that, as a result, she was entitled to UIM benefits from her own insurance company, defendant Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance. Eventually, plaintiff settled with Turner and Oliver for a total of $175,000, and the case was dismissed as to them. This case was the second appeal in a dispute between Plaintiff and her insurance company over the limits of her Underinsured Motorist (UIM) coverage. Plaintiff’s policy included a limit of $500,000 for damages “resulting from any one automobile accident.” In the first trial in this case, the jury found that plaintiff’s injuries resulted in damages of $979,540. In the second trial, the jury found that plaintiff was injured, not in one, but in two, separate “accidents,” and that it could not “separate the cause” of plaintiff’s injuries between those two accidents. Consequently, the trial court awarded plaintiff the full measure of her damages, minus offsets. On appeal, the insurance company argued the trial court had erred in its instructions to the jury and should have required the jury to apportion plaintiff’s damages between the two accidents. The Court of Appeals agreed with the company and reversed. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded the trial correctly instructed the jury it could find, as a matter of fact, the number of accidents that occurred and whether the cause of plaintiff's injuries could be separated between them. View "Wright v. Turner" on Justia Law

The primary question this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court’s review was whether a defective waiver of a preliminary hearing deprived a circuit court of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals accordingly considered defendant’s unpreserved challenge to his waiver, found the waiver defective, and reversed his conviction. The Supreme Court allowed the state’s petition for review to consider whether a defective waiver of a preliminary hearing was a jurisdictional defect. The Court held that Huffman v. Alexander, 251 P2d 87 (1952) stood for a more limited proposition than defendant perceived, and that the state constitutional provision on which he relied did not establish that a defective waiver of a preliminary hearing deprived a circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court accordingly reversed the Court of Appeals decision and remanded this case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Keys" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the trial court erred by ruling that defendant Damon Naudain, a Black man, could not pursue a line of questioning on cross-examination that was intended to show that the witness was racially biased against Black people. Defendant sought to ask about the witness’s relationship with the victim, who was the witness’s fiancée at the time and with whom the witness had a child and shared a home. Specifically, defendant wanted to ask questions that touched on the victim’s racial prejudices and refusal to allow Black people in the home that the couple shared. The trial court granted the state’s motion in limine to prevent such questioning, ruling that information about the victim’s racial bias was not probative of the witness’s own bias and, to the extent it had any relevance, it was unfairly prejudicial and inadmissible under OEC 403. Defendant was convicted and appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in its ruling on the evidentiary issue because defendant’s proffered evidence of bias was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. Concurring with the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, and remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Naudain" on Justia Law

Petitioner Michael Evans raised a claim for inadequate assistance of counsel based on the performance of his appellate counsel, who had represented him in his direct appeal of multiple sexual-assault convictions. The post-conviction court denied that claim, concluding both that counsel had not acted unreasonably and that no evidence showed that petitioner had suffered any prejudice. Petitioner appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, but on different grounds than those at issue before the post-conviction court or raised by the parties in their briefing on appeal. The Oregon Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals, in effect, affirmed the post-conviction court’s judgment by invoking the “right for the wrong reason” principle. In Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. Oregon, 20 P3d 180 (2001), the Supreme Court explained that an appellate court may affirm a lower court based on that principle, but only if certain conditions are met. One condition was that, if the question was not purely one of law, then the record had to “materially be the same one that would have been developed had the prevailing party raised the alternative basis for affirmance below.” Perhaps even more significantly for the Supreme Court: neither party had any opportunity to develop an argument regarding the appropriateness of the evidentiary burden that the Court of Appeals described. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals decision and remanded to that court, to resolve the issue framed by the parties. View "Evans v. Nooth" on Justia Law

In January 2020, the Energy Facility Siting Council adopted permanent rules addressing the process for amending site certificates and other procedural aspects of the council’s work. Petitioners challenged three of the council’s new rules on two grounds, contending the rules exceeded the council’s statutory authority. According to petitioners, two of the rules improperly limited party participation in contested case proceedings, and the third rule improperly authorized the expansion of site certificate boundaries without a site certificate amendment. The council disputed those arguments. The Oregon Supreme Court concurred with petitioners’ arguments and declared the three rules at issue invalid. View "Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question of law to the Oregon Supreme Court concerning whether a statutory damages cap applied to an award of noneconomic damages in an unlawful employment practice action. Plaintiff Max Zweizig filed suit in the federal district court in Oregon, alleging that corporate defendants had retaliated against him and that defendant Timothy Rote had aided and abetted the corporations in violation of Oregon statutes. The jury found for plaintiff and awarded him $1,000,000 in noneconomic damages. Over plaintiff’s objection, the district court entered a judgment for only half that amount after applying the non- economic damages cap set out in ORS 31.710(1). Defendant appealed, and plaintiff cross-appealed, challenging the reduction of the noneconomic damage award. The Supreme Court determined the damages cap in ORS 31.710(1) did not apply to an award of noneconomic damages for an unlawful employment practice claim under ORS 659A.030 in which the plaintiff did not seek damages that arose out of bodily injury and instead sought damages for emotional injury. View "Zweizig v. Rote" on Justia Law