Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case required the Oregon Supreme Court's interpretation of ORS 12.135(1)(a). ORS 12.135(1)(a) provided that an action arising from the “construction, alteration or repair of any improvement to real property” must be commenced within “[t]he applicable period of limitation otherwise established by law.” The question in this construction defect case was precisely what is the period of limitation “otherwise established by law.” Plaintiffs argued their action was subject to a six-year statute of limitations set out in ORS 12.080(3). Defendant argued that the action was not for injury to an “interest” in real property, but for damage to the property itself, which is governed by a shorter, two-year statute of limitations described in ORS 12.110(1) that applied to tort actions generally. The trial court agreed with plaintiffs that the six year-limitation period applied, but granted summary judgment for defendant on the ground that plaintiffs brought their action more than six years after the construction was completed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that, although the six-year statute applied, a “discovery rule” applied, there remained an issue of fact as to whether plaintiffs initiated their action within six years from the time that they knew or should have known of the injury that formed the basis for their claim. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that plaintiffs’ action was subject to the six-year statute: that statute applied to actions for interference with or injury to an “interest” in real property, such as trespass or waste, not to actions for damage to property itself, which are subject to the two-year statute of limitations. There remained, however, a question of fact as to when plaintiffs discovered the damage to their property, which would have triggered the two-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals with regard to summary judgment, and remanded for for further proceedings. View "Goodwin v. Kingsmen Plastering, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant William Althouse was convicted in 2011 of felony public indecency after previously having been convicted of three other felony sex crimes. Pursuant to ORS 137.719(1), the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Throughout this litigation, defendant argued that, as applied to him, a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole violated Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment without opinion. The Supreme Court allowed defendant’s petition for review to consider two issues: (1) whether ORS 138.222(2)(a) barred direct appellate review of a presumptive sentence imposed pursuant to ORS 137.719(1); and, (2) if not, whether defendant’s sentence was unconstitutional as applied. The Court held that defendant’s sentence was both reviewable and constitutional. The Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Oregon v. Althouse" on Justia Law

The City of Eugene sued to collect from Comcast of Oregon II, Inc. (Comcast) a license fee that the city, acting under a municipal ordinance, imposes on companies providing “telecommunications services” over the city’s rights of way. Comcast did not dispute that it used the city’s rights of way to operate a cable system. However it objected to the city’s collection effort and argued that the license fee was either a tax barred by the Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA), or a franchise fee barred by the Cable Communications and Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act). The city read those federal laws more narrowly and disputed Comcast’s interpretation. The trial court rejected Comcast’s arguments and granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Eugene v. Comcast of Oregon II, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved a challenge to a juvenile court’s decision to waive its jurisdiction over a 13-year-old boy who was alleged to have committed aggravated murder. Under the relevant statutes, ORS 419C.352 and ORS 419C.349, a youth under age of 15 who is alleged to have committed murder may be waived into adult court only if, at the time of the conduct, he or she “was of sufficient sophistication and maturity to appreciate the nature and quality of the conduct involved.” In this case, the evidence suggested that youth was of “average” sophistication and maturity for his age and was “just as effective” as peers of his age in understanding that his conduct was wrong. The juvenile court found that the statutory “sophistication and maturity” requirement had been satisfied. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the “sophistication and maturity” provision required only an awareness of the physical nature and criminality of the conduct at issue. The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with the youth that the “sophistication and maturity” requirement was more demanding, and reversed both the appellate and juvenile courts. The case was remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. J. C. N.-V." on Justia Law

The Attorney General prepared and filed a modified ballot title following remand from the Supreme Court. In its second trip to the Oregon Supreme Court, two petitioners challenged the modified title. IP 62 applies to public employees (employees) and public employee labor organizations (unions). If adopted by the voters, IP 62 would have amended several provisions of the Oregon Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act. Petitioners Neel and Forest set out two main objections to the modified caption: (1) they claimed that the phrase “limits public employee union members’ obligations” was vague and overbroad and was likely to mislead and confuse voters; (2) the phrase “employees might benefit without sharing bargaining costs" petitioners contended that, as used to describe IP 62, that phrase was “underinclusive, inaccurate, misleading, politically loaded,” and failed to reasonably identify the actual major effect of the proposed initiative measure. The Supreme Court found certain of the objections to be well taken, and referred the modified ballot title to the Attorney General for additional modification. View "Conroy v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

