Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The trial court found defendant Robert Makin guilty of first-degree child neglect, as well as other offenses. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s first-degree child neglect convictions without discussion. The question in this case was whether a reasonable trier of fact could find defendant guilty of first-degree child neglect for knowingly allowing his children to stay “[i]n a vehicle where controlled substances are being criminally delivered * * *.” Defendant's three children were in his car when a police officer stopped him for a traffic violation. Also in the car were methamphetamine and implements for selling it. There was no evidence, however, that defendant had sold or was delivering methamphetamine to an identified buyer while his children were with him in the car. Rather, all that the evidence showed was that, while his children were in the car, defendant possessed methamphetamine with the intent to sell in the future. After review, the Supreme Court held that first-degree child neglect, as defined in ORS 163.547, did not include knowingly leaving or allowing a child under 16 years of age to stay in a vehicle where controlled substances are possessed with an intent to deliver. Because the state did not argue that the evidence in this case gave rise to any inference other than possession with intent to deliver, the Court of Appeals' decision to the extent it upheld defendant’s convictions for first-degree child neglect was reversed. On review, defendant did not challenge his convictions for delivery and possession, and the state did not challenge the Court of Appeals decision reversing defendant’s conviction for manufacturing and remanding that charge for further proceedings. Those parts of the Court of Appeals decision were affirmed. View "Oregon v. Makin" on Justia Law

In 2009, plaintiff American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon, Inc. (ACLU), made a request under the Oregon Public Records law to inspect and copy certain documents of the Civilian Review Board of the City of Eugene pertaining to city police officers' use of a Taser against "Mr." Van Ornum. The request was ultimately denied, and the ACLU sued for release of the documents under ORS 192.420 (1). The City of Eugene cited, as grounds for its denial the records request, a conditional exemption in the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the exemption did not apply when “the public interest requires disclosure of the information. . . .[W]hen that exemption applies, a trial court must determine, as a matter of both law and fact, the nature and significance of two competing interests - the public’s interest in disclosure and the public body’s interest in confidentiality. Then, the court must balance those competing interests and determine, as a matter of law, which interest predominates." In this case, after considering the nature and significance of the competing interests, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the public interest in disclosure of the requested records predominates, and the trial court erred in declining to order their disclosure. View "American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Eugene" on Justia Law

This consolidated appeal concerned six civil actions against an ambulance company for permitting a paramedic in its employ to sexually abuse women while they were patients. The claims were alleged under ORS 124.100(5), which authorized a vulnerable person to bring an action against a person who “permit[s]” another person to engage in physical or financial abuse “if the person knowingly acts or fails to act under circumstances in which a reasonable person should have known” of the abuse. The ambulance company moved for summary judgment on the ground that there was no evidence that it actually knew of its para-medic’s abuse against plaintiffs and then acted in a way that permitted that abuse to occur. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the statute does not require actual knowledge of a plaintiff’s abuse. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and reversed the trial court. View "Wyers v. American Medical Response Northwest, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Davis threatened and assaulted two people outside of a store, and two uniformed officers were dispatched to the area. When the officers arrived, one of them saw defendant walking away from a group of people. Believing that defendant was the perpetrator, the officer got out of his patrol car and identified himself as a police officer. Defendant ran away. The officer chased him and repeatedly yelled “Stop, police!” The other officer pursued defendant in his patrol car, activating its overhead emergency lights and siren. Defendant kept running and continued to run from the officers until they apprehended him. The state ultimately charged defendant with third-degree escape for fleeing from police after the officer commanded him to stop. The issue in this case was whether, in running from the police, defendant committed the criminal offense of third-degree escape. The statute that defined the offense requires proof that the defendant was in custody at the time of the escape. The trial court concluded that the police, in shouting for defendant to stop, had effectively placed him in “constructive custody.” The Court of Appeals agreed, affirming without a written opinion. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that police merely shouting for another person to stop does not place that person in custody for the purposes of establishing third-degree escape. View "Oregon v. Davis" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review called for a review of ORS 197.772(3): if a local historic designation is imposed on a property and that property is then conveyed to another owner, may the successor remove that designation? The local government concluded that it was required to grant the successor-owners’ request, but on appeal the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) disagreed, concluding that the right to remove imposed designations did not apply to successors-in-interest like the owners in this case. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that, although the legislature intended ORS 197.772(3) to provide a statutory remedy for certain owners whose property was designated as historic against their wishes, the legislature also intended that owners who acquired property after it had been designated would be bound by that designation and by any resulting restrictions on the use and development of that property. Accordingly, the Court agreed with LUBA that the right to remove an historic designation under ORS 197.772(3) applied only to those persons who owned their properties at the time that the designation was imposed and not to those who acquired them later, with the designation already in place. The Court therefore reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed LUBA’s final order. View "Lake Oswego Preservation Society v. City of Lake Oswego" on Justia Law

