Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Marvin Taylor was an Oregon inmate who was convicted, sentenced, and incarcerated in Oregon, but confined in Colorado pursuant to the Western Interstate Corrections Compact (WICC). Petitioner appeals from a judgment dismissing with prejudice his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under ORS 34.310. This case presented the question of whether petitioner’s transfer and confinement out of state prohibited him from bringing a habeas claim in Oregon. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that it did not. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and reversed the trial court's judgment. View "Taylor v. Peters" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jacob Barrett committed aggravated murder in Oregon and was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. Pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact (ICC), Oregon transferred petitioner to an institution in the state of Florida. Thereafter, petitioner filed, in Oregon, two separate petitions for writ of habeas corpus alleging, among other things, that the terms of his confinement in Florida violated his rights under the state and federal constitutions. Defendant Colette Peters, Director of the Oregon Department of Corrections moved to “deny” petitioner’s first habeas petition for failure to state a claim. The state argued that the director was not a proper defendant because she did not have physical custody of petitioner and because she did not control the conditions of confinement in Florida. The trial court agreed with the state and dismissed petitioner’s first habeas petition with prejudice. Subsequently, the trial court, acting sua sponte, dismissed petitioner’s second petition for the same reasons that it had dismissed petitioner’s first petition. In reversing both of the trial court's decisions, the Court of Appeal held that an Oregon inmate incarcerated out of state pursuant to the ICC retained the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Oregon to remedy alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement and that petitioner had properly named the Director of ODOC as defendant. The state sought review of both cases, raising three issues: (1) whether Oregon law permits an inmate confined outside of Oregon pursuant to the ICC to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Oregon; (2) whether petitioner alleged cognizable habeas corpus claims in contesting the conditions of his confinement in Florida; and (3) whether petitioner properly named the Director of ODOC as defendant in these cases. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that petitioner’s transfer to and confinement in Florida did not prohibit him from bringing those constitutional claims, and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Barrett v. Peters" on Justia Law

The State charged defendant Denny Ghim and his wife with 17 counts of criminal mistreatment, first-degree theft, and aggravated first-degree theft. Midway through trial, defendant’s wife filed a motion in limine to exclude copies of her bank records, which the Department of Consumer and Business Services (DCBS) had obtained by administrative subpoena, from being admitted into evidence. Defendant joined in that motion and, throughout the trial, adopted his wife’s arguments on that issue. The question in this case was whether the agency’s use of an administrative subpoena to obtain defendant’s wife’s bank records violated Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence that the agency uncovered as a result of its subpoena, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Relying on "Oregon v. Johnson," (131 P3d 173 (2006)), the Court of Appeals held that defendant had no constitutionally protected privacy interest in the bank records. It followed that the agency’s use of an administrative subpoena to obtain those records did not violate Article I, section 9. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, but for slightly different reasoning: "Even if defendant has a protected privacy interest in his wife’s bank records, our decisions lead to the conclusion that the administrative subpoenas issued by DCBS did not violate defendant’s Article I, section 9, rights. We leave for another day the question whether and in what circumstances a defendant will have a protected privacy interest in information that a third party maintains, a question that can arise in differing factual circumstances which can have a bearing on its resolution." View "Oregon v. Ghim" on Justia Law

In 2012, an inter-agency drug interdiction team (comprised of U.S. Postal Service inspectors and local law enforcement) was deployed to examine packages at a USPS air cargo center near Portland International Airport. An officer noticed an Express Mail package addressed to "Maxi-pad Barnt" and addressed with defendant Max Barnthouse's Portland address. Aspects about the package and how it was addressed lead the officer to believe the package contained contraband. Officers went to Barnthouse's residence, and upon opening the package, found a stack of currency wrapped in a t-shirt. Subsequent search of the residence would reveal Barnthouse had large quantities of marijuana, packing materials, boxes and wrappers designed to hold bundles of money. Defendant was ultimately arrested and charged with unlawful possession of marijuana and intent to deliver. At issue in this case was whether the officer who initially handled the package violated Barnthouse's constitutional rights when it singled out the Express Mail package with the wrapped bundle of money in it. The trial court granted Barnthouse's motion to suppress, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court agreed the officers lacked probable cause to seize the package, and affirmed the appellate and trial courts. View "Oregon v. Barnthouse" on Justia Law

