Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioners sought review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 61 (2016) (IP 61), arguing that the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035. IP 61 implicated the use of public funds to pay for abortions. As written, the Supreme Court found that the summary to the Initiative Petition did not address the limitation on access to abortion that would directly follow from the enactment of IP 61. "The Attorney General must revise the summary to describe that limitation." As written, the Court also found that the summary did not address the broad definition of the term “abortion,” but, with regard to contraception, it explained what the term abortion excluded, rather than what it included. "The summary provides that the measure '[d]efines ‘abortion’ to exclude termination of ectopic pregnancy, removing dead fetus/embryo, or contraceptives that ‘inhibit or prevent conception.’ In taking that approach, the Attorney General uses the literal terms of the measure, but obscures the meaning of the term 'abortion' rather than conveying the practical information that ORS 250.035 required. The Court referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Cross v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review concerned the extent to which a social host of a gathering at which alcohol is consumed is liable for injuries that occur during the party. The defendant hosted a party at which his guests drank alcohol. Two of the guests engaged in horseplay with loaded handguns, and one of the guests was killed. The personal representative of the decedent sued defendant, who asserted that, under ORS 471.565(2), he was not liable because he had not “served or provided” alcohol to the shooter “while” the shooter was “visibly intoxicated.” The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under ORS 471.545(2), a social host “serve[s] or provide[s]” alcohol when the host controls the alcohol supply, and in this case the evidence permitted an inference that defendant did that at a time when the shooter was visibly intoxicated. On review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and affirmed. View "Baker v. Croslin" on Justia Law

Defendant John Sines came to the attention of law enforcement after his housekeeper anonymously called the child protective services division of the Department of Human Services (DHS) and said that she suspected that defendant might be sexually abusing his adopted daughter. The housekeeper’s suspicions had been raised after finding an unusual “discharge” on several pairs of the child’s underwear, and she told DHS that she had considered taking a pair for authorities to examine. In response to a question from the housekeeper, the DHS employee who handled the call said that he would be able to connect the housekeeper with someone in law enforcement who could analyze the underwear and confirm or refute her concerns. The DHS employee told the housekeeper several times that he could not tell her to take the victim’s underwear. The next day the housekeeper obtained a pair of the victim’s underwear, and the following day she turned it over to the police. Based on that evidence and other statements by the housekeeper, police obtained a warrant and searched defendant’s house, after which defendant was arrested and charged with a number of sex crimes. Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained through the search and seizure of the underwear was denied, and he was convicted on four counts of first degree sexual abuse. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court had erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress. The issue this case raised for the Oregon Supreme Court's review was whether a private citizen’s seizure of criminal evidence was subject to suppression at trial as the fruit of an unlawful government search. The Court of Appeals concluded that, although the underwear had been procured by a private person, there was nevertheless sufficient contact between state officials and the private person that the warrantless search and seizure constituted state action, in violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed, acknowledging that this was a "close case:"Contacts between private individuals and state officers before a private search always require careful examination to determine whether, given all the circumstances, the state officers provided such affirmative encouragement and authorization to the private individuals so as to render them agents of the state. In this case . . . we hold that they did not." View "Oregon v. Sines" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a tragic helicopter crash in a remote part of Peru, which resulted in the deaths of everyone on board. Plaintiffs brought wrongful death actions in Oregon against Evergreen Helicopters, Inc. (Evergreen - an Oregon corporation) that provided the helicopter and the pilot. Evergreen filed motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ actions on forum non conveniens grounds, arguing that Peru was the appropriate forum in which to litigate those cases. The trial court consolidated the cases and granted Evergreen’s motions. Plaintiffs appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed. Although it concluded that the doctrine of forum non conveniens was available in Oregon, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred as a matter of law because it made factual determinations that went to the underlying merits of plaintiffs’ claims and failed to assess the materiality of the documentary and testimonial evidence with respect to the different claims in the complaint. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that forum non conveniens was part of the common law of Oregon and permitted a trial court to dismiss or stay an action under certain circumstances when justice required. The Court disagreed in some respects with the Court of Appeals as to the standards that governed the application of forum non conveniens, but agreed with its decision vacating the trial court judgments and remanding the cases back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Espinoza v. Evergreen Helicopters, Inc." on Justia Law