After considering SAIF Corporation's medical evidence, the Workers’ Compensation Board (board) found that the evidence did not satisfy SAIF’s burden of persuasion and entered an order finding that claimant Roger Thompson's heart attack was a compensable occupational disease. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the board erred in concluding that only one type of medical evidence (evidence of risk factors unique to the claimant and unrelated to his work) would rebut the presumption. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals misperceived the basis for the board’s order. Furthermore, the Court concluded the board reasonably found, on the evidence before it, that SAIF had failed to satisfy its burden of persuasion. The Supreme Court accordingly reversed the Court of Appeals decision and affirmed the board’s order. View "SAIF v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an employee of a subcontractor working on a construction jobsite. Plaintiff fell while framing the third floor of a townhome that was under construction. In this action, plaintiff brought claims for relief against the general contractor under Oregon’s Employer Liability Law (ELL), and for common-law negligence, in which he sought damages for injuries that he suffered in the fall. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the general contractor, Polygon Northwest Company (Polygon), on both of plaintiff’s claims, after concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that Polygon was entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Plaintiff appealed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to withstand a motion for summary judgment on the specification of his ELL claim that Polygon retained a right to control the method or manner in which the risk-producing activity was performed. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision affirming the dismissal of the retained right of control specification of plaintiff’s ELL claim, and remanded that claim to the trial court for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the lower courts with respect to plaintiff’s negligence claim and the remaining specifications of his ELL claim. View "Yeatts v. Polygon Northwest Co." on Justia Law

Defendant Caryn Nascimento was convicted of theft and computer crime for using a computer terminal at work, which was linked to the Oregon State Lottery, to print and steal lottery tickets. She appealed the conviction for computer crime, arguing that the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal on that count because, she argued, she was “authorized” to use the computer terminal and therefore had not violated ORS 164.377(4). The narrow "but potentially far-reaching issue" in this case was the scope of ORS 164.377(4), and the term “without authorization.” The State argued that, although defendant’s employer authorized her to use the computer terminal at issue here, defendant did so for a purpose not permitted by her employer and thus was guilty of computer crime. Defendant conceded that her use may have violated her employer’s policies or other provisions of ORS 164.377, but she was still authorized to use it. After review, the Supreme Court agreed that defendant’s conduct did not violate subsection (4) of the statute, and, accordingly, that the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal. Defendant’s computer crime conviction was therefore reversed. View "Washington v. Nascimento" on Justia Law

Washington resident Stuart Etter was an aircraft dispatcher for Horizon Air Industries, Inc. who worked almost entirely in Portland. To work as a dispatcher, however, he had to spend five hours each year riding along in the cockpit for each aircraft group that he dispatched. Taxpayer argued that, pursuant to 49 USC § 40116(f), that flight time exempted him from paying Oregon income tax in the tax year 2000. The Oregon Tax Court concluded that taxpayer did not meet the requirements of the federal statute and denied his exemption. On appeal, taxpayer renewed his arguments. Finding no reversible error, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed. View "Etter v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the personal representative of the estate of Martha Delgado, alleged in her complaint that Delgado, a foreign exchange student staying in this country under the supervision of defendants Rotary International and Rotary International District 5100, was shot and killed by an assailant while standing in line on a public sidewalk outside the "Zone," a teenage nightclub in Portland owned by several business entities. On defendants’ motion, the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that plaintiff had failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a claim for relief with respect to the issue whether Delgado’s death was a foreseeable result of defendants’ conduct. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed. On review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff alleged facts that, if proved, were sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find that Delgado’s death was a reasonably foreseeable result of defendants’ conduct. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed, and the judgment dismissing this action was reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Piazza v. Kellim" on Justia Law