Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2011, a 12-year-old girl, A, reported that defendant Jesus Prieto-Rubio, a member of her extended family, had sexually abused her the previous day. The following day, Detective Rookhuyzen went to defendant’s home and interviewed him. Defendant admitted that he had been in the same room with A, but he said that he did not remember what had happened there. Rookhuyzen arrested defendant for his abuse of A. At the station, Rookhuyzen interviewed defendant again. He asked defendant primarily about A. But he also asked whether any other children had come to defendant’s home. Defendant mentioned another child, K, but only by first name. The state ultimately charged defendant with first-degree sexual abuse of A. Defendant retained counsel to defend him on that charge. Over the next several weeks, Rookhuyzen continued to investigate, locating two of defendant's nieces who separately reported that defendant had touched her inappropriately. The nieces reported that the separate incidents occurred at least eight months before defendant allegedly abused A. The issue in this case centered on the extent to which the same constitutional provision prohibits the police from questioning a represented defendant charged with a crime about other, uncharged offenses. Defendant argued that police violated the right to counsel by questioning about other, uncharged offenses if those matters were in any way “factually related” to the crime for which he had obtained counsel. According to defendant, that is what happened in this case, and so the trial court should have suppressed certain statements that he made to police without the assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court concluded that the appropriate test for determining the permissible scope of questioning of a criminal defendant who is represented by counsel was whether it is objectively reasonably foreseeable that the questioning will lead to incriminating evidence concerning the offense for which the defendant has obtained counsel. In this case, the charged and uncharged offenses were so closely related that it was reasonably foreseeable that questioning defendant about the uncharged offenses would elicit incriminating evidence about the charged offense. As a result, that questioning violated defendant’s state constitutional right to counsel. View "Oregon v. Prieto-Rubio" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 51 (2016) (IP 51). IP 51 was a proposed constitutional amendment that, if adopted by the voters, would have changed current voter registration methods for federal, state, and local elections in Oregon by requiring in-person registration, thereby eliminating “motor-voter,” online, and mail registration options. Its passage also would result in the expiration within 10 years of all current Oregon voter registrations and establish other new requirements that must be satisfied in order for Oregonians to register to vote. Petitioners argued that the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). After review, the Oregon Supreme Court agreed that IP 51, as then-drafted, did not satisfy the requirements of Oregon law and referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Nearman v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Petitioners seek review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 62 (2016) (IP 62). IP 62 applied to public employees and public employee labor organizations. If adopted by the voters, IP 62 would amend several provisions of the Oregon Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act (PECBA). Petitioners argued that the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). After review, the Oregon Supreme Court agreed that IP 62, as then-drafted, did not satisfy the requirements of Oregon law and referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Conroy v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Taxpayer Leslie Scott appealed a tax court judgment that dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In 2012, the Department of Revenue issued notices of deficiency assessments against taxpayer relating to his personal income taxes for the tax years 2007 and 2008. Taxpayer appealed, and the Magistrate Division of the Tax Court determined that taxpayer had substantiated some claimed deductions that the department had disputed, but also that he had additional unreported income. Following the proceedings in the Magistrate Division, the department assessed additional income taxes for 2007 and 2008, and issued notices of liability balances to that effect. Taxpayer appealed to the Regular Division. The Tax Court received taxpayer’s complaint, a declaration of mailing, a motion for a stay of the requirement to pay the taxes owed, and the filing fee for the complaint. The Tax Court did not, however, receive an affidavit, with the complaint, alleging that payment of the disputed amounts pending appeal would cause him undue hardship. The department moved to dismiss taxpayer’s complaint on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter because taxpayer had not complied with the requirements of ORS 305.419 and TCR 18 C. Taxpayer opposed the department’s motion and submitted a declaration by his counsel that, according to counsel’s recollection, he had printed and assembled a packet for mailing to the Tax Court that included a complaint, a declaration of mailing, a motion for a stay, a hardship declaration, and a filing fee. Ultimately, the Tax Court granted the department’s motion. The Supreme Court reversed. "We hesitate to deem as jurisdictional a statutory requirement that is designed to allow someone without funds access to the courts to pursue their statutory appeal rights. […] what makes the taxpayer’s complaint subject to dismissal is the failure to establish undue hardship, not the failure to file an affidavit with the complaint." The Supreme Court concluded the Tax Court erred in dismissing taxpayer’s appeal on that ground. View "Scott v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

