Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Capital One Auto Finance, Inc. (taxpayer) filed consolidated Oregon corporate excise tax returns as part of a group that included two corporate affiliates. Taxpayer disputed the Department of Revenue’s contention that it owed additional taxes. Ultimately, the issue in this case was whether taxpayer’s corporate affiliates, which did not have a physical presence in this state, were subject to either Oregon’s corporate excise tax or its corporate income tax for the tax years 2006-2008. Preliminarily, taxpayer also asserted the department lacked the authority to assert for the first time in the Tax Court that the affiliates were subject to corporate income tax. Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the Tax Court concluded that the affiliates were subject to the corporate income tax and entered judgment in favor of the department. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded: (1) the department timely raised the corporate income tax issue; and (2) the corporate affiliates were subject to the corporate income tax based on “income derived from sources within this state.” View "Capital One Auto Finance, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Defendant Jacob Bliss sought to suppress evidence discovered in a warrantless search of his car, asserting that, because he had been stopped for a traffic infraction rather than in connection with a crime, the police officer’s failure to obtain a warrant was not excused by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. In March 2014, a police officer stopped defendant for speeding after observing him driving 79 miles per hour in a 60-mile-per-hour zone. The officer approached the car and asked defendant for his license and registration. Defendant appeared to be very nervous and he was sweat- ing heavily. A strong odor of marijuana emanated from the car. The officer’s check of defendant’s records revealed that defendant did not own the car, that the license plates on the car were registered to a different car, and that defendant was a state and federal parolee. While the officer questioned defendant, defendant repeatedly reached under the seat. Based on defendant’s conduct and other observations, defendant was ordered out of the car and patted down. The search netted a pipe used to smoke methamphetamine. A test of residue on the pipe affirmed it was methamphetamine. Defendant was subsequently arrested. The trial court ruled that the automobile exception applied and that no warrant was necessary. It therefore declined to suppress the evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Bliss" on Justia Law

Three people - Debra, Michelle, and Charles - shared a house in Lincoln City. Defendant Adam Anderson needed a place to stay, and Debra and Michelle agreed that defendant could “crash” at their house for a couple of days. The weekend after defendant began staying at their house, Debra tried to withdraw money from her bank account at an ATM but was unable to do so. On Monday morning, Debra checked with the bank and learned that someone had withdrawn $300 from her account at a Wells Fargo ATM and that the personal identification number (PIN) for her account had been changed. She also learned that, six or seven minutes after $300 had been withdrawn from the Wells Fargo ATM, someone had attempted to withdraw additional funds from her account at a nearby Bank of America ATM. After learning that information, Debra went home and found that her emergency ATM card, with her PIN attached, had been taken from the dresser drawer in her bedroom. She also realized that defendant had moved out of her house on Sunday rather than later, as he initially had planned. Debra notified the police, who obtained a surveillance video from the Bank of America ATM. The police showed Debra and Michelle stills taken from the video, which depicted a person attempting to use Debra’s ATM card at the Bank of America ATM and also walking away from the ATM. The stills either do not show the person’s face or do not do so clearly. Despite that fact, both Debra and Michelle identified the person in the stills as defendant, based on the clothing that the person was wearing and the person’s general physical resemblance (height and build) to defendant. To support its claim that it was defendant depicted from images taken at the ATMs, the prosecution offered a booking video taken approximately two weeks after the ATM images. Defendant objected to admission of the video. The Court of Appeal reversed, noting that while the trial court found the video relevant, it did not expressly identify its probative value, or expressly balance the probative value against its prejudicial effect. The Oregon Supreme Court disagreed after review of the trial court record, and was satisfied that pursuant to the applicable case law, the trial court’s use of the word “relevant” served as a shorthand way of describing the trial court’s agreement with the state that the video was very relevant to prove a central issue in the case, and the trial court's statements regarding the video were sufficient to show the court balanced the probative value of the booking video against the danger of unfair prejudice. View "Oregon v. Anderson" on Justia Law

