Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2019, the state charged defendant Michael Wolfe with aggravated murder as that crime was then defined. Later in 2019, the legislature passed Senate Bill (SB) 1013, narrowing the definition of aggravated murder, and amending the statute governing death penalty sentences. The State filed an amended indictment charging defendant with aggravated murder as redefined by SB 1013. Defendant sought dismissal of the aggravated murder charge based on the ex post facto clauses of the Oregon and United States Constitutions. The trial court granted defendant’s motion, and the State filed a direct, interlocutory appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred; reversed the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

At Tax Court, the parties disagreed about what types of equipment fall within the definition of "logging equipment" exempt from ad valorem property taxation under ORS 307.27. Specifically, they disagreed about what types of equipment used for logging road work - logging road construction, maintenance, reconstruction, improvement, closure, or obliteration - fell within the definition. Plaintiff Bert Brundige, LLC argued that all types of equipment used for logging road work fell within the definition. Defendant, the Oregon Department of Revenue, argued that excavators were the only type of equipment used for logging road work that fell within the definition. The Tax Court agreed with defendant and entered a judgment in its favor. Plaintiff appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bert Brundige, LLC v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

The Speaker of the Oregon House of Representatives, and the President of the Oregon State Senate, on behalf of the Oregon Legislative Assembly, informed the Oregon Supreme Court that the federal government would not meet its statutory deadline to produce federal decennial census data and, therefore, that neither the Legislative Assembly nor the Oregon Secretary of State (Secretary) would be able to meet the deadlines for decennial reapportionment of state legislative districts set out in Article IV, section 6, of the Oregon Constitution. Relators asked the Supreme Court to exercise its authority under Article VII (Amended), section 2, of the Oregon Constitution and issue a writ of mandamus requiring the Secretary to fulfill her constitutionally specified duties, and to do so on dates ordered by the court. Relators served their petition for writ of mandamus on the Secretary, and she appeared in opposition. The Court elected to exercise that authority to compel compliance with Article IV, section 6, according to a revised schedule set out in an appendix to its opinion in this case. The Court thus issued a peremptory writ to direct the Secretary to abide by that schedule. View "Oregon ex rel Kotek v. Fagan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff submitted a motion for a new trial to the trial court on the last permissible day for filing such a document. The clerk rejected the filing for failure to pay the filing fee. Plaintiff corrected that deficiency the next day, immediately upon notification of the problem, and requested that the filing relate back to the original submission date under Uniform Trial Court Rule (UTCR) 21.080(5). The trial court, the Appellate Commissioner, and the Court of Appeals determined plaintiff’s motion was untimely, each on a different basis. After its review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded plaintiff’s motion for a new trial was timely under UTCR 21.080(5). It therefore reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Otnes v. PCC Structurals, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kyle Walker persuaded a jury that her public employer had wrongfully discharged her from her at-will position for blowing the whistle on what she reasonably believed to be her employer’s violations of law. The trial court had denied her employer’s motions for a directed verdict, and the court entered a judgment that awarded her damages on that claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, notwithstanding the jury verdict in her favor, plaintiff’s action had not served an important public policy. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, finding the appellate court incorrectly concluded that the threshold issue, whether plaintiff had identified an important public policy that permitted her to assert the tort of wrongful discharge, depended on whether she had reasonably believed that her employer had violated the law; instead, the Court found that threshold issue properly turned on sources of law that support the asserted public policy and whether those sources of law were tied to the acts by plaintiff that led her employer to discharge her. The Supreme Court further concluded that whether plaintiff had a reasonable belief that her employer had violated the law - the disputed element of whistleblowing on appeal - was a question of fact for the factfinder and that the record contained evidence that supported the jury’s finding. View "Walker v. Oregon Travel Information Council" on Justia Law

