Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Tyler Turner contended that defendant Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT) had contributed to a motor vehicle accident by negligently failing to correct hazardous conditions at the highway intersection where he was injured. In a summary judgment motion, ODOT claimed immunity under ORS 30.265(6)(c). ODOT’s claim of immunity rested on the theory that, because it had a policy of seeking highway safety improvement funding from the legislature only for the most crash-prone sites in the state highway system, ODOT’s omission of the crash site from its appropriation requests amounted to a budget-driven, discretionary policy decision not to make improvements at the site. Plaintiff opposed the motion with evidence that ODOT employees knew that the intersection was dangerous but had neglected to make improvements by using ODOT’s other mechanisms for evaluating and funding low-cost highway safety improvements. Although ODOT prevailed at the trial court, the Court of Appeals determined that questions of fact precluded summary judgment. ODOT argued to the Supreme Court that, when a state agency used a global process for setting priorities and allocating limited resources, discretionary-function immunity attached and the agency need not engage in further, particularized decision-making. "The record on summary judgment does not bear out that premise as a matter of undisputed fact. It follows that ODOT’s employment of the ranking process cannot resolve the issue of ODOT’s immunity under ORS 30.265(6)(c) as a matter of law. "Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for ODOT on that ground, and the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Turner v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

The question this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review was whether a statute limiting a state employee’s tort liability violated either the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution or the jury trial clauses of Article I, section 17, and Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court held that the statute, as applied to the state employee, violated each of those provisions and entered a limited judgment against the employee for the full amount of the jury’s verdict. Plaintiff’s six-month-old son developed a cancerous mass on his liver. Two doctors at Oregon Health & Science University (OHSU) participated in an operation to remove the mass: Dr. Harrison, a specialist in pediatric surgery, and Dr. Durant, a pediatric surgical fellow in training. During the operation, the doctors inadvertently transected blood vessels going to the child’s liver, resulting in the child having to undergo a liver transplant, removal of his spleen, additional surgeries, and lifetime monitoring due to the risks resulting from the doctors’ act. Plaintiff brought this action on her son’s behalf against Harrison, Durant, OHSU, and Pediatric Surgical Associates, P.C. The trial court granted Pediatric Surgical Associates’ motion for summary judgment, and dismissed Durant as a result of an agreement among plaintiff, OHSU, and Harrison. Pursuant to that agreement, Harrison and OHSU admitted liability for the child’s injuries and plaintiff’s case against Harrison and OHSU went to the jury to determine the amount of the child’s damages. The jury found that plaintiff’s son had sustained and will sustain economic damages of $6,071,190.38 and noneconomic damages of $6,000,000. After the jury returned its verdict, OHSU and Harrison filed a motion to reduce the jury’s verdict to $3,000,000 based on the Oregon Tort Claims Act. The trial court granted the motion as to OHSU. The trial court, however, denied the motion as to Harrison. Harrison appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that applying the Tort Claims Act limit to plaintiff’s claim against defendant did not violate the remedy clause in Article I, section 10, nor does giving effect to that limit violate the jury trial clauses in Article I, section 17, or Article VII (Amended), section 3. View "Horton v. OHSU" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Rockwood Water People’s Utility District (Rockwood PUD), Northwest Natural Gas Company (NW Natural) and Portland General Electric Company (PGE) sought review of a Court of Appeals decision to uphold the validity of municipal enactments by respondent City of Gresham (the city) that increased the licensing fee that each utility was required to pay from five percent to seven percent of the utility’s gross revenues earned within the City. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the enactments were void and unenforceable because they conflicted with the provisions of ORS 221.450. Alternatively, Rockwood PUD argued that it could not be taxed more than five percent by a city without explicit statutory authority. Trial court agreed with plaintiffs that the enactments violated ORS 221.450, and did not reach Rockwood PUD’s alternative argument. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the fee increase was not preempted by ORS 221.450 because the utilities were not operating “without a franchise” and that a city’s home-rule authority to impose taxes or fees on a utility is not affected by a utility’s municipal corporation status. The Supreme Court held that the license fee imposed by the City was a “privilege tax” and that the affected utilities were operating “without a franchise” within the meaning of ORS 221.450. The Court also held that the City was not preempted by ORS 221.450 from imposing the seven percent privilege tax on NW Natural and PGE, but that the City did not have express statutory authority to impose a tax in excess of five percent on Rockwood PUD under ORS 221.450. View "Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Gresham" on Justia Law