This was an action brought by an injured construction worker and his wife. A defective board broke. Plaintiffs Kevin Rains and Mitzi Rains obtained a judgment based on claims of strict products liability and loss of consortium, respectively, against both the retailer, Stayton Builders Mart, and the manufacturer, Weyerhaeuser Company, of the defective wooden board. Stayton, in turn, obtained a judgment against Weyerhaeuser based on its cross-claim for common-law indemnity. Prior to trial, plaintiffs and Stayton had partially settled their claims in an agreement that required Stayton to pay at least $1.5 million in damages to plaintiffs, but capped Stayton’s liability at $2 million. Weyerhaeuser appealed, alleging numerous errors in trial court rulings. The Court of Appeals agreed with Weyerhaeuser that the trial court had erred by refusing to apply a statutory cap on noneconomic damages to plaintiff’s claim for strict products liability and by refusing to require Stayton to discharge its liability to plaintiffs before Stayton could prevail on its indemnity claim against Weyerhaeuser. The Court of Appeals, however, largely rejected Weyerhaeuser’s remaining arguments, affirming the trial court’s decisions: (1) refusing to dismiss Stayton as a defendant for lack of adversity after it had partially settled plaintiffs’ claims; (2) refusing to admit the partial settlement agreement in evidence at trial; (3) failing to allow the jury to allocate fault to the general contractor, Five Star Construction, on the verdict form; and (4) refusing to apply the statutory cap on noneconomic damages to Mitzi Rains’ claim for loss of consortium. And, although the Court of Appeals deducted some of the expenses that Weyerhaeuser challenged in Stayton’s award for defense costs, the deductions were small, and the Court of Appeals largely upheld the trial court’s calculation of Stayton’s defense costs. After its review of this matter, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed most aspects of the Court of Appeals' decision, but vacated with respect to the parties’ assignments of error concerning the statutory cap on noneconomic damages based on Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution. Those assignments of error were remanded reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's decision in "Horton v. OHSU," ( 359 Or 168 (2016)). Furthermore, the Court concluded that ORS 20.220(3) required the general judgment in favor of Stayton against Weyerhaeuser awarding defense costs to be reversed, and as such, reversed the Court of Appeals to the extent that it was inconsistent with that conclusion. The limited judgment for indemnity in favor of Stayton against Weyerhaeuser was reversed, as was the general judgment in favor of Stayton for costs on Stayton’s indemnity claim against Weyerhaeuser. View "Rains v. Stayton Builders Mart, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Tyler Turner contended that defendant Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT) had contributed to a motor vehicle accident by negligently failing to correct hazardous conditions at the highway intersection where he was injured. In a summary judgment motion, ODOT claimed immunity under ORS 30.265(6)(c). ODOT’s claim of immunity rested on the theory that, because it had a policy of seeking highway safety improvement funding from the legislature only for the most crash-prone sites in the state highway system, ODOT’s omission of the crash site from its appropriation requests amounted to a budget-driven, discretionary policy decision not to make improvements at the site. Plaintiff opposed the motion with evidence that ODOT employees knew that the intersection was dangerous but had neglected to make improvements by using ODOT’s other mechanisms for evaluating and funding low-cost highway safety improvements. Although ODOT prevailed at the trial court, the Court of Appeals determined that questions of fact precluded summary judgment. ODOT argued to the Supreme Court that, when a state agency used a global process for setting priorities and allocating limited resources, discretionary-function immunity attached and the agency need not engage in further, particularized decision-making. "The record on summary judgment does not bear out that premise as a matter of undisputed fact. It follows that ODOT’s employment of the ranking process cannot resolve the issue of ODOT’s immunity under ORS 30.265(6)(c) as a matter of law. "Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for ODOT on that ground, and the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Turner v. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

