Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Oregon Supreme Court in this matter was whether defendant Peter Ciraulo's conviction should be reversed in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S Ct 1390 (2020), which held that only a unanimous jury can find a defendant guilty of a serious crime. Defendant was charged with first-degree forgery, possession of a forged instrument, and third-degree theft. Defendant was tried before a twelve-person jury, in a trial that occurred before the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos. Before trial, defendant requested that the jury be instructed that it needed to be unanimous in order to return a conviction. The trial court denied defendant’s request, stating: “[U]ntil the Court of Appeals tells me otherwise, I’ll continue to comply with the law that requires the ten-person verdict in felony cases.” After deliberation, the jury found defendant guilty of all three counts. After receiving the verdict form, the trial court asked the presiding juror whether the jury’s decision had been unanimous, and the presiding juror confirmed that it had been. The trial court asked defendant whether there was any need to poll the jury further, and defense counsel responded that there was not. To the Oregon Supreme Court, defendant argued that Ramos required his convictions be reversed: (1) the nonunanimous jury instruction was a structural error, which always required reversal; and (2) even if the error is subject to a harmlessness analysis, the poll of the jury is insufficient to establish that the jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court concluded that, although the jury instruction permitting nonunanimous verdicts was erroneous, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to all of the verdicts in this case. Judgment was affirmed. View "Oregon v. Ciraulo" on Justia Law

The issue before the Oregon Supreme Court in this matter was whether defendant Zackery Chorney-Phillips' conviction should be reversed in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S Ct 1390 (2020), which held that only a unanimous jury can find a defendant guilty of a serious crime. Defendant was charged with first- and second-degree custodial interference and was found guilty on both counts by a twelve-person jury. At trial, which occurred before the Supreme Court’s Ramos decision, the court instructed the jury that “[t]en or more jurors must agree on your verdict,” and defendant did not object to that jury instruction. After the jury returned its verdict, on a form that contained no indication of how individual jurors voted, the trial court polled the jury at defendant’s request. All jurors indicated they concurred with the verdict. For purposes of sentencing, the court merged the jury’s two guilty verdicts into one conviction for first-degree custodial interference, and then entered judgment. Defendant appealed, arguing the nonunanimous jury instruction was a structural error, which always required reversal. In addition, defendant argued the erroneous instruction required reversal under the federal harmless error standard because the poll of the jury was insufficient to establish the jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State did not dispute the instruction was given in error, but it argued the error was harmless because each of defendant’s convictions was based on a unanimous verdict. The State also argued defendant’s acceptance of the jury poll prevented him from challenging the adequacy of the jury poll on appeal. The Oregon Supreme Court ultimately determined it was not appropriate to exercise its discretion to review defendant's unpreserved assignment of error as plain error; judgment was therefore affirmed. View "Oregon v. Chorney-Phillips" on Justia Law

The issue before the Oregon Supreme Court in this matter was whether defendant Charles Kincheloe's conviction should be reversed in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S Ct 1390 (2020), which held that only a unanimous jury can find a defendant guilty of a serious crime. Defendant was charged with several offenses, including first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, and fourth-degree assault. Defendant’s case was tried to a twelve-person jury in 2018, prior to Ramos. While formulating jury instructions, the trial court asked defendant whether he wished to object to the instruction that the jury could return a nonunanimous verdict, stating, “All the defense attorneys are doing that now.” Defense counsel responded, “That’s fine.” There was no further discussion of the issue. The jury was instructed that “10 or more jurors must agree on the verdict.” The jury found defendant guilty as charged. Defendant requested that the trial court poll the jury. The poll revealed that the jury had unanimously convicted defendant of the sodomy and assault charges but that it had divided eleven to one on the rape count. Defendant appealed, assigning error to the nonunanimous jury instruction and to the receipt of the nonunanimous verdict. Defendant conceded that he had not preserved that assignment of error, and he asked the Court of Appeals to conduct plain error review. In his briefing to the Oregon Supreme Court, defendant argued that his exchange with the trial court was sufficient to preserve an objection to the nonunanimous jury instruction. The state conceded that defendant’s single conviction based on a nonunanimous verdict had to be reversed, but it argued the instructional error was harmless with respect to the two convictions based on unanimous verdicts. Even assuming that defendant preserved an objection to the jury instruction, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that error was harmless as to the two convictions based on unanimous verdicts. Defendant's convictions were therefore affirmed without the Court addressing whether defendant adequately preserved an objection to the nonunanimous jury instruction. View "Oregon v. Kincheloe" on Justia Law

