Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In Senate Bill (SB) 226 (2019), enacted as Oregon Laws 2019, chapter 545, sections 1 to 5, the Oregon Legislature sought to retroactively cure defects in a 2016 local election in which voters approved disincorporating the City of Damascus. Anticipating controversy as to the validity and effectiveness of SB 226 in curing the problem with the election, the legislature included a provision for direct and expedited review by the Oregon Supreme Court upon a timely petition filed by any person who was “interested in or affected or aggrieved” by the statute. Petitioners, who included at least one person who was “interested in or affected or aggrieved,” challenged SB 226 on various statutory and constitutional grounds in a timely filed petition. Having considered their arguments and the state’s responses, the Supreme Court concluded SB 226 was valid, and that it accomplished what the legislature intended, giving effect to the 2016 vote by the city’s residents to disincorporate. View "City of Damascus v. Oregon" on Justia Law

While defendant Francis Weaver was awaiting trial for murder, the state entered into a plea agreement with one of his codefendants, Michael Orren - a potential witness in defendant’s case. The plea agreement required Orren, if called by defendant as a witness, to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination and not to testify on defendant’s behalf. If Orren complied with the agreement, the state would seek a life sentence with the possibility of parole after 30 years. However, if Orren testified for defendant, even truthfully, the state could seek a death sentence or a sentence of life without parole - two sentencing options that were otherwise taken off the table by Orren’s plea agreement. Defendant attempted to call Orren as a witness, and Orren invoked privilege. Defendant sought to at least place Orren’s plea agreement before the jury, but the trial court ruled that he could not. The jury found defendant guilty of murder and other crimes, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal, defendant argued the state's conduct interfered with his right to call witnesses under Article I, section 11, and the Sixth Amendment. To this, the Oregon Supreme Court concurred, finding defendant's right to compulsory process was violated. Defendant's convictions were reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Weaver" on Justia Law

Defendant Austin Haltom was convicted of second-degree sexual abuse, defined in ORS 163.425(1)(a). In Oregon v. Simonov, 368 P3d 11 (2016), in the context of analyzing ORS 164.135(1)(a), the statute criminalized using a vehicle “without consent of the owner;” the Oregon Supreme Court held that the “without consent” element of that offense was part of the “essential character” of the conduct that the statute proscribed, and therefore had to be treated as a “conduct” element for purposes of determining the minimum mental state that attaches to the element when the statute fails to specify a mental state. Relying on the fact that general provisions in the Criminal Code appear to contemplate at least a knowing mental state for any “conduct” element of a crime, the Supreme Court held that the state was required to prove that a defendant charged under ORS 164.135(1)(a) knew that the vehicle’s owner had not consented to its use at the relevant time. The Court rejected the state’s argument that the “without consent” element was a “circumstance” element to which a minimum mental state of “criminal negligence” would attach. In Haltom's case, he contended that the "does not consent" element in ORS 163.425(1)(a) played a similar role to that of the “without consent” element in the unauthorized use of a vehicle statute at issue in Simonov, and that, insofar as ORS 163.425(1)(a) did not specify a mental state that attaches to the “does not consent” element, both the analysis and ultimate conclusion in Simonov applied and established that “knowingly” was the minimum mental state that attached to the “does not consent” element. Thus, he argued that, to convict him under ORS 163.425(1)(a), the state was required to prove that he had engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim knowing that she did not consent and that the trial court therefore erred when it denied his request for an instruction to that effect and entered a judgment of conviction based on a jury finding that he had merely been reckless with respect to the victim’s consent.After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred and that the judgment of the trial court, and the Court of Appeals decision affirming that judgment, had to be reversed. View "Oregon v. Haltom" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Gene Summerfield, worked for defendant Oregon Liquor Control Commission (OLCC), in its warehouse. In his complaint plaintiff alleged that he and other African-Americans had been subjected to racial discrimination and racial harassment at the warehouse. Plaintiff also alleged that he had repeatedly told defendant about the discrimination and harassment, but defendant had failed to take effective corrective action. Plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim for acute stress. The claim was accepted, and plaintiff received treatment. Plaintiff’s treatment provider eventually released plaintiff to return to work, and plaintiff requested reemployment. The jury rejected plaintiff’s first claim; on the verdict form, it answered the questions finding that defendant had not “intentionally discriminate[d] against plaintiff because of his race” and had not “subject[ed] plaintiff to a racially hostile work environment by his co-workers.” The jury also rejected plaintiff’s retaliation claim, finding that defendant had not “retaliate[d] against [plaintiff] for opposing or reporting racial dis- crimination or racial harassment.” But the jury accepted plaintiff’s whistleblowing claim, finding that defendant had “take[n] adverse enforcement [sic] action against plaintiff because he in good faith reported information that he believed was a violation of a law, rule or other regulation.” Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Oregon Supreme Court determined the trial court did not err in granting defendant a directed verdict on plaintiff’s reemployment claim; plaintiff bore the burden of proving that defendant had available and suitable employment for him and plaintiff conceded that he had not done so. The Supreme Court also concluded that, although the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the meaning of “adverse employment action” for the purposes of plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the error was harmless because there was no dispute that the actions plaintiff relied on to support his retaliation claim were adverse employment actions and the jury actually found that defendant had committed an adverse employment action. Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff has not established that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court abused its discretion in declining to award plaintiff equitable relief. View "Summerfield v. OLCC" on Justia Law

