Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The trial court admitted other acts evidence over defendant’s objection and without conducting OEC 403 balancing. Defendant was charged with three counts of first degree sexual abuse of K and T, the daughters of defendant’s ex-girlfriend. The Court of Appeals concluded that that failure to balance was error apparent on the record under ORAP 5.45(1), in light of the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in “Oregon v. Williams,” (346 P3d 455 (2015)), and exercised its discretion to correct the error. The Court of Appeals vacated defendant’s convictions and remanded to the trial court for an OEC 403 balancing, and for a determination of whether defendant was prejudiced by the admission of the challenged evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction. View "Oregon v. Zavala" on Justia Law

In this prosecution for failure to perform the duties of a driver, reckless endangerment, and reckless driving, the trial court admitted other acts evidence over defendant’s objection and, the State conceded, without conducting OEC 403 balancing. Defendant argued the trial court erred in admitting that other acts evidence. Because the Court of Appeals could not conclude that the trial court’s error was harmless, it reversed defendant’s convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. The State argued that the Oregon Supreme Court should reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court because the trial court was not required to conduct “traditional” OEC 403 balancing and admission of the challenged evidence did not violate due process. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and remanded this case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Mazziotti" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Supreme Court’s review was whether provisions of Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA) that prohibited using “unconscionable tactic[s]” to collect certain debts, and causing likely “confusion” or “misunderstanding” regarding loans and credit, applied to the debt collection activities of plaintiffs, Daniel N. Gordon, P.C. and Daniel Gordon. The trial court held that those provisions applied only to certain consumer relationships and that plaintiffs’ roles as a lawyer and law firm engaged in debt collection activities, and not as a lender or debt owner, removed their activities from the scope of the UTPA. The court granted plaintiffs’ request for an injunction preventing the Oregon Department of Justice from enforcing the UTPA against plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the UTPA did apply to plaintiffs’ debt collection activities. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Daniel N. Gordon, PC v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

After defendant Sean McNally refused to comply with a police officer’s order to leave a bus station, the officer arrested him and charged him with, among other things, the misdemeanor offense of interfering with a peace officer. At defendant’s subsequent trial, defendant asked the trial court to instruct the jury that it should acquit him of the charge of interfering with a peace officer if it found that he had engaged in passive resistance. The trial court refused, and the jury found defendant guilty on all charged counts. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction for interfering with a peace officer, holding that defendant had not been entitled to a passive resistance instruction, because only someone who is performing specific acts or techniques commonly associated with governmental protest or civil disobedience can be said to be engaged in “passive resistance.” After its review, the Oregon Supreme Court held the phrase “passive resistance” referred to noncooperation with a peace officer that does not involve violence or other active conduct by the defendant. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming defendant’s conviction for interfering with a peace officer and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings; the Court otherwise affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Oregon v. McNally" on Justia Law

The issue in this workers’ compensation case was whether claimant was entitled to benefits for his “combined condition” claim. Claimant filed- and his employer’s insurer, SAIF Corporation, initially accepted-a claim for a lumbar strain combined with preexisting lumbar disc disease and related conditions. SAIF later denied the combined condition claim on the ground that the lumbar strain had ceased to be the major contributing cause of the combined condition. Claimant objected. He did not contest that his lumbar strain had ceased to be the major contributing cause of his combined condition. Instead, he argued that the otherwise compensable injury was not limited to the lumbar strain that SAIF had accepted as part of his combined condition claim. In claimant’s view, an “otherwise compensable injury” within the meaning of ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) referred not just to the condition that SAIF accepted, but also includes any other conditions not accepted that might have resulted from the same work-related accident that caused the lumbar strain, and that larger group of work-related conditions continued to be the major contributing cause of his combined condition. As a result, claimant contended that an employer could not close a combined condition claim if any of those non accepted conditions remained the major cause of the combined condition claim. The Workers’ Compensation Board rejected claimant’s argument and upheld SAIF’s denial of claimant’s combined condition claim, concluding that existing precedent defined the “otherwise compensable injury” component of combined conditions to consist of the condition or conditions that the employer has accepted as compensable. The Court of Appeals reversed, acknowledging that its holding was “potentially at odds” with existing precedents from both that court and the Oregon Supreme Court. It nevertheless concluded that those precedents were either distinguishable or should be reconsidered. The Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred and that the Workers’ Compensation Board was correct. View "Brown v. SAIF Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant Shawn Haugen was convicted of one count of third-degree assault, based mainly on the victim’s eyewitness identification of him. Before his trial, defendant moved to exclude the eyewitness identification. Applying the test for admissibility of eyewitness testimony set out in “Oregon v. Classen,” (590 P2d 1198 (1979)), the trial court ruled that the victim’s eyewitness identification was admissible. While the case was pending on appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court announced its decision in “Oregon v. Lawson/James,” (291 P3d 673 (2012)), in which the Court substantially revised the Classen test for determining the admissibility of eyewitness testimony. In the Court of Appeals, defendant argued that the identification procedures used in this case raised serious questions about the reliability of the identification under “Lawson/James,” and, therefore, that the Court of Appeals should have remanded the case to the trial court for a new hearing and trial, with the trial court utilizing the “Lawson/James” test. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that, even under “Lawson/James,” the trial court correctly denied defendant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court allowed review and, reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Oregon v. Haugen" on Justia Law

