Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Oregon Supreme Court in this matter was whether defendant Michael Dilallo's conviction should be reversed in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S Ct 1390 (2020), which held that only a unanimous jury can find a defendant guilty of a serious crime. Defendant was charged with delivery of methamphetamine and conspiracy to commit delivery of methamphetamine. He entered a plea of not guilty. Both charges were tried to a twelve-person jury in 2018, before the Ramos decision. At trial, consistent with Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, the jury was instructed that it could convict him without reaching unanimity. Defendant did not object to that jury instruction, and the record did not reveal whether the jury’s guilty verdicts were unanimous. Defendant argued that, although he did not preserve an objection to the erroneous jury instruction, the Oregon Supreme Court should exercise its discretion to review the trial court's error. Because of the absence of a jury poll, the Oregon Court concluded it was not appropriate to consider defendant’s unpreserved assignment of error; therefore defendant’s judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "Oregon v. Dilallo" on Justia Law

The issue before the Oregon Supreme Court in this matter was whether defendant Isidro Flores Ramos' conviction should be reversed in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S Ct 1390 (2020), which held that only a unanimous jury can find a defendant guilty of a serious crime. Defendant broke into a home and sexually assaulted a nine-year-old girl. Defendant was charged with first-degree unlawful sexual penetration, first-degree sexual abuse, attempted first-degree rape, first-degree burglary, and coercion. Before trial, he filed a motion requesting that the jury be instructed that it needed to be unanimous to convict. The trial court denied that motion. The jury returned guilty verdicts on each of the five counts. The trial court polled the jury; the poll indicated the jury had reached a unanimous guilty verdict on all counts except for the attempted first-degree rape count. On that count, only ten jurors voted to convict. Defendant did not object to the manner in which the trial court polled the jury, and defense counsel indicated that he was satisfied by the poll. Defendant appealed. As relevant here, he assigned error to both the use of the nonunanimous jury instruction and the receipt of the nonunanimous verdict—assignments of error that he had preserved in the trial court. He argued that those errors required reversal of all his convictions. In a decision before the federal Supreme Court's Ramos decision, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. Because the jury returned four unanimous verdicts, the Oregon Supreme Court determined those convictions could stand; however, pursuant to Ramos, the fifth, nonunanimous conviction was reversed. View "Oregon v. Flores Ramos" on Justia Law

The appeal before the Oregon Supreme Court in this case was an attorney fee dispute arising out of an administrative rules challenge. Petitioners successfully challenged rules adopted by the Energy Facility Siting Council that amended the process for reviewing requests for amendment (RFAs) to site certificates. Petitioners sought $299,325.64 in attorney fees under ORS 183.497. The council asked the Supreme Court the court to award no fees. After review, the Supreme Court awarded petitioners $31,633 in attorney fees. "In the end, the most relevant statutory factor here in resolving the parties’ dispute is '[t]he time and labor required in the proceeding, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved in the proceeding and the skill needed to properly perform the legal services.' . . . it does require attorney time and effort to defeat even meritless arguments, like the council’s argument on this issue. Having carefully reviewed petitioners’ filing, and based on other fee petitions recently filed in this court and our experience with appellate briefing and argument as judges and lawyers, we conclude that it is reasonable to compensate petitioners for 70 hours of work for briefing the claim on judicial review and preparing a fee petition for work on that claim." View "Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun." on Justia Law

Defendant Gerardo Morales was indicted on various sex crime charges and, after the trial court set bail, defendant’s mother paid $20,000 as security for defendant’s release prior to trial. The notice defendant’s mother signed when depositing the security funds on defendant’s behalf stated that “[t]he Court may order that the security deposit be applied to any fines, costs, assessments, restitution, contribution, recoupment, or other monetary obligations that are imposed on the defendant.” Defendant was represented by court-appointed counsel at trial, after which the jury found defendant guilty of several sex offenses. Following those convictions, the State requested that defendant be required to pay attorney fees for his court-appointed counsel. Defendant objected on the ground that the court could not find that he had the ability to pay attorney fees. The State argued that when a third party makes a security deposit on behalf of a criminal defendant, that third party was informed that fees or fines might be paid out of that deposit. For that reason, the State argued, those funds were available to pay court-ordered fees and the defendant therefore had the “ability to pay” such fees out of the security amount. The court found defendant did not have the ability to pay, but nevertheless imposed $5,000 in attorney fees and ordered it to be paid out of the money deposited by defendant’s mother as security for his pretrial release. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court held that because the trial court determined defendant did not have the ability to pay, it erred in imposing the fees on the basis of the third party's security payment alone. View "Oregon v. Morales" on Justia Law

