Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves Carlos Alberto Quebrado, who was charged as an accomplice to second-degree assault and unlawful use of a weapon. The charges stemmed from an incident where Quebrado's co-defendant fired a shotgun from the passenger window of the car Quebrado was driving, hitting a passenger in another car. Prior to trial, the co-defendant entered a plea deal with the state in return for her testimony against Quebrado. However, the state did not call her as a witness during the trial, instead introducing several of her statements through other witnesses. Quebrado's defense counsel filed a motion for a mistrial, arguing that the state's failure to call the co-defendant as a witness violated Quebrado's confrontation rights under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution.The trial court denied the motion, ruling that no confrontation violation had occurred. Quebrado was subsequently convicted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, reasoning that Quebrado's motion had been untimely and therefore not preserved as error on appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that Quebrado's motion for a mistrial was timely and therefore preserved the issue for appeal. The court reasoned that a confrontation challenge under Article I, section 11, is not the direct equivalent to a challenge to the admission of evidence. Instead, it looks to the co-occurrence of two events at trial: the state’s introduction of hearsay statements, and the state’s failure to call the declarant without a showing that the declarant is unavailable. The court concluded that the practical purposes of preservation were served by defendant’s objection at the close of the state’s case, rather than at the time when the hearsay statements were admitted. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration. View "State v. Quebrado" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the ballot title for Legislative Referral 403 (2024) (LR 403), which was referred for voters' consideration at the upcoming November 2024 General Election. The petitioner, James Sasinowski, challenged all parts of the ballot title, asserting non-compliance with requirements set out in ORS 250.035(2). LR 403 would amend ORS chapter 254 to require "ranked choice voting" for certain elections and would permit local governments to adopt ranked-choice voting in their elections.The ballot title for LR 403 was prepared by a joint legislative committee and filed with the Secretary of State. The petitioner challenged all parts of the ballot title, arguing that the word "majority" was used inaccurately and without proper context. He contended that "majority of votes" suggests that a candidate has received the majority of total votes cast, but in operation, ranked-choice voting can produce a winner who does not receive that type of "majority" vote.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon agreed with the petitioner in part. The court found that the caption of the ballot title for LR 403 did not reasonably identify the subject matter of the measure and required modification. The court also agreed that the "yes" result statement in the ballot title for LR 403 did not substantially comply with ORS 250.035(2)(b) and required modification. However, the court disagreed with the petitioner that the "no" result statement and the summary in the ballot title for LR 403 required modification. The court concluded that the caption and "yes" result statement in the joint legislative committee’s ballot title for LR 403 required modification and referred the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification. View "Sasinowski v. Legislative Assembly" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was found guilty of driving under the influence of intoxicants. After his conviction, the defendant fled the state, delaying his sentencing and the entry of a judgment of conviction for over ten years. Upon his return to Oregon, the trial court imposed a sentence and entered a judgment of conviction, which the defendant appealed. The defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to caution the jury that a defendant’s decision not to testify cannot be considered evidence of guilt.The Court of Appeals dismissed the defendant's appeal based on the "former fugitive doctrine," which presumes that an appellate court has inherent authority to dismiss a criminal defendant’s direct appeal if the defendant was formerly a fugitive from justice and the flight significantly interfered with the appellate process. The state argued that the defendant's decade-long absence would prejudice the state in any retrial due to the passage of time and difficulty in locating witnesses.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that while the Court of Appeals may have inherent authority to dismiss an appeal when the defendant's former fugitive status significantly interferes with the appellate process, this authority does not extend to dismissing a direct appeal to address the appellant’s flight from the jurisdiction of the trial court. The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant's former fugitive status did not interfere with the appellate court’s ability to address the merits of the appeal. The court held that concerns about potential prejudice that would arise in the trial court in relation to a retrial are most appropriately left for the trial court to address on any remand. View "State v. Satter" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Terri Lee Brown, was incarcerated due to an order from Governor Tina Kotek that revoked a previous conditional commutation of one of Brown's sentences. Brown had received the commutation in December 2020 from then-Governor Kate Brown and completed all her sentences by February 2023. Governor Kotek's revocation order was issued in December 2023. Brown petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the Governor lacked authority to revoke the commutation after she had finished serving all her sentences.In the lower courts, the state argued that the Governor had the authority to revoke Brown's commutation after her sentence had expired. The state also contended that Brown, in accepting the previous Governor's conditional commutation, had waived her right to seek habeas relief or otherwise challenge the revocation. Brown countered that the purported waiver in the acceptance agreement she signed was invalid or unenforceable.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon concluded that when the Governor revoked Brown's conditional commutation, she lacked the authority to do so under the terms of the commutation. The court also rejected the state's argument that Brown waived her right to challenge her present imprisonment. The court found that Brown's imprisonment was unlawful and ordered her immediate release from custody. The court further waived otherwise applicable appellate rules relating to reconsideration and the issuance of the appellate judgment, directing the State Court Administrator to issue the appellate judgment immediately. View "Brown v. Kotek" on Justia Law

