Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether the City of Lebanon (city) committed an unfair labor practice under Oregon’s Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act (PECBA) when one of its council members, Campbell, wrote a letter to a local newspaper disparaging labor unions in general and calling for city employees to decertify their existing union. The Employment Relations Board (ERB or board) concluded that the city had engaged in an unfair labor practice based on Campbell’s conduct. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the city was not liable because Campbell had not acted as a “public employer or its designated representative” within the meaning of PECBA. The Supreme Court disagreed, reversed and remanded the matter back to the ERB for further proceedings. View "AFSCME Council 75 v. City of Lebanon" on Justia Law

In 2011, plaintiff discovered a leak under her kitchen sink, which had caused extensive damage to her home, and filed a claim with her insurer, Farmers Insurance Company of Oregon (Farmers). In early 2012, Farmers voluntarily paid plaintiff a sum that it determined constituted the actual cash value of plaintiff’s losses less a deductible, $3,300.45. At around that time, it also paid plaintiff $2,169.22 in mitigation expenses. A few weeks later, plaintiff submitted to Farmers a proof of loss that included estimates of her mitigation costs and the actual cash value of her losses that far exceeded the sum that Farmers had paid her. Because plaintiff had not yet replaced any of the damaged items, she did not, at that time, submit a proof of loss that included the replacement cost of her losses. A year later, the parties had not resolved plaintiff’s claim, and in January 2013, plaintiff initiated this action. ORS 742.061 required an insurer to pay its insured’s attorney fees if, in the insured’s action against the insurer, the insured obtains a “recovery” that exceeds the amount of any tender made by the insurer within six months from the date that the insured first filed proof of a loss. In this case, the Supreme Court found that, when an insured files an action against an insurer to recover sums owing on an insurance policy and the insurer subsequently pays the insured more than the amount of any tender made within six months from the insured’s proof of loss, the insured obtains a “recovery” that entitles the insured to an award of reasonable attorney fees. View "Long v. Farmers Ins. Co." on Justia Law

An officer stopped defendant Victor Pichardo to investigate whether he was helping another person evade the police. During the stop, the officer asked defendant for consent to a search for drugs. The primary question presented for the Supreme Court's review in this matter was whether the officer's request for consent was reasonably related to the reason for the stop and thus did not extend it in violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court ruled that the officer's request for consent did not unreasonably extend the stop. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that an unrelated request for consent extended the stop in violation of Article I, section 9, and that defendant's consent had not attenuated that illegality. The Supreme Court allowed the state's petition for review, vacated the Court of Appeals decision, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals, which adhered on remand to its decision. The Supreme Court allowed the state's petition for review from the decision on remand and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision. View "Oregon v. Pichardo" on Justia Law

In June 2002, defendant Ron Miller entered into an open account agreement with plaintiff Union Lumber Company for the purchase of building supply materials. In July 2010, plaintiff filed an action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment against Ron Miller and his spouse Linda Miller, seeking $17,865 as the unpaid balance on the account. The complaint alleged that defendants' son, Ean Miller, had purchased building materials from plaintiff, charging those materials to the Miller account with his father's authority. The complaint further alleged that the materials that Ean purchased were delivered to properties that defendants owned and were used to improve those properties and that, for several years, defendants had paid the charges that Ean had made on the account. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the trial court erred in denying defendants' motion under ORCP 71 B(1) to set aside a general judgment entered against them on grounds of excusable neglect and mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling, concluding that the judgment was entered as a result of mistakes made by plaintiff and a court-appointed arbitrator with respect to the service of case-related documents on defendants. Because the Supreme Court concluded that defendants were not entitled to relief from the judgment on the grounds asserted, it reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's order denying defendants' motion to set aside the judgment. View "Union Lumber Co. v. Miller" on Justia Law

