Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The defendant faced serious felony charges and underwent two trials, both ending in mistrials. The second mistrial occurred because a courtroom clerk mistakenly gave the jury an exhibit revealing the defendant's prior felony conviction, which had been excluded from the jury's consideration. The defendant moved to dismiss the charges with prejudice, arguing that a retrial was barred by the former jeopardy provision in the Oregon Constitution, as interpreted in State v. Kennedy. The trial court denied the motion, concluding it could not find "indifference" under the Kennedy test.The Multnomah County Circuit Court initially declared a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury. Months later, a juror contacted the defendant's counsel, revealing that the jury had seen an exhibit disclosing the defendant's prior conviction. The trial court then changed the basis for the mistrial to include the erroneous submission of the exhibit. After further hearings and testimony from jurors and the clerk's supervisor, the trial court found that the clerk had made an error but did not intentionally give the jury the exhibit knowing it disclosed the prior conviction. The court could not determine whether the clerk was indifferent or simply lacked the capacity to do her job.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that the record did not compel findings that the clerk knowingly engaged in improper and prejudicial conduct or acted with indifference to the consequences. The court emphasized that the Kennedy test requires a conscious choice of prejudicial action, which was not evident in this case. Therefore, the trial court was not compelled to dismiss the charges with prejudice, and a retrial was not barred under the Oregon Constitution. View "State v. Blackmon" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant charged with driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). At trial, the arresting officer testified about administering two field sobriety tests (FSTs) to the defendant: the walk-and-turn test and the one-leg-stand test. The officer described these tests as "standardized" and "designed to determine impairment," supported by studies proving their validity. The defendant did not object to this testimony, and the jury found her guilty of DUII.The defendant appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals, arguing that the officer's testimony constituted scientific evidence that was admitted without an adequate foundation, constituting plain error. The Court of Appeals agreed, concluding that the testimony was scientific evidence requiring a foundation under the standards set in State v. Brown and State v. O’Key. The court exercised its discretion to reverse the conviction, determining that the error was not harmless due to the persuasive effect of scientific evidence.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case to address the application of plain-error review. The court assumed, without deciding, that the admission of the officer's testimony was plain error. However, it concluded that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion by reversing the conviction based solely on the determination that the error was not harmless. The Supreme Court emphasized that reversing based on plain error requires considering multiple factors, including the gravity of the error and the ends of justice, rather than solely whether the error was harmless.The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals was instructed to consider the appropriate factors in exercising its discretion and, if necessary, address the defendant's remaining assignment of error. View "State v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

The defendant was prosecuted for attacking a woman who was jogging on a sidewalk. He tackled her from behind, knocked her out, and dragged her into a ditch. The victim fought back, and the defendant fled. He was charged with attempted first-degree sexual abuse, among other crimes. The state lacked direct evidence of his intent to sexually assault the victim, so it introduced evidence of sexually explicit notes the defendant had previously written to two other women, expressing a desire to forcibly sexually assault them. The trial court admitted these notes under OEC 404(3) to prove intent, and the defendant was convicted on all charges.The Court of Appeals initially held that the notes were inadmissible under OEC 404(3) because their relevance depended on a character-based propensity inference. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine if the notes were admissible under OEC 404(4), which allows for the admission of other acts evidence if relevant, subject to OEC 403 balancing. On remand, the trial court admitted the notes under OEC 404(4) and found that their probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, later ruled that the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting the notes under OEC 403.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court's decision to admit the notes under OEC 403 was within the permissible range of discretion. The court found that the notes were highly probative of the defendant's intent and that the trial court had taken steps to mitigate any unfair prejudice. The court declined to address the defendant's due process argument because it was not preserved at the trial court level. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of multiple crimes after forcibly entering the victim’s apartment at night, moving her from the entryway to a bedroom and then to a bathroom, where he strangled, sodomized, and assaulted her. The defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove the "asportation" element of first-degree kidnapping, which requires moving the victim "from one place to another." He also contended that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for the kidnapping and sodomy convictions.The Marion County Circuit Court denied the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping charge, finding that the movement within the apartment was not incidental to the other crimes. The court found the defendant guilty of all charges and imposed consecutive sentences for the kidnapping and sodomy convictions. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the movement increased the victim’s isolation and was not merely incidental to the other crimes.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant moved the victim to a qualitatively different place within the apartment, increasing her isolation and limiting her freedom of movement. The court also held that the movement was not incidental to the other crimes, as it was a distinct step in a series of events. Regarding the consecutive sentences, the court found that the sodomy was not merely incidental to the kidnapping but indicated the defendant’s willingness to commit more than one offense, as the crimes were distinct in nature, conduct, and timing. View "State v. Soto" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was charged with third-degree sexual abuse for making sexual contact with a woman studying alone at a community college library. The state presented "other acts" evidence, which included security video footage showing the defendant engaging in a similar course of conduct with another woman in the library just before the incident with the victim. The defendant argued that this evidence was inadmissible as it relied on character-based reasoning. However, the trial court admitted the evidence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, arguing that the video footage was character evidence and thus inadmissible under the Oregon Evidence Code (OEC) 404(3). The state countered that the footage was relevant to show the defendant's state of mind and course of conduct at the time of the incident, and did not rely on impermissible character reasoning.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. The court concluded that the video footage, when considered with the victim's testimony, was admissible to establish that the defendant had engaged in an unusual pattern of behavior consistent with a person seeking an opportunity to make sexual contact with a woman studying alone in the library. This fact was relevant to inferring that the defendant committed the charged act and did so intentionally. The court held that this inference did not depend on impermissible character reasoning. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The case involves Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Company (Santa Fe), a New Mexico corporation that sells branded tobacco products to wholesalers, who then sell to retailers in Oregon. The primary issue is whether a federal statutory limit on a state’s ability to impose income tax on out-of-state corporations, 15 USC section 381, precludes Oregon from taxing Santa Fe because its business in Oregon is limited. The Oregon Department of Revenue concluded that Santa Fe’s various actions in Oregon had taken it outside the safe harbor of Section 381, thus rendering Santa Fe liable to pay Oregon tax. The Tax Court agreed with the department that Santa Fe’s actions had made it subject to taxation in this state.The Tax Court agreed with the Oregon Department of Revenue that Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Company's actions in Oregon had made it subject to taxation in the state. The court found that Santa Fe's representatives had exceeded the scope of "solicitation of orders" when they obtained "prebook orders" from Oregon retailers. These orders, bolstered by incentive agreements with wholesalers, facilitated sales on behalf of wholesalers, who were effectively committed to accept those sales. This activity went beyond the protections of Section 381(a)(2), which limits a state's ability to impose income tax on out-of-state corporations whose in-state activities are limited to the solicitation of orders.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon affirmed the judgment of the Tax Court. The court concluded that Santa Fe's pursuit of prebook orders in Oregon, invoking incentive agreement contractual provisions used by Santa Fe to ensure that wholesalers treated each one of those orders favorably, exceeded the scope of permitted "solicitation of orders" under Section 381(a)(2). The court further agreed that Santa Fe's activities were not de minimis. Accordingly, Santa Fe was subject to Oregon income tax. View "Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co. v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