The issue before the Oregon Supreme Court in this matter was whether defendant Michael Dilallo's conviction should be reversed in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S Ct 1390 (2020), which held that only a unanimous jury can find a defendant guilty of a serious crime. Defendant was charged with delivery of methamphetamine and conspiracy to commit delivery of methamphetamine. He entered a plea of not guilty. Both charges were tried to a twelve-person jury in 2018, before the Ramos decision. At trial, consistent with Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, the jury was instructed that it could convict him without reaching unanimity. Defendant did not object to that jury instruction, and the record did not reveal whether the jury’s guilty verdicts were unanimous. Defendant argued that, although he did not preserve an objection to the erroneous jury instruction, the Oregon Supreme Court should exercise its discretion to review the trial court's error. Because of the absence of a jury poll, the Oregon Court concluded it was not appropriate to consider defendant’s unpreserved assignment of error; therefore defendant’s judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "Oregon v. Dilallo" on Justia Law

The issue before the Oregon Supreme Court in this matter was whether defendant Isidro Flores Ramos' conviction should be reversed in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S Ct 1390 (2020), which held that only a unanimous jury can find a defendant guilty of a serious crime. Defendant broke into a home and sexually assaulted a nine-year-old girl. Defendant was charged with first-degree unlawful sexual penetration, first-degree sexual abuse, attempted first-degree rape, first-degree burglary, and coercion. Before trial, he filed a motion requesting that the jury be instructed that it needed to be unanimous to convict. The trial court denied that motion. The jury returned guilty verdicts on each of the five counts. The trial court polled the jury; the poll indicated the jury had reached a unanimous guilty verdict on all counts except for the attempted first-degree rape count. On that count, only ten jurors voted to convict. Defendant did not object to the manner in which the trial court polled the jury, and defense counsel indicated that he was satisfied by the poll. Defendant appealed. As relevant here, he assigned error to both the use of the nonunanimous jury instruction and the receipt of the nonunanimous verdict—assignments of error that he had preserved in the trial court. He argued that those errors required reversal of all his convictions. In a decision before the federal Supreme Court's Ramos decision, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. Because the jury returned four unanimous verdicts, the Oregon Supreme Court determined those convictions could stand; however, pursuant to Ramos, the fifth, nonunanimous conviction was reversed. View "Oregon v. Flores Ramos" on Justia Law

The appeal before the Oregon Supreme Court in this case was an attorney fee dispute arising out of an administrative rules challenge. Petitioners successfully challenged rules adopted by the Energy Facility Siting Council that amended the process for reviewing requests for amendment (RFAs) to site certificates. Petitioners sought $299,325.64 in attorney fees under ORS 183.497. The council asked the Supreme Court the court to award no fees. After review, the Supreme Court awarded petitioners $31,633 in attorney fees. "In the end, the most relevant statutory factor here in resolving the parties’ dispute is '[t]he time and labor required in the proceeding, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved in the proceeding and the skill needed to properly perform the legal services.' . . . it does require attorney time and effort to defeat even meritless arguments, like the council’s argument on this issue. Having carefully reviewed petitioners’ filing, and based on other fee petitions recently filed in this court and our experience with appellate briefing and argument as judges and lawyers, we conclude that it is reasonable to compensate petitioners for 70 hours of work for briefing the claim on judicial review and preparing a fee petition for work on that claim." View "Friends of Columbia Gorge v. Energy Fac. Siting Coun." on Justia Law

Defendant Gerardo Morales was indicted on various sex crime charges and, after the trial court set bail, defendant’s mother paid $20,000 as security for defendant’s release prior to trial. The notice defendant’s mother signed when depositing the security funds on defendant’s behalf stated that “[t]he Court may order that the security deposit be applied to any fines, costs, assessments, restitution, contribution, recoupment, or other monetary obligations that are imposed on the defendant.” Defendant was represented by court-appointed counsel at trial, after which the jury found defendant guilty of several sex offenses. Following those convictions, the State requested that defendant be required to pay attorney fees for his court-appointed counsel. Defendant objected on the ground that the court could not find that he had the ability to pay attorney fees. The State argued that when a third party makes a security deposit on behalf of a criminal defendant, that third party was informed that fees or fines might be paid out of that deposit. For that reason, the State argued, those funds were available to pay court-ordered fees and the defendant therefore had the “ability to pay” such fees out of the security amount. The court found defendant did not have the ability to pay, but nevertheless imposed $5,000 in attorney fees and ordered it to be paid out of the money deposited by defendant’s mother as security for his pretrial release. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court held that because the trial court determined defendant did not have the ability to pay, it erred in imposing the fees on the basis of the third party's security payment alone. View "Oregon v. Morales" on Justia Law