Four consolidated property tax appeals returned to the Oregon Supreme Court following remand to the Oregon Tax Court. In "Village I," the Supreme Court addressed whether the Tax Court had erred by denying defendant-intervenor Clackamas County Assessor's (assessor) motion for leave to file amended answers on the ground that the answers contained impermissible counterclaims challenging the value of taxpayers' land. The Supreme Court determined that the assessor should have been allowed to challenge the land valuations, and it reversed and remanded the cases to the Tax Court. Before the assessor filed amended answers, taxpayers served notices of voluntary dismissal of their cases pursuant to Tax Court Rule (TCR) 54 A(1). The Tax Court then entered a judgment of dismissal, over the assessor's objection. The court denied the subsequent motions for relief from the judgment by defendant Department of Revenue (department) and the assessor. On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed whether, as defendants argued, the Tax Court erred by giving effect to taxpayers' notices of voluntary dismissal rather than to the decision in "Village I" concerning the assessor's counterclaims pending in the motions for leave to file amended answers. The Court concluded that the Tax Court erred in dismissing the appeals given the decision and remand in Village I. Accordingly, it vacated the Tax Court's order denying defendants relief from the judgment, reversed the general judgment of dismissal, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Village at Main Street Phase II, LLC II v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Petitioner Karlyn Eklof was convicted for aggravated murder, for which she received a life sentence without the possibility of parole. He filed this successive action for postconviction relief to appeal the Court of Appeals decision that upheld summary judgment for the State on the ground that petitioner’s “Brady” violation claim was barred as a matter of law under ORS 138.510(3) and ORS 138.550(3).Under “Brady v. Maryland,” (373 US 83 (1963), the United States Supreme Court held that a prosecutor’s withholding of favorable evidence from a criminal defendant violated due process where the evidence was material either to guild or to punishment, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecution. Petitioner argued that she was entitled to pursue her Brady violation claim despite the bars against untimely and successive petitions set out in the Oregon statutes, and that the trial court erred in concluding that her petition was barred as a matter of law. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred in granting the state’s motion for summary judgment on petitioner’s Brady violation claim. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Eklof v. Steward" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are brothers, aged eight and twelve, were crossing a street in a crosswalk with the walk signal with their seven-year-old younger brother. Defendant negligently drove his pickup truck through the crosswalk, running over the youngest boy and narrowly missing the other two. The brother who was struck died at the scene. The two surviving brothers witnessed their brother’s death and experienced serious emotional injuries as a result. This case tasked the Oregon Supreme Court to consider the circumstances, if any, under which damages could be recovered by a bystander who suffers serious emotional distress as a result of observing the negligent physical injury of another person. The trial court dismissed the action and the Court of Appeals affirmed, both relying on the “impact rule,” which allows a plaintiff to seek damages for negligently caused emotional distress only if the plaintiff can show some physical impact to himself or herself, thus precluding the claims brought by plaintiffs in this case. The Supreme Court concluded that plaintiffs should be able to pursue their claims notwithstanding the fact that they did not themselves suffer physical injury. The Court therefore reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court, and remanded the case to the trial court. View "Philibert v. Kluser" on Justia Law

The Department of Human Services was required by law to recover Medicaid payments from those assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of death. In 2008, the department amended its administrative rules regarding the scope of that recovery. The amended rules allowed the department to recover the payments from assets that the recipient had transferred to a spouse up to five years before a person applied for Medicaid. Pursuant to ORS 183.400, petitioner Tim Nay sought judicial review of those rule amendments. The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner that the amendments were invalid. The department then sought review. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the rule amendments were invalid under ORS 183.400(4)(b) because they exceeded the department’s statutory authority. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Nay v. Dept. of Human Services" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition (IP) 1 (2018), contending that the “yes” and “no” result statements and the summary did not comply with the requirements set out in ORS 250.035(2). IP 1 was a proposed amendment to the Oregon Constitution that, if approved, would prohibit public funding for abortions, “except when medically necessary or as may be required by federal law.” Section 1 of IP 1 set out that general prohibition, and Section 2 set out several related definitions. Section 3 set out two exceptions to the prohibition in Section 1. Section 4 provided that nothing in the proposed amendment “shall be construed as prohibiting the expenditure of public funds to pay for health insurance,” so long as “such funds are not spent to pay or reimburse for the costs of performing abortions.” The Oregon Supreme Court considered petitioners’ arguments regarding the “yes” and “no” result statements in the certified title, and concluded that those statements substantially complied with statutory requirements. However, the Court agreed with one of petitioners’ arguments challenging the summary, and therefore referred the summary back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Jimerson v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased an insurance policy from defendant that provided coverage for his house, other structures on his property, personal property, and loss of use for up to 12 months. The policy also included “extended dwelling coverage,” which provided additional coverage of 50 percent to pay for unexpected repair or rebuilding costs that exceeded the base amount of coverage for the house. A fire completely destroyed plaintiff’s house and its contents and damaged other structures on the property. Plaintiff and defendant disagreed about what was owed under the policy. In particular, the parties disagreed about whether plaintiff was entitled to the extended dwelling coverage without having to first actually replace the house. After a lengthy and complicated trial, the jury returned a special verdict finding for plaintiff on his breach of contract claim and assessing damages in the amount of the limits of the extended dwelling coverage. The jury also found for defendant on the counterclaim, however. The trial court declined to enter a judgment awarding plaintiff any damages. The court concluded that, in light of the jury’s findings on the counterclaim, the insurance policy had been voided, and as a result, it was defendant who was entitled to a judgment for all payments that it had made under the policy up to that time. Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had erred in even sending the counterclaim to the jury because there was no evidence that defendant had reasonably relied on any misrepresentations by plaintiff. Defendant petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court, which ultimately denied defendant’s petition. Plaintiff sought an award of $30,771 in attorney fees incurred before the Supreme Court, contending that, given the Court of Appeals’ decision, he was the prevailing party on appeal and was entitled to fees. The Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff’s action was “upon [a] policy of insurance” within the meaning of ORS 742.061(1), and therefore did not address whether defendant was correct about the insufficiency of plaintiff’s “alternative” theory of recovery under the statute, based on his defeat of the counterclaim. Defendant advanced no other objection to the requested award of fees. The petition for attorney fees was allowed. View "Masood v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Oregon" on Justia Law