In 2017, the Oregon legislature enacted a law that imposed a tax imposed on each vehicle dealer "for the privilege of engaging in the business of selling taxable motor vehicles at retail in this state.” The issue in this case was whether that tax was subject to Article IX, section 3a, of the Oregon Constitution. As relevant here, Article IX, section 3a, provided that taxes “on the ownership, operation or use of motor vehicles” “shall be used exclusively for the construction, reconstruction, improvement, repair, maintenance, operation and use of public highways, roads, streets and roadside rest areas in this state.” Petitioners AAA Oregon/Idaho Auto Source, LLC (Auto Source), AAA Oregon/Idaho, and Oregon Trucking Associations, Inc. argued the Section 90 tax fell within paragraph (1)(b) because it was a tax “on the owner- ship *** of motor vehicles.” Specifically, petitioners contended that taxes “on the ownership *** of motor vehicles” included taxes levied on the exercise of any of the rights of ownership, including the rights to sell and use. Petitioners posited that the voters would have understood “the concept of ownership” to include “multiple segregable rights or incidents, principal among which were the rights to sell and to use,” and, therefore, it is likely that the voters would have understood taxes levied “on the ownership *** of motor vehicles” to include taxes levied on the sale or use of motor vehicles. The Oregon Supreme Court disagreed with petitioners' contention: the Section 90 and Section 91 taxes worked together, so that the Section 91 privilege tax could be imposed on in-state vehicle dealers without placing them at a competitive disadvantage to out-of-state vehicle dealers, which supported the conclusion that the Section 90 tax was a business privilege tax. Therefore, the Court held the Section 90 tax was not a tax “on the ownership, operation or use of motor vehicles,” as that phrase is used in Article IX, section 3a. View "AAA Oregon/Idaho Auto Source v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

In this case, the Oregon Supreme Court reviewed a final order of the Department of State Lands (DSL) that granted a permit to the Port of Coos Bay (Port) in connection with the construction of a deep water marine terminal in Coos Bay. The permit allowed the Port to dredge 1.75 million cubic yards of material from the bay, while also imposing a number of conditions to address environmental concerns. Petitioners were environmental advocacy groups who argued the Port’s application did not meet the requirements for issuing a permit set out in ORS 196.825. An Administrative Law Judge held a contested case hearing and rejected petitioners’ arguments. DSL reviewed the conclusions of the ALJ and issued a final order affirming the permit. The Court of Appeals affirmed DSL’s final order. Petitioners contended DSL erred in failing to consider evidence of certain negative effects of the construction and operation of the terminal in the permit application review process. The Oregon Supreme Court held DSL properly considered the criteria set out in ORS 196.825 and did not err in granting the permit. View "Coos Waterkeeper v. Port of Coos Bay" on Justia Law

Police initially suspected defendant William Miller was driving under the influence, and stopped his car. The officer asked defendant for his identification and returned to his own car to conduct a records check. The officer walked back to defendant and asked if he had a firearm with him. In response, defendant indicated that he “had a knife on his boot, or leg.” The officer removed two knives from defendant’s boot. The officer then administered field sobriety tests to defendant. He ultimately determined that defendant was not intoxicated but cited defendant for carrying a concealed weapon. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence that the officer had obtained as a result of his question about weapons. Defendant argued to the trial court that the officer’s question had unlawfully extended the stop because the officer did not possess a “reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts,” that defendant posed an “immediate threat of serious physical injury.” In support of that argument, defendant elicited testimony from the officer that nothing about defendant’s conduct during the encounter had caused the officer to be concerned for his safety. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant and reversed his conviction, emphasizing that nothing about defendant’s conduct during the encounter gave the officer a reason to be concerned for his safety. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded the officer in this case perceived a circumstance-specific of danger based on his explanation of the risk of performing late-night field sobriety tests on a person whom the officer reasonably suspected was intoxicated. The Court also concluded the state met its burden to prove that the officer’s perception of danger and decision that a question about firearms was necessary were objectively reasonable. View "Oregon v. Miller" on Justia Law