The Oregon legislature made various changes to the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) by enacting amendments set out in SB 1049, Or Laws 2019, ch 355. Petitioners were PERS members challenging two of those amendments: (1) the redirection of a member's PERS contributions from the member’s individual account program to a newly created employee pension stability account, used to help fund the defined-benefit component of the member’s retirement plan; and (2) a cap on the salary used to calculate a member's benefits. Petitioners primarily argued the amendments impaired their contractual rights and therefore violated the state Contract Clause, Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution. Respondents were the state, the Public Employees Retirement Board (the board), and various state and local public employers. The Oregon Supreme Court disagreed with petitioners' contentions, finding challenged amendments did not operate retrospectively to decrease the retirement benefits attributable to work that the member performed before the effective date of the amendments. And, although the amendments operated prospectively to change the offer for future retirement benefits, the preamendment statutes did not include a promise that the retirement benefits would not be changed prospectively. The Supreme Court resolved petitioners’ other claims on similar grounds and denied their requests for relief. View "James v. Oregon" on Justia Law

Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the residents of a small neighborhood (or their predecessors) who since 1942, used a railroad crossing on a private roadway to access their homes, had established a prescriptive easement over the crossing. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the residents could not take advantage of the “presumption of adversity” long recognized by the Oregon Supreme Court because their use of the crossing was not likely to put the landowner on notice of the adverse nature of the use. The Supreme Court concluded that the presumption of adversity applied to the residents’ claims and that no evidence rebutted that presumption. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "Albany & Eastern Railroad Co. v. Martell" on Justia Law

After claimant Danny Arvidson received an award of permanent total disability, insurer Liberty Northwest Insurance Corporation requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) to review the award. The ALJ dismissed insurer’s hearing request as time-barred. The question on review before the Oregon Supreme Court was whether that dismissal entitled claimant to attorney fees under ORS 656.382(2), which provided that, if an insurer initiates review of a compensation award and the reviewing body “finds that ... all or part of the compensation awarded ... should not be reduced or disallowed,” the insurer shall pay the claimant’s attorney a “reasonable attorney fee.” The ALJ determined that the statute applied to the dismissal of insurer’s claim and awarded fees to claimant. The Workers’ Compensation Board reached a different conclusion and reversed that decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, finding the ALJ correctly determined that his dismissal of insurer’s request for hearing entitled claimant to attorney fees. The board erred in concluding otherwise. View "Arvidson v. Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

The dispute in this case arose from an Environmental Quality Commission order, which concluded that petitioners were persons “controlling” an inactive landfill site and imposed liability on them for failing to per- form the statutory closure requirements. At issue here was whether the legislature intended that the category of persons “controlling” the landfill site would extend to those having the legal authority to control the site, as the commission concluded, or would be limited to “those persons actively involved in the operation or management of a landfill site,” as the Court of Appeals concluded. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded the legislature intended the category of persons “controlling” the site to include persons having the authority to control the site, regardless of whether that authority has been exercised. The matter was remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider petitioners’ remaining challenges to the order in light of the correct legal standard. View "Kinzua Resources v. DEQ" on Justia Law

Plaintiff had the right-of-way and was walking across a crosswalk in downtown Portland when defendant’s garbage truck struck him. By the time the truck stopped, plaintiff’s leg was under the truck and attached to his body by a one-inch piece of skin. Plaintiff was fully conscious and alert, and he experienced tremendous pain. Plaintiff had surgery to amputate his leg just above the knee. In this personal injury action, the issue presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review centered on the constitutionality of a statutory cap on the damages that a plaintiff may recover for injuries resulting from a breach of a common-law duty. Here, plaintiff brought a personal injury claim for damages against defendant, a private entity, and, pursuant to ORS 31.710(1), the trial court reduced the noneconomic damages that the jury awarded — $10,500,000 — to the maximum amount permitted by statute — $500,000. The Court of Appeals held that, as applied to plaintiff, the cap violated the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution and reversed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reversed the decision of the circuit court. View "Busch v. McInnis Waste Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review centered on a final order of the Oregon State Board of Nursing (the board) and the meaning of the term “time limitations” in ORS 183.645(1). That statute required the chief administrative law judge (ALJ) to assign a different ALJ to a contested case on written request from a party, subject to applicable “time limitations” that the chief ALJ has established by rule for submitting such requests. The chief ALJ established OAR 471-060-0005, under which the chief ALJ evaluated the timeliness of a request by determining whether a party had a “reasonable opportunity” to make an earlier request. Licensee Rebecca Pulito challenged a preliminary decision of the chief ALJ that denied her request for a different ALJ. In that decision, the chief ALJ determined that licensee had failed to take advantage of a “reasonable opportunity” to make an earlier request. The contested case proceeded on the merits, and the board issued a final order revoking licensee’s nursing license. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. Licensee then petitioned the Oregon Supreme court for review. Licensee argued OAR 471-060-0005 was invalid because it did not impose a “time limitation” as authorized by ORS 183.645(1). Alternatively, she contended the chief ALJ erred in applying OAR 471-060-0005 because her request for a different ALJ was made within a reasonable time. The Supreme Court concluded OAR 471-060-0005 was invalid as written and that the error in denying licensee’s request for a different ALJ required reversal. Because that ruling was dispositive, the Supreme Court did not reach licensee’s alternative argument that the chief ALJ erred in applying the rule. The final order was reversed and the matter remanded for a new hearing. View "Pulito v. Board of Nursing" on Justia Law