Defendant Micus Ward was convicted of aggravated and felony murder. After being arrested for that crime, and before being appointed counsel, defendant was twice interrogated while in custody. The trial court suppressed the statements that defendant made during the first interrogation, because the court determined that officers conducting that interrogation continued to question defendant after he invoked his right to remain silent. But the trial court refused to suppress defendant’s statements from the second interrogation, because it determined that the officers who conducted that interrogation obtained a valid waiver of defendant’s Article I, section 12, rights. The trial court thus suppressed statements that defendant made during the first interrogation but not those he made during the second interrogation. A jury found defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. On review, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded the State failed to prove that defendant validly waived his rights before the second interrogation. Accordingly, the Court concluded the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress, and further concluded the error required a reversal of defendant’s conviction and a remand for a new trial. View "Oregon v. Ward" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two young Oregonians, concerned about the effects of climate change and their guardians, filed suit against the Governor and the State of Oregon (collectively, the State), contending the State was required to act as a trustee under the public trust doctrine to protect various natural resources in Oregon from substantial impairment due to greenhouse gas emissions and resultant climate change and ocean acidification. Among other things, plaintiffs asked the circuit court to specify the natural resources protected by the public trust doctrine and to declare that the State had a fiduciary duty, which it breached, to prevent substantial impairment of those resources caused by emissions of greenhouse gases. Plaintiffs also asked for an injunction ordering the State to: (1) prepare an annual accounting of Oregon’s carbon dioxide emissions; and (2) implement a carbon reduction plan protecting the natural resources, which the court would supervise to ensure enforcement. The circuit court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, concluding the public trust doctrine did not encompass most of the natural resources that plaintiffs identified, and did not require the State to take the protective measures that plaintiffs sought. In 2015, the circuit court entered a general judgment dismissing the action, and the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded for the circuit court to enter a judgment, consistent the Court of Appeals opinion, declaring the parties’ rights. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that as a matter of common law, the public trust doctrine was not fixed and, that it must evolve to address the undisputed circumstances presented, namely, that climate change was damaging Oregon’s natural resources. They argued the doctrine was not limited to the natural resources that the circuit court identified and, the doctrine should cover other natural resources beyond those that have been traditionally protected. The Oregon Supreme Court held the public trust doctrine currently encompassed navigable waters and the submerged and submersible lands underlying those waters. "Although the public trust is capable of expanding to include more natural resources, we do not extend the doctrine to encompass other natural resources at this time." The Supreme Court also declined to adopt plaintiffs’ position that, under the doctrine, the State had the same fiduciary duties that a trustee of a common-law private trust would have, such as a duty to prevent substantial impairment of trust resources. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, which vacated the judgment of the circuit court. The matter was remanded the circuit court to enter a judgment consistent with Supreme Court's judgment. View "Chernaik v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Albany & Eastern Railroad Company (AERC) petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for reconsideration of its decision in Albany & Eastern Railroad Co. v. Martell, 469 P3d 748 (2020). In the previous case, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of defendants, holding that the trial court correctly concluded that defendants established a prescriptive easement over plaintiff AERC’s land. By that decision, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. In its petition for reconsideration, plaintiff did not challenge the resolution of the prescriptive easement issue. Instead, plaintiff argued the Supreme Court erred in affirming the judgment of the trial court, rather than remanding the case to the Court of Appeals to consider a separate issue: the trial court’s award of attorney fees to defendants under ORS 20.080(2). Plaintiff had argued to the Court of Appeals that, even if defendants successfully asserted a prescriptive easement counterclaim, the trial court had no authority to award attorney fees to