Defendant Peter Fonte took a pair of jeans from the sales floor at a department store. He went to a cash register and told the store employee that he wanted to return the jeans, giving the impression that he had previously purchased them. The employee accepted the jeans and handed defendant $124.60 in cash. Defendant returned the next day and repeated the scenario but with a different pair of jeans. That time, he received $151.30 in cash. Defendant attempted to leave the store, but loss prevention personnel stopped and detained him until police arrived. At issue before the Oregon Supreme Court was whether defendant committed the crime of first-degree theft. The Supreme Court concluded that act was not sufficient to establish that crime, and accordingly reversed the contrary decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and defendant’s felony convictions. View "Walters v. Fonte" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Henley was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and attempted first-degree sodomy, arising out of child sexual abuse allegations by his stepdaughter during a family camping trip. The issue his case posed for the Oregon Supreme Court's review was whether the expert testimony that the trial court allowed about “grooming” children for later sexual activity was “scientific” evidence that required a foundational showing of scientific validity under OEC 702. At trial, over defendant’s objection, the trial court permitted a forensic interviewer to testify about defendant’s behavior that may have constituted “grooming” of the victim for sexual abuse if defendant had the requisite intent, without the state first establishing that the testimony about grooming was scientifically valid and reliable. On defendant’s appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the testimony was not scientific evidence for which a foundation was required. The Supreme Court concluded that the testimony was scientific evidence and that the trial court erred in admitting it without a proper foundation. Given the record, the Court declined to decide the validity and reliability of the expert testimony on review. The Court also concluded that the admission of the testimony was not harmless. Therefore, the Court of Appeals and the trial court were reversed, and the case remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Henley" on Justia Law

Defendant Ryan Hamann drove while under the influence of alcohol and was arrested. The State charged him with felony DUII because defendant had two previous DUII convictions; defendant had been convicted of DUII in Georgia in 2007, and then again in Clackamas County, Oregon in 2010. Defendant argued on appeal of his conviction that, once he proved the Georgia conviction was constitutionally invalid, the trial court’s imposition of any additional consequence on him based on that conviction was inconsistent with his right to counsel, as articulated in City of Pendleton v. Standerfer, 688 P2d 68 (1984). The Oregon Supreme Court concluded the trial court correctly relied on the Georgia conviction to revoke defendant’s driving privileges as a civil disability (not a criminal punishment) and that the revocation was consistent with defendant’s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. View "Oregon v. Hamann" on Justia Law

This mandamus proceeding arose from a dispute about a contract’s forum-selection clause. Trinity Bank loaned money to Apex, a drilling company. Michael Lachner, a part owner of Apex and the relator in this case, signed a personal guaranty of the loan. Apex defaulted on the loan, and Lachner defaulted on the guaranty. Trinity filed an action asserting separate breach of contract claims against Apex (on the loan) and Lachner (on the guaranty). Apex made no appearance, and a default judgment was entered against it. Lachner filed a motion to dismiss the action against him under ORCP 21 A(1), because the action was not filed in San Francisco as required by the forum-selection clause. Neither party disputed the meaning of the forum-selection clause, only whether it should be enforced. The trial court denied the motion, without making any findings or conclusions of law, stating that it “ha[d] discretion in [the] matter.” After review of the clause at issue, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded the clause should be enforced. The Court found none of the circumstances identified in Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., 364 P3d 328 (2015) (as grounds for invalidating a contractual forum-selection clause) were present here. “Trinity’s objections amount to little more than dissatisfaction with the forum selection clause. The trial court’s factual findings indicate that Oregon might be a marginally more convenient place than California to litigate the case, but that is not the applicable legal standard. . . . As counsel for Trinity conceded at oral argument, it is not unfair or unreasonable to litigate the case in California. For that reason, the trial court did not have discretion to deny Lachner’s ORCP 21A (1) motion to dismiss based on the forum-selection clause: The law required the court to dismiss the action. It was legal error not to do so.” A peremptory writ of mandamus issued. View "Trinity v. Apex Directional Drilling LLC" on Justia Law