HotChalk, LLC filed a lawsuit against the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod and 22 other defendants, alleging breach of contract and fraud in relation to the closure of Concordia University - Portland. HotChalk claimed that the Synod orchestrated the university’s closure to financially benefit itself and its affiliates while leaving the university’s creditors out in the cold. During discovery, the Synod sought a protective order to prevent the disclosure of certain documents related to internal religious matters. The trial court granted the protective order, effectively denying a motion to compel discovery of those documents. HotChalk then filed a petition for mandamus.The trial court's decision to grant the protective order was based on an in-camera review of the documents in question. The court equated the Synod's motion to a motion to restrict discovery to protect a party from embarrassment. After completing its final in-camera review, the trial court granted the Synod's motion for a protective order. HotChalk then filed a timely petition for mandamus in the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon issued an alternative writ of mandamus, directing the trial court to either vacate its order or show cause why it should not do so. The trial court declined to vacate its order, leading to arguments in the Supreme Court. The Synod argued that the writ should be dismissed because HotChalk has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. The Supreme Court agreed with the Synod, stating that HotChalk had not established that the normal appellate process would not constitute a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in this case. Therefore, the Supreme Court dismissed the alternative writ as improvidently allowed. View "Hotchalk, Inc. v. Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over whether a hospital that supplies and administers a drug that causes harm can be considered a "seller" under Oregon's strict product liability statute, ORS 30.920(1). The plaintiffs, Brown and Gomez, are the parents of a child who suffered irreparable heart defects as a result of in utero exposure to the drug Zofran, which Providence Health System - Oregon administered to Gomez. The plaintiffs sued Providence, asserting a claim for strict liability under ORS 30.920, alleging that Providence was a "seller" of Zofran and that the drug was "unreasonably dangerous and defective."The trial court granted Providence's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the statute was inapplicable under the circumstances. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, disagreeing with the trial court’s interpretation of the statute. The Supreme Court of Oregon granted review.The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the legislature did not intend to exclude hospitals from the scope of ORS 30.920(1); a hospital that supplies and administers a dangerously defective drug in conjunction with providing a healthcare service can be a "seller" that is "engaged in the business of selling" for purposes of liability under ORS 30.920; and, consequently, the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Brown v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the approval of a site certificate for the construction of a wind energy facility in Umatilla County, Oregon. The Energy Facility Siting Council granted the certificate to Nolin Hills Wind, LLC, despite the proposed facility not complying with a local siting criterion requiring a two-mile setback between any turbine and a rural residence. Umatilla County sought judicial review of the council's decision, arguing that the council should have required Nolin Hills to comply with the two-mile setback rule.The case was reviewed by the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon. The court noted that the council had the authority to approve the proposed energy facility despite its failure to comply with the two-mile setback rule. The court also noted that the council had the authority to approve the proposed facility even if it did not pass through more than three land use zones and even if it did not comply with all of the county’s recommended substantive criteria.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon affirmed the council's decision, concluding that the council was authorized to issue a site certificate for the proposed wind facility notwithstanding the failure of the proposed facility to comply with the two-mile setback rule. The court found that the council was not required to reject a proposed facility simply because it did not comply with a local criterion. The court also rejected the county's argument that the council erred in concluding that the proposed facility "does otherwise comply with the applicable statewide planning goals." View "Umatilla County v. Dept. of Energy" on Justia Law

The case involves Raji Afife Azar, who was charged with three counts of "computer crime" under ORS 164.377(2)(c) for selling items on eBay that he believed to be stolen. The state argued that by selling stolen merchandise on eBay, Azar had accessed and used a computer system for the purpose of committing theft of property. Azar moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state had not proved that he had engaged in "computer hacking," which he asserted was required to establish computer crime. The trial court denied Azar's motion, and a nonunanimous jury convicted him of those counts.The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's denial of Azar's motion for judgment of acquittal. The court concluded that Azar's conduct of selling stolen property on eBay constituted computer crime under ORS 164.377(2)(c). The court reasoned that "theft" as used in ORS 164.377(2)(c) encompasses each of the forms of theft described in ORS 164.015, including theft by receiving.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the legislature did not intend for the computer crime statute to reach conduct such as Azar's, which may constitute "theft" within the meaning of the Criminal Code but neither interferes with another’s protected interests in a computer, computer system, or computer network nor depends on computer technology as the means of gaining access to the thing that the person seeks to unlawfully obtain. The court held that the trial court erred in denying Azar's motion for judgment of acquittal and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "State v. Azar" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, the case involved a mother contesting the juvenile court's decision concerning the permanency plan for her child, A. In July 2019, A was made a ward of the court and placed in substitute care under the Department of Human Services (DHS). Despite DHS's efforts, the juvenile court determined that the mother had not made sufficient progress to allow A's safe return home.The mother argued that the juvenile court applied an incorrect legal standard, asserting that she had made significant progress. The court, however, determined that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the juvenile court's conclusion that the mother's progress was inadequate for A’s safe return home.The court held that the juvenile court's "sufficient progress" determination is a legal conclusion rather than a factual finding. It concluded that the record developed in this case was legally sufficient to support the juvenile court's legal conclusion that the mother's progress was insufficient to make possible A's safe return home. As a result, the court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the juvenile court. View "Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed a case involving a defendant convicted of two domestic violence offenses, who appealed his convictions on the grounds that the trial court had erred in refusing to dismiss a prospective juror for actual bias. The prospective juror had expressed during jury selection that her close friends' experiences of sexual assault might influence her judgment. The trial court denied the defendant's request to excuse the juror, who was later dismissed by the defendant using a peremptory challenge.On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant, holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the defendant's for-cause challenge and that the error was prejudicial because it resulted in the loss of a peremptory challenge. The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon agreed with the Court of Appeals that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the defendant's for-cause challenge. However, the Supreme Court held that the error did not prejudice the defendant in respect to a substantial right, as required for reversal under ORS 131.035.The Supreme Court reasoned that the error did not interfere with the defendant's right to a fair trial before impartial jurors, and the error's impact on how the defendant used his peremptory challenges did not prejudice him in respect to a substantial right. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "State v. Villeda" on Justia Law