This case was an original mandamus proceeding, arising from a medical negligence action in which plaintiff-relator sought damages for physical injuries. Plaintiff filed suit seeking damages for physical injuries suffered as the result of a foot surgery that, as alleged in his complaint, left him with "severe and permanent injury to his right foot and ankle leaving him unable to use his foot and suffering constant pain and numbness." The issue on appeal was whether plaintiff, who, without objection by his counsel, answered questions in a discovery deposition about the treatment of his physical condition by health care providers, thereby waived his physician-patient privilege under OEC 511, so as to allow pretrial discovery depositions of those health care providers. The Oregon Supreme Court court allowed plaintiff’s petition for an alternative writ of mandamus, in which he challenged a circuit court order that allowed the providers’ depositions. After review, the Court concluded that, by answering questions about his treatment at his discovery deposition, plaintiff did not "offer" (and thereby voluntarily disclose) that testimony so as to waive his privilege. Accordingly, the Court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its order allowing the depositions. View "Barrier v. Beaman" on Justia Law

Relator Mark Moore, who was a defendant in the underlying criminal case, sought a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss the indictment against him with prejudice, based on former or double jeopardy under state and federal law. This petition arose out of criminal charges involving defendant, a codefendant and a third defendant. All three men allegedly played a role in the arson-related death of the victim. After a jury was impaneled and several witnesses for the state had testified, the trial court declared a mistrial. When the State sought a retrial, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on jeopardy grounds, and the trial court denied his motion. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether, under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution, there was “manifest necessity” for the trial court’s mistrial order. After review, the Court concluded the State did not meet its burden of demonstrating that the trial court’s mistrial was consistent with the “manifest necessity” standard. The Court therefore directed the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring the trial court to dismiss the indictment with prejudice. View "Oregon v. Moore" on Justia Law

In this case, two officers were waiting for defendant Bell Andersen's car to arrive at a parking lot to complete a drug sale. One officer was out of sight of the parking lot but listened as defendant’s passenger explained over his cell phone that he and defendant were arriving at the parking lot. The second officer left one part of the parking lot to see if defendant had arrived at a different part of the lot. When he did not see defendant’s car, he returned to where he had been a minute earlier and saw defendant’s car parked across several parking spaces. Defendant was sitting in the driver’s seat with the engine running as two passengers stepped out of the car and were walking towards the area where the drug sale was supposed to occur. Under the automobile exception to Article I, section 9, officers may search a car if they have probable cause to believe that the car contains evidence of a crime and the car is mobile at the time they stop it. The exception does not apply if the car is “parked, immobile and unoccupied at the time the police first encounte[r] it in connection with the investigation of a crime.” The trial court held that, although defendant’s car momentarily had come to rest before the second officer saw and stopped it, the car was mobile for the purposes of the automobile exception. The court accordingly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence that the officers found when they later searched the car and its contents. Because defendant’s car momentarily had come to rest before the officer saw it, the Court of Appeals held that the automobile exception did not apply. The State appealed, and after review, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court, reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Oregon v. Andersen" on Justia Law

This case involved the State’s appeal of a pretrial order suppressing evidence in a pending murder prosecution. The trial court determined that, near the beginning of a custodial interrogation, defendant equivocally invoked his right against compelled self-incrimination under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution, but law enforcement failed to clarify defendant’s intent as to that invocation and, instead, continued the interrogation. The court concluded that the failure to clarify was unconstitutional, and it therefore suppressed defendant’s invocation and all the statements that he had made thereafter. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed, but on different grounds: that defendant unequivocally invoked his right against compelled self-incrimination and, therefore, the interrogation should have ended when defendant made that invocation. View "Oregon v. Nichols" on Justia Law