Daimler-Benz AG acquired Freightliner Corporation (Freightliner) from Consolidated Freightways (now Con-Way) in 1981. As part of the transaction, it liquidated Freightliner’s assets and liabilities into a subsidiary, Daimler Trucks North America LLC (Daimler). Between 1952 and 1982, Freightliner and then Daimler had engaged in business activities, primarily the manufacture of trucks, that subsequently led to several environmental remediation proceedings, including claims related to the Portland Harbor Superfund cleanup, and to some 1,500 asbestos personal injury claims. Plaintiffs Allianz Global Risk US Insurance and Allianz Underwriters Insurance Company (Allianz) insured Freightliner in 1981 and Daimler from 1981 to 1986 through a general commercial liability insurance policy. Daimler also purchased from Allianz another policy to provide coverage for future claims that might be made against Freightliner based on its past operations that were “incurred but not yet reported.” By the time it filed the operative complaint in this action in 2014, Allianz had spent more than $24 million defending and paying environmental and asbestos claims against Daimler and the now-dissolved Freightliner arising from Freightliner’s business operations between 1952 and 1982. In this litigation, Allianz sought contribution for the payments it has made and will make in the future based on those environmental and asbestos claims from insurance companies that insured Freightliner -- either directly or through its parent, Con-Way -- from 1976 to 1982. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' holding that Daimler did not assume the contingent liabilities of Freightliner (including the liabilities at issue here) and affirmed the jury verdict on that issue. On Allianz's appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred in submitting to the jury the question of whether, because of side agreements between Con-Way/Freightliner and the insurers, those insurers had a "duty to defend or indemnify Freightliner" -- that question was to be decided by the trial court as a matter of law based on the relevant policies. As to the "London pollution exclusion", the Supreme Court agreed with Allianz that it was error for the trial court not to provide a legal interpretation of a key provision in the policy as part of the jury instructions. The Court also concluded that the jury instructions regarding the London pollution exclusion should be similar to those regarding the Domestic exclusion. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. The limited judgments of the trial court were affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Allianz Global Risks v. ACE Property & Casualty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant Talon Ramoz was charged with two counts of first-degree rape and two counts of first-degree unlawful sexual penetration. When it came time to instruct the jury on those charges, defendant and the state both requested instructions that they expected would correspond to those set out in the Uniform Criminal Jury Instructions. The final jury instructions did not, however, correspond with those instructions; instead, the instructions omitted, in the list of elements the state was required to prove, the mens rea elements — that defendant had acted knowingly. Defendant was found guilty on all counts but moved for a new trial under ORCP 64 B(1), alleging that the omission in the instructions was an “[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court” that prevented him from having a fair trial. The trial court granted defendant’s motion, and the state appealed. In a divided, en banc decision, the Court of Appeals reversed. Finding no reversible error, the Oregon Supreme Court concurred and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Oregon v. Ramoz" on Justia Law

Defendant Justin Link committed aggravated murder as a juvenile in 2001. He was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment, which, as defined by statute at the relevant time, required him to serve “a minimum of 30 years without possibility of parole.” After serving that minimum term of confinement, defendant could petition to convert his sentence to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. In this case, defendant argued the statute under which he was sentenced violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals agreed. The Oregon Supreme Court allowed the state’s petition for review, and reversed, finding defendant did not establish that the statutory scheme applicable here denied him a meaningful opportunity for release. "Therefore, the sentence that defendant received is not the functional equivalent of life without parole. It follows that defendant has failed to establish that Miller’s individualized-sentencing requirement applies to a sentence of 'life imprisonment' under ORS 163.105(1)(c) (2001)." The circuit court's order was affirmed. View "Oregon v. Link" on Justia Law

Defendant Alex Aguirre-Rodriguez pleaded guilty to several crimes that resulted in damage to the victim’s truck. After the state presented evidence of a repair bill paid by the victim’s insurer, the trial court ordered defendant to pay restitution for the full amount of that bill, pursuant to ORS 137.106. Defendant appealed, arguing that the restitution award was not supported by sufficient evidence to prove that the amount charged had been reasonable. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant and reversed. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded the state presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the amount that the victim’s insurer paid for repairs was reasonable. The trial court therefore did not err in entering the restitution award. View "Oregon v. Aguirre-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The Oregon Supreme Court allowed review in this criminal case to consider whether the trial court correctly allowed the state to impeach defendant’s testimony with evidence that defendant previously had been convicted of second-degree assault. Defendant Frank Phillips was originally convicted on that crime in 1994, as well as other, more serious crimes arising out of an incident in 1993. In 2007, while still serving his prison sentence for the 1994 convictions, defendant successfully challenged those convictions through a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court vacated all of defendant’s 1994 convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, at which point the Department of Corrections released him from confinement. On retrial, in 2008, defendant again was convicted of second-degree assault, for which he was sentenced to a period of 36 months’ incarceration. But defendant was acquitted on retrial of the more serious charges that had been the basis for his lengthy original prison sentence. As a result, the judgment of conviction following retrial specified that defendant’s 36-month sentence for the second-degree assault “is served,” and the Department of Corrections issued a certificate specifying that defendant had an “Adjusted Calculated Release Date” of May 1996. In this case, defendant was charged with assault and strangulation arising out of an altercation with a neighbor. At the start of defendant’s trial, he advised the court that he planned to testify, and he urged the court to rule that evidence of his prior second-degree assault conviction would not be admissible under OEC 609. Defendant argued the operative date of his prior conviction was 1994, and that the operative date of his release from confinement for that conviction was 1996, meaning that the conviction should have been excluded because both dates fell outside of the OEC 609(3)(a) window of admissibility. The trial court disagreed and ruled that the state could offer evidence of the conviction as impeachment. The Court of Appeals concluded the date of defendant’s conviction on retrial supplied “the date of the conviction” for purposes of OEC 609’s 15-year window of admissibility and, accordingly, that the trial court correctly allowed evidence of that conviction to impeach defendant’s testimony. The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and affirmed. View "Oregon v. Phillips" on Justia Law