Defendant took a pickup truckload of scrap metal items from the metal recycling bin of a Washington County microchip manufacturing plant and was subsequently charged with third-degree theft. At the close of the state’s case-in-chief, defendant unsuccessfully moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence presented by the state had failed to establish that the items he had taken possessed actual value. Defendant was subsequently convicted of the theft charge. The Court of Appeals affirmed that conviction, holding that the evidence adduced at trial had been sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find that the items stolen by defendant had indeed possessed some market value. Finding no reversible error with the Court of Appeals' decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Waterhouse" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a December 2008 bombing of a bank in Woodburn. After a life-threatening phone call was made to an adjacent bank, and an employee was told that the lives of employees in both banks were at risk, law enforcement officers responded to the scene and discovered the bomb, which they assessed and treated as a hoax device. While law enforcement officers were trying to dismantle the bomb, it exploded. Two law enforcement officers were killed; a third law enforcement officer was critically injured, but survived; a bank employee was also injured. Defendant Joshua Turnidge was convicted on 10 counts of aggravated murder, as well as other felonies, following a joint trial with his father, Bruce, for which the two were sentenced to death. In this automatic and direct review of his convictions and sentences of death, defendant raised 151 assignments of error, supplemented by additional pro se assignments, relating to the pretrial and guilt phases of his trial. Finding no reversible error on any of defendant's challenges, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed defendant's convictions and sentences of death. View "Oregon v. Turnidge" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a December 2008 bombing of a bank in Woodburn. After a life-threatening phone call was made to an adjacent bank, and an employee was told that the lives of employees in both banks were at risk, law enforcement officers responded to the scene and discovered the bomb, which they assessed and treated as a hoax device. While law enforcement officers were trying to dismantle the bomb, it exploded. Two law enforcement officers were killed; a third law enforcement officer was critically injured, but survived; a bank employee was also injured. Defendant Bruce Turnidge was convicted on 10 counts of aggravated murder, as well as other felonies, following a joint trial with his son, Joshua, for which the two were sentenced to death. In this automatic and direct review of his convictions and sentences of death, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support four of the 10 aggravated murder convictions. Additionally, he raised numerous challenges to other trial court rulings. Finding no reversible error on any of defendant's challenges, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed defendant's convictions and sentences of death. View "Oregon v. Turnidge" on Justia Law

Leonard and Judith Peverieri and Peverieri Investments, LLC (landlords) appealed a trial court’s judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of Couch Investments, LLC (tenant). Landlords argued that the arbitrator exceeded his powers when he found not only that landlords were liable for the cost of storm water drainage improvements required by the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), but also ordered remedies. Landlords argued on appeal that the trial court erred in denying their petition to vacate the arbitration award, and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the outcome, but on different grounds from the Court of Appeals. View "Couch Investments, LLC v. Peverieri" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 61 (2016) (IP 61), arguing that the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035. IP 61 implicated the use of public funds to pay for abortions. As written, the Supreme Court found that the summary to the Initiative Petition did not address the limitation on access to abortion that would directly follow from the enactment of IP 61. "The Attorney General must revise the summary to describe that limitation." As written, the Court also found that the summary did not address the broad definition of the term “abortion,” but, with regard to contraception, it explained what the term abortion excluded, rather than what it included. "The summary provides that the measure '[d]efines ‘abortion’ to exclude termination of ectopic pregnancy, removing dead fetus/embryo, or contraceptives that ‘inhibit or prevent conception.’ In taking that approach, the Attorney General uses the literal terms of the measure, but obscures the meaning of the term 'abortion' rather than conveying the practical information that ORS 250.035 required. The Court referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Cross v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review concerned the extent to which a social host of a gathering at which alcohol is consumed is liable for injuries that occur during the party. The defendant hosted a party at which his guests drank alcohol. Two of the guests engaged in horseplay with loaded handguns, and one of the guests was killed. The personal representative of the decedent sued defendant, who asserted that, under ORS 471.565(2), he was not liable because he had not “served or provided” alcohol to the shooter “while” the shooter was “visibly intoxicated.” The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under ORS 471.545(2), a social host “serve[s] or provide[s]” alcohol when the host controls the alcohol supply, and in this case the evidence permitted an inference that defendant did that at a time when the shooter was visibly intoxicated. On review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and affirmed. View "Baker v. Croslin" on Justia Law

Defendant John Sines came to the attention of law enforcement after his housekeeper anonymously called the child protective services division of the Department of Human Services (DHS) and said that she suspected that defendant might be sexually abusing his adopted daughter. The housekeeper’s suspicions had been raised after finding an unusual “discharge” on several pairs of the child’s underwear, and she told DHS that she had considered taking a pair for authorities to examine. In response to a question from the housekeeper, the DHS employee who handled the call said that he would be able to connect the housekeeper with someone in law enforcement who could analyze the underwear and confirm or refute her concerns. The DHS employee told the housekeeper several times that he could not tell her to take the victim’s underwear. The next day the housekeeper obtained a pair of the victim’s underwear, and the following day she turned it over to the police. Based on that evidence and other statements by the housekeeper, police obtained a warrant and searched defendant’s house, after which defendant was arrested and charged with a number of sex crimes. Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained through the search and seizure of the underwear was denied, and he was convicted on four counts of first degree sexual abuse. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court had erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress. The issue this case raised for the Oregon Supreme Court's review was whether a private citizen’s seizure of criminal evidence was subject to suppression at trial as the fruit of an unlawful government search. The Court of Appeals concluded that, although the underwear had been procured by a private person, there was nevertheless sufficient contact between state officials and the private person that the warrantless search and seizure constituted state action, in violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed, acknowledging that this was a "close case:"Contacts between private individuals and state officers before a private search always require careful examination to determine whether, given all the circumstances, the state officers provided such affirmative encouragement and authorization to the private individuals so as to render them agents of the state. In this case . . . we hold that they did not." View "Oregon v. Sines" on Justia Law