American Family Mutual Insurance Company (AFM) sought review of a Court of Appeals decision upholding the trial court's judgment in a garnishment proceeding requiring AFM to pay a judgment that plaintiffs FountainCourt Homeowners’ Association and FountainCourt Condominium Owners’ Association (FountainCourt) had obtained against AFM’s insured, Sideco, Inc. (Sideco). The underlying dispute centered on a housing development that was constructed between 2002 and 2004 in Beaverton. FountainCourt sued the developers and contractors seeking damages for defects in the construction of the buildings in the development. Sideco, a subcontractor, was brought in as a third-party defendant, and a jury eventually determined that Sideco’s negligence caused property damage to FountainCourt’s buildings. Based on that jury verdict, the trial court entered judgment against Sideco in the amount of $485,877.84. FountainCourt then served a writ of garnishment on AFM in the amount owed by Sideco, and, in response, AFM denied that the loss was covered by its policies. The trial court ultimately entered judgment against AFM, after deducting the amounts that had been paid by other garnishees. After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the court of Appeals' judgment and affirmed the courts below. View "FountainCourt Homeowners v. FountainCourt Develop." on Justia Law

Defendant Dennis Davidson was convicted of two counts of public indecency for exposing himself at a public park; because he had two prior felony convictions for public indecency, and the trial court found no ground for downward departure, defendant was sentenced consecutively on each count to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under ORS 137.719(1). The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s convictions but held that the sentences violated Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution. Defendant petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for review, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding his convictions. The State also sought review, asserting: (1) that defendant’s sentences were unreviewable because they are “presumptive” sentences; and (2) that the sentences were not unconstitutionally disproportionate in light of the facts of this case and the circumstances of defendant’s previous crimes. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s convictions, but concluded that the sentences were unconstitutionally disproportionate as applied to defendant. The case was remanded for resentencing. View "Oregon v. Davidson" on Justia Law

Defendant petitioned for review of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, imposed for a conviction for first-degree sexual abuse. Defendant argued that, as applied to his circumstances, the sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate under Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution. The Court of Appeals rejected that challenge. As defendant observed, the Supreme Court concurred that his sentence was the second harshest criminal penalty under Oregon law. However, in light of the circumstances of defendant’s current offense and his history of committing similar offenses against other young children, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole that the trial court imposed pursuant to ORS 137.719(1) was not disproportionate under Article I, section 16. View "Oregon v. Sokell" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Boyd's girlfriend was found dead on the street, the victim of a severe beating. Witnesses saw her on the ground and saw defendant running away from the scene. A few minutes later, police arrested defendant, who had the victim's blood on his hands, shoes, and pants. The issue in this case was whether police unlawfully interrogated defendant after he invoked his rights to counsel and against compelled self-incrimination. The State argued that defendant had asked a “confusing” question and that police responded by seeking “clarification,” which did not amount to unconstitutional interrogation. Defendant argued that he had merely asked why he had been taken into custody and whether he could make a phone call, that there was nothing particularly confusing about the requests, and that police responded with questions that were reasonably likely to (and in fact did) elicit incriminating evidence. The trial court agreed with the State and denied defendant’s motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, and concluded that the police unconstitutionally interrogated him. View "Oregon v. Boyd" on Justia Law

Defendant Brian Chandler was convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual abuse. On appeal of that conviction, defendant argued the trial court erred by admitting a videotaped pretrial interrogation of defendant by Detective Gates. The videotape, which was played for the jury, included statements by Gates indicating her belief that defendant was lying and that the victims were telling the truth. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to redact Gates’s statements, because, under OEC 403, the prejudicial impact of those statements outweighed their probative value. The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant had failed to preserve his argument under OEC 403. The court rejected defendant’s remaining argument that Gates’s statements constituted impermissible vouching testimony. Finding no reversible error after review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Chandler" on Justia Law

Habitat for Humanity of the Mid-Willamette Valley was a nonprofit corporation. Part of Habitat's mission (as reflected in its articles of incorporation) is that it acquires vacant lots and builds affordable housing on those lots. In this direct appeal from the Regular Division of the Tax Court (Tax Court), the issue was whether Habitat was entitled to an exemption from property taxes assessed on a vacant lot that it owned. During the relevant time, Habitat intended to build a home on the lot but had not yet started construction. The Marion County Assessor (the county) denied Habitat’s application for a tax exemption under ORS 307.130(2)(a), which provided nonprofit institutions with a tax exemption on “such real or personal property, or proportion thereof, as is actually and exclusively occupied or used in the literary, benevolent, charitable or scientific work carried on by such institutions.” The Tax Court affirmed, holding that Habitat was not using the vacant lot to carry out its charitable work at the time of the assessment. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that it was "apparent" that the real property at issue was actually and exclusively "used in the literary, benevolent, charitable or scientific work carried on" by Habitat. As a result, at the time of the assessment, Habitat was entitled to receive the exemption that the county denied. View "Habitat for Humanity v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law