At issue before the Oregon Supreme Court in this matter was ORS 471.565(2), which provided an independent statutory right of action against a social host who served alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest, who in turn caused injuries to a third party. Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued the driver of the other vehicle, Defendant Diana Bunch, and the social host who served that driver, defendant Jeffrey King. Plaintiff asserted two claims against the social host: (1) for common-law negligence; and (2,at issue in this appeal) statutory liability. In the common-law negligence claim, plaintiff alleged that King was negligent in serving alcohol to his visibly intoxicated guest at his home when it was reasonably foreseeable that she would drive her vehicle and cause injury to persons on the roadway. In his statutory liability claim, plaintiff alleged that defendant was statutorily liable for serving alcohol to the guest in violation of ORS 471.565(2) Defendant filed a pretrial motion to dismiss plaintiff’s statutory liability claim for failure to allege ultimate facts sufficient to state a claim for relief. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and the case was tried solely on the common-law negligence claim, resulting in a jury verdict for defendant. Plaintiff appealed, arguing it was error to dismiss the statutory liability claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that in enacting ORS 471.565(2), the legislature intended to impose statutory liability on social hosts for serving visibly intoxicated guests. The appellate court also rejected defendant’s argument that any error in dismissing the statutory liability claim was rendered harmless by the jury instructions that the trial court gave. The Supreme Court concluded that ORS 471.565(2) does not provide a statutory liability claim against alcohol providers that exists independently from a claim for common-law negligence. Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the circuit court. View "Deckard v. Bunch" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of aggravated murder. He petitioned the Supreme Court for reconsideration of its prior decision in his case, arguing that the Supreme court erred in affirming the conviction, arguing: (1) the trial court did not err in allowing the prosecutor's extensive cross-examination of a defense witness at a pretrial hearing until after defendant interposed a second objection to that cross-examination; and (2) any trial court error allowing the extensive cross-examination was harmless. Upon reconsideration, the Supreme Court agreed that it was unclear in the opinion why it marked the error at the trial court’s overruling of the second and third objections, and allowed reconsideration to clarify the its reasoning in that regard. However, the Court found defendant's arguments as to "harmless error" to be unpersuasive, and denied reconsideration as to that issue. The petition for reconsideration was allowed, and the former opinion was modified and adhered to as modified. View "Oregon v. Agee" on Justia Law

The Commission on Judicial Fitness and Disability filed a formal complaint alleging that respondent Walter Miller, then a circuit court judge, had violated the Oregon Code of Judicial Conduct (Code) in connection with a 2014 voters’ pamphlet statement supporting his judicial candidacy. The commission specifically alleged violations of Rule 2.1(D) (judge shall not engage in “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation”) and Rule 5.1(D) (judicial candidate shall not knowingly or with reckless disregard for truth make any “false statement” concerning qualifications, education, experience, or other material fact relating to judicial campaign). The commission conducted a hearing and recommended that the Supreme Court dismiss the formal complaint. The Supreme Court accepted the commission’s recommendation. View "In re Miller" on Justia Law

While defendant Anthony Lazarides' criminal appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, he absconded from post-prison supervision, prompting the state to move for dismissal of his appeal. After defendant had been arrested and returned to supervision, the Court of Appeals granted the state’s motion to dismiss. Later, the Court of Appeals denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration and declined to reinstate his appeal after the state supplied additional information concerning defendant’s behavior. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on when a court determines a defendant’s status. The Supreme Court concluded that “the motion” referenced in ORAP 8.05(3) was the motion to dismiss, and agreed with the parties that the state failed to meet its burden to prove that defendant was on “abscond status” at the time that the Court of Appeals decided that motion. Thus, the court erred in dismissing defendant’s appeal. View "Oregon v. Lazarides" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review centered on whether a defamatory statement made in an online business review was entitled to First Amendment protection. Plaintiff Carol Neumann owned plaintiff Dancing Deer Mountain, LLC, a business that arranged and performed wedding events at a property owned by Neumann. Defendant Christopher Liles was a wedding guest who attended a wedding and reception held on Neumann’s property in June 2010. Two days after those events, Liles posted a negative review about Neumann and her business on Google Reviews, a publicly accessible website where individuals may post comments about services or products they have received. In response to Neumann and Dancing Deer Mountain's defamation claim, Liles filed a special motion to strike under Oregon’s Anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (Anti-SLAPP) statute. After a hearing, the trial court allowed Liles’s motion to strike and entered a judgment of dismissal of Neumann’s defamation claim without prejudice. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, reasoning that “the evidence submitted by plaintiffs, if credited, would permit a reasonable factfinder to rule in Neumann’s favor on the defamation claim, and the evidence submitted by [Liles] does not defeat Neumann’s claim as a matter of law.” After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the online review at issue in this case was entitled to First Amendment protection. The Court therefore reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals to the contrary and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to resolve a disputed attorney fee issue. View "Neumann v. Liles" on Justia Law

In consolidated juvenile dependency cases, father appealed judgments changing the permanent plans for one of his children from reunification with a parent to guardianship and for another child from reunification to another planned permanent living arrangement. Father argued that his trial counsel was inadequate for failing to appear on his behalf at the hearing in which the juvenile court decided to change the permanent plans. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether a parent could raise a claim of inadequate assistance of counsel for the first time on direct appeal from judgments changing the permanent plans for his children from reunification with a parent to permanent plans of guardianship and APPLA. After review, the Supreme Court answered that question in the affirmative. The Court concluded: (1) the unchallenged rationale of "Oregon ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Geist" (796 P2d 1193 (1990)), was applicable to a direct appeal from judgments that make such changes in the permanent plans for children who were wards of the court in dependency cases; and (2) the legislature’s enactment, following the Supreme Court's decision in "Geist," of a statute that provided a juvenile court procedure for modifying or setting aside a dependency judgment while an appeal from the judgment was pending, did not obviate the need for a direct appeal remedy for father’s claim of inadequate assistance of counsel. View "Dept. of Human Services v. T. L." on Justia Law