The question this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review was whether a statute limiting a state employee’s tort liability violated either the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution or the jury trial clauses of Article I, section 17, and Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court held that the statute, as applied to the state employee, violated each of those provisions and entered a limited judgment against the employee for the full amount of the jury’s verdict. Plaintiff’s six-month-old son developed a cancerous mass on his liver. Two doctors at Oregon Health & Science University (OHSU) participated in an operation to remove the mass: Dr. Harrison, a specialist in pediatric surgery, and Dr. Durant, a pediatric surgical fellow in training. During the operation, the doctors inadvertently transected blood vessels going to the child’s liver, resulting in the child having to undergo a liver transplant, removal of his spleen, additional surgeries, and lifetime monitoring due to the risks resulting from the doctors’ act. Plaintiff brought this action on her son’s behalf against Harrison, Durant, OHSU, and Pediatric Surgical Associates, P.C. The trial court granted Pediatric Surgical Associates’ motion for summary judgment, and dismissed Durant as a result of an agreement among plaintiff, OHSU, and Harrison. Pursuant to that agreement, Harrison and OHSU admitted liability for the child’s injuries and plaintiff’s case against Harrison and OHSU went to the jury to determine the amount of the child’s damages. The jury found that plaintiff’s son had sustained and will sustain economic damages of $6,071,190.38 and noneconomic damages of $6,000,000. After the jury returned its verdict, OHSU and Harrison filed a motion to reduce the jury’s verdict to $3,000,000 based on the Oregon Tort Claims Act. The trial court granted the motion as to OHSU. The trial court, however, denied the motion as to Harrison. Harrison appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that applying the Tort Claims Act limit to plaintiff’s claim against defendant did not violate the remedy clause in Article I, section 10, nor does giving effect to that limit violate the jury trial clauses in Article I, section 17, or Article VII (Amended), section 3. View "Horton v. OHSU" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Rockwood Water People’s Utility District (Rockwood PUD), Northwest Natural Gas Company (NW Natural) and Portland General Electric Company (PGE) sought review of a Court of Appeals decision to uphold the validity of municipal enactments by respondent City of Gresham (the city) that increased the licensing fee that each utility was required to pay from five percent to seven percent of the utility’s gross revenues earned within the City. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the enactments were void and unenforceable because they conflicted with the provisions of ORS 221.450. Alternatively, Rockwood PUD argued that it could not be taxed more than five percent by a city without explicit statutory authority. Trial court agreed with plaintiffs that the enactments violated ORS 221.450, and did not reach Rockwood PUD’s alternative argument. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the fee increase was not preempted by ORS 221.450 because the utilities were not operating “without a franchise” and that a city’s home-rule authority to impose taxes or fees on a utility is not affected by a utility’s municipal corporation status. The Supreme Court held that the license fee imposed by the City was a “privilege tax” and that the affected utilities were operating “without a franchise” within the meaning of ORS 221.450. The Court also held that the City was not preempted by ORS 221.450 from imposing the seven percent privilege tax on NW Natural and PGE, but that the City did not have express statutory authority to impose a tax in excess of five percent on Rockwood PUD under ORS 221.450. View "Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Gresham" on Justia Law

Defendant took a pickup truckload of scrap metal items from the metal recycling bin of a Washington County microchip manufacturing plant and was subsequently charged with third-degree theft. At the close of the state’s case-in-chief, defendant unsuccessfully moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence presented by the state had failed to establish that the items he had taken possessed actual value. Defendant was subsequently convicted of the theft charge. The Court of Appeals affirmed that conviction, holding that the evidence adduced at trial had been sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find that the items stolen by defendant had indeed possessed some market value. Finding no reversible error with the Court of Appeals' decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Waterhouse" on Justia Law