Defendant Micus Ward was convicted of aggravated and felony murder. After being arrested for that crime, and before being appointed counsel, defendant was twice interrogated while in custody. The trial court suppressed the statements that defendant made during the first interrogation, because the court determined that officers conducting that interrogation continued to question defendant after he invoked his right to remain silent. But the trial court refused to suppress defendant’s statements from the second interrogation, because it determined that the officers who conducted that interrogation obtained a valid waiver of defendant’s Article I, section 12, rights. The trial court thus suppressed statements that defendant made during the first interrogation but not those he made during the second interrogation. A jury found defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. On review, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded the State failed to prove that defendant validly waived his rights before the second interrogation. Accordingly, the Court concluded the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress, and further concluded the error required a reversal of defendant’s conviction and a remand for a new trial. View "Oregon v. Ward" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two young Oregonians, concerned about the effects of climate change and their guardians, filed suit against the Governor and the State of Oregon (collectively, the State), contending the State was required to act as a trustee under the public trust doctrine to protect various natural resources in Oregon from substantial impairment due to greenhouse gas emissions and resultant climate change and ocean acidification. Among other things, plaintiffs asked the circuit court to specify the natural resources protected by the public trust doctrine and to declare that the State had a fiduciary duty, which it breached, to prevent substantial impairment of those resources caused by emissions of greenhouse gases. Plaintiffs also asked for an injunction ordering the State to: (1) prepare an annual accounting of Oregon’s carbon dioxide emissions; and (2) implement a carbon reduction plan protecting the natural resources, which the court would supervise to ensure enforcement. The circuit court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, concluding the public trust doctrine did not encompass most of the natural resources that plaintiffs identified, and did not require the State to take the protective measures that plaintiffs sought. In 2015, the circuit court entered a general judgment dismissing the action, and the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded for the circuit court to enter a judgment, consistent the Court of Appeals opinion, declaring the parties’ rights. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that as a matter of common law, the public trust doctrine was not fixed and, that it must evolve to address the undisputed circumstances presented, namely, that climate change was damaging Oregon’s natural resources. They argued the doctrine was not limited to the natural resources that the circuit court identified and, the doctrine should cover other natural resources beyond those that have been traditionally protected. The Oregon Supreme Court held the public trust doctrine currently encompassed navigable waters and the submerged and submersible lands underlying those waters. "Although the public trust is capable of expanding to include more natural resources, we do not extend the doctrine to encompass other natural resources at this time." The Supreme Court also declined to adopt plaintiffs’ position that, under the doctrine, the State had the same fiduciary duties that a trustee of a common-law private trust would have, such as a duty to prevent substantial impairment of trust resources. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, which vacated the judgment of the circuit court. The matter was remanded the circuit court to enter a judgment consistent with Supreme Court's judgment. View "Chernaik v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Albany & Eastern Railroad Company (AERC) petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for reconsideration of its decision in Albany & Eastern Railroad Co. v. Martell, 469 P3d 748 (2020). In the previous case, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of defendants, holding that the trial court correctly concluded that defendants established a prescriptive easement over plaintiff AERC’s land. By that decision, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. In its petition for reconsideration, plaintiff did not challenge the resolution of the prescriptive easement issue. Instead, plaintiff argued the Supreme Court erred in affirming the judgment of the trial court, rather than remanding the case to the Court of Appeals to consider a separate issue: the trial court’s award of attorney fees to defendants under ORS 20.080(2). Plaintiff had argued to the Court of Appeals that, even if defendants successfully asserted a prescriptive easement counterclaim, the trial court had no authority to award attorney fees to defendants. According to plaintiff, a prescriptive easement was an equitable remedy that fell outside of ORS 20.080. Defendants filed a response, arguing that the trial court was correct in its award of attorney fees. They also filed petitions for attorney fees and costs and disbursements. Plaintiff objected to the request for attorney fees, arguing that the issue of defendants’ entitlement to fees had not yet been resolved and, alternatively, that defendants’ claimed fees were unreasonable. The Supreme Court agreed with plaintiff that the matter of attorney fees should have been remanded to the Court of Appeals following its disposition on the merits. Accordingly, plaintiff’s petition for reconsideration was granted, and the disposition in the earlier case modified. Defendants' petition for fees was denied. View "Albany & Eastern Railroad Co. v. Martell" on Justia Law