defendants. According to plaintiff, a prescriptive easement was an equitable remedy that fell outside of ORS 20.080. Defendants filed a response, arguing that the trial court was correct in its award of attorney fees. They also filed petitions for attorney fees and costs and disbursements. Plaintiff objected to the request for attorney fees, arguing that the issue of defendants’ entitlement to fees had not yet been resolved and, alternatively, that defendants’ claimed fees were unreasonable. The Supreme Court agreed with plaintiff that the matter of attorney fees should have been remanded to the Court of Appeals following its disposition on the merits. Accordingly, plaintiff’s petition for reconsideration was granted, and the disposition in the earlier case modified. Defendants' petition for fees was denied. View "Albany & Eastern Railroad Co. v. Martell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case had submitted Initiative Petition 2016-005 (IP 5) to the Oregon Secretary of State so that it could be certified in time for the 2016 ballot. Section (1) of IP 5 provided that the people “call for an Article V Convention by enacting into law this Application, in accordance with Article V of the U.S. Constitution,” for purposes of considering whether to amend the United States Constitution to allow greater regulation of corporations and other artificial legal entities and greater regulation of money used for political purposes. Section (2) added that the call for such a convention was continuing and did not terminate by the passage of time. Section (3) provided for copies of the call to be sent to various persons. And section (4) stated that the call “shall be codified in Title 17 of Oregon Revised Statutes.” In this case, the Secretary refused to certify IP 5 on the ground that it failed to meet the procedural requirements established by the Oregon Constitution. Specifically, the Secretary explained that she “ha[d] been advised that a court review of [IP 5] would probably determine that it does not propose a law within the meaning of Article IV, section 1 of the Oregon Constitution and therefore may not legally be adopted through the initiative process.” Plaintiffs then filed this action in circuit court. Among other things, they sought a declaratory judgment that the Secretary was required to certify IP 5. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded the Oregon voters who adopted the initiative power did not intend that power to extend beyond state lawmaking, and that Article IV, section 1(2)(a) did not authorize the people to directly apply for a federal constitutional convention. View "Harisay v. Clarno" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ernie Perez pled guilty in 2005 to two aggravated murders that he had committed at the age of fourteen. In 2016, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief raising constitutional claims premised on the Oregon Supreme Court’s interpretation of ORS 419C.349, a statute governing when a juvenile defendant could be waived into adult court, in Oregon v. J. C. N.-V., 380 P3d 248 (2016). The post-conviction court concluded that petitioner’s claims were barred by the claim preclusion rule in ORS 138.550(3) because petitioner could reasonably have raised those claims in an earlier petition that he had filed in 2008. For similar reasons, the post-conviction court held that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations set out in ORS 138.510(3). The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Oregon Supreme Court granted certiorari review to address petitioner's argument that his claims could not reasonably have been raised prior to J. C. N.-V., thereby allowing him to escape the statute of limitations in ORS 138.510(3). The Supreme Court determined petitioner’s claims were indeed barred by ORS 138.550(3) because he failed to show that he could not reasonably have raised those claims at the time of his 2008 petition. The Court therefore affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the post-conviction court. View "Perez v. Cain" on Justia Law

Respondent Eric Nisley was elected to the office of Wasco County District Attorney and began serving a four-year term in January 2017. After respondent’s election, the Oregon State Bar charged him with several violations of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct. The Oregon Supreme Court ultimately reviewed the case against respondent, concluded that he had committed some of the charged violations, and imposed the sanction of a 60-day suspension from the practice of law, beginning February 2020. The Supreme Court agreed to exercise its original jurisdiction in the nature of quo warranto to determine whether respondent was the lawful holder of that office. The dispute turned on whether the 60-day suspension from the practice of law caused respondent to “cease[ ] to possess” a qualification for holding office—thus creating a vacancy in the public office—as contemplated by ORS 236.010(1)(g). The Supreme Court concluded respondent’s brief suspension from the practice of law did not render the office of Wasco County District Attorney vacant. View "Oregon ex rel Rosenblum v. Nisley" on Justia Law