The case involves a criminal defendant, Tasi Autele, who was indicted on charges of second-degree assault and strangulation. Autele retained attorneys Mackeson and Hall to represent him. However, on the day of the trial, the court granted defense counsel's request to postpone the trial to investigate photographs that had been anonymously delivered to Hall's office. On the next scheduled trial date, the trial court granted defense counsel's request to withdraw due to an ethical conflict that would likely arise from the prosecutor's plan to cross-examine Autele about those photographs. Nine days later, the same attorneys appeared and asked to be allowed to represent Autele, but the trial court denied the request due to its concerns about a continuing ethical issue.The Court of Appeals affirmed Autele's conviction, concluding that the record was insufficient to determine whether the trial court had abused its discretion in denying Autele's request to be represented by his retained counsel. The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that when a trial court denies a criminal defendant's request to be represented by retained counsel of their choice, the record must demonstrate that the trial court's decision was a permissible exercise of its discretion. The court found that the record in this case did not reflect that the trial court's decision amounted to a reasonable exercise of its discretion. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. View "State v. Autele" on Justia Law

This case involves the interpretation of Oregon's "guilty except for insanity" (GEI) defense. The defendant, Erik John Meiser, was charged with multiple crimes, including aggravated murder and burglary. He did not dispute committing the acts but raised a GEI defense, arguing that due to his schizophrenia, he lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law. The trial court found him guilty of murder and second-degree burglary, rejecting his GEI defense for these charges.On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that to prove the GEI defense, a defendant must show that their lack of capacity resulted solely from a mental disease or defect. If the lack of capacity resulted from a combination of a mental disease or defect and a personality disorder, the defendant could not prove the GEI defense. The Supreme Court of Oregon disagreed, holding that the GEI defense applies if a defendant proves that they lacked the requisite capacity as a "consequence" or "effect" of their mental disease or defect. The lack of capacity need not be solely attributable to the mental disease or defect; a "set of conditions" can combine to result in the lack of capacity. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "State v. Meiser" on Justia Law

The case involves a review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 54 (2024) (IP 54), which was challenged by the petitioners, Sandy Chung and Yvonne Garcia. IP 54, also known as the "Oregon Crimefighting Act," proposes significant changes to the pretrial release system for individuals charged with felonies and Class A misdemeanors in Oregon. The Act also empowers local governments to pass ordinances to fight local crime and requires the state to pay for jail space for those charged with felonies and Class A misdemeanors who need to be held until trial.The Attorney General prepared a draft ballot title for IP 54 and, after considering public comments, modified the draft and certified the final ballot title. The petitioners, who had submitted comments on the draft, challenged the certified ballot title, arguing that the summary did not comply with the requirements set out in ORS 250.035(2)(d).The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the ballot title to determine whether it substantially complied with the requirements. The court agreed with the petitioners that the summary was deficient. It found that the summary did not adequately convey the breadth of the changes that IP 54 would effectuate, particularly in relation to pretrial release decisions at arraignment. The court concluded that the summary must be modified to clarify that IP 54 would override existing law and to provide a more accurate description of the changes that IP 54 would make to the current law governing pretrial release at arraignment. The court referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Chung v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

The case involves the State of Oregon and Stephen Andrew Aranda. Aranda was charged with first-degree rape and chose to testify in his own defense. The state sought to impeach his testimony with evidence of his prior felony convictions, including two counts of first-degree sexual abuse and one count of second-degree assault. Aranda argued that the court should weigh the probative value of his conviction history against its potential for unfair prejudice before admitting it as evidence. The trial court denied his motion, and Aranda was subsequently convicted.On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with Aranda's argument and reversed his conviction, holding that due process required the trial court to conduct a balancing test before admitting his prior convictions as impeachment evidence. The state appealed to the Supreme Court of Oregon.The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. The court held that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that due process required a balancing test before admitting a defendant's prior convictions as impeachment evidence. The court found that neither historical practice nor principles of fundamental fairness required such a balancing test. The court noted that while the admission of prior convictions could be prejudicial, it was also highly relevant to a defendant's credibility as a witness. The court concluded that due process did not require a balancing test under Oregon Evidence Code 403 before admitting a defendant's prior convictions as impeachment evidence under Oregon Evidence Code 609. View "State v. Aranda" on Justia Law