Two sets of petitioners sought review of the certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 69 (2016) (IP 69). IP 69, if enacted, would have altered the rights and obligations that public employers, their employees, and the unions representing those employees owe each other under the Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act (PECBA). IP 69, if enacted, would: (1) divide public employees within a bargaining unit into two groups (union and nonunion employees) and would provide different means for determining the employment terms (wages, benefits, and other employment terms) for each group; and (2) would determine a union’s obligation to represent union and nonunion employees within a bargaining unit equally and nonunion employees’ corresponding obligation to make “payments in lieu of dues.” Both sets of petitioners raised essentially the same challenge to the caption of the Initiative, although their specific arguments differed. ”At bottom, both sets of petitioners argue that the caption is too narrow and focuses on only some of the measure’s major effects, to the exclusion of other major effects." The Supreme Court agreed that the caption, the “yes” and “no” vote result statements, and the summary required modification. The Ballot title was referred to Attorney General for such modification. View "Vaandering v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

In 2011, a 12-year-old girl, A, reported that defendant Jesus Prieto-Rubio, a member of her extended family, had sexually abused her the previous day. The following day, Detective Rookhuyzen went to defendant’s home and interviewed him. Defendant admitted that he had been in the same room with A, but he said that he did not remember what had happened there. Rookhuyzen arrested defendant for his abuse of A. At the station, Rookhuyzen interviewed defendant again. He asked defendant primarily about A. But he also asked whether any other children had come to defendant’s home. Defendant mentioned another child, K, but only by first name. The state ultimately charged defendant with first-degree sexual abuse of A. Defendant retained counsel to defend him on that charge. Over the next several weeks, Rookhuyzen continued to investigate, locating two of defendant's nieces who separately reported that defendant had touched her inappropriately. The nieces reported that the separate incidents occurred at least eight months before defendant allegedly abused A. The issue in this case centered on the extent to which the same constitutional provision prohibits the police from questioning a represented defendant charged with a crime about other, uncharged offenses. Defendant argued that police violated the right to counsel by questioning about other, uncharged offenses if those matters were in any way “factually related” to the crime for which he had obtained counsel. According to defendant, that is what happened in this case, and so the trial court should have suppressed certain statements that he made to police without the assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court concluded that the appropriate test for determining the permissible scope of questioning of a criminal defendant who is represented by counsel was whether it is objectively reasonably foreseeable that the questioning will lead to incriminating evidence concerning the offense for which the defendant has obtained counsel. In this case, the charged and uncharged offenses were so closely related that it was reasonably foreseeable that questioning defendant about the uncharged offenses would elicit incriminating evidence about the charged offense. As a result, that questioning violated defendant’s state constitutional right to counsel. View "Oregon v. Prieto-Rubio" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 51 (2016) (IP 51). IP 51 was a proposed constitutional amendment that, if adopted by the voters, would have changed current voter registration methods for federal, state, and local elections in Oregon by requiring in-person registration, thereby eliminating “motor-voter,” online, and mail registration options. Its passage also would result in the expiration within 10 years of all current Oregon voter registrations and establish other new requirements that must be satisfied in order for Oregonians to register to vote. Petitioners argued that the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). After review, the Oregon Supreme Court agreed that IP 51, as then-drafted, did not satisfy the requirements of Oregon law and referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Nearman v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Petitioners seek review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 62 (2016) (IP 62). IP 62 applied to public employees and public employee labor organizations. If adopted by the voters, IP 62 would amend several provisions of the Oregon Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act (PECBA). Petitioners argued that the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). After review, the Oregon Supreme Court agreed that IP 62, as then-drafted, did not satisfy the requirements of Oregon law and referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Conroy v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Taxpayer Leslie Scott appealed a tax court judgment that dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In 2012, the Department of Revenue issued notices of deficiency assessments against taxpayer relating to his personal income taxes for the tax years 2007 and 2008. Taxpayer appealed, and the Magistrate Division of the Tax Court determined that taxpayer had substantiated some claimed deductions that the department had disputed, but also that he had additional unreported income. Following the proceedings in the Magistrate Division, the department assessed additional income taxes for 2007 and 2008, and issued notices of liability balances to that effect. Taxpayer appealed to the Regular Division. The Tax Court received taxpayer’s complaint, a declaration of mailing, a motion for a stay of the requirement to pay the taxes owed, and the filing fee for the complaint. The Tax Court did not, however, receive an affidavit, with the complaint, alleging that payment of the disputed amounts pending appeal would cause him undue hardship. The department moved to dismiss taxpayer’s complaint on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter because taxpayer had not complied with the requirements of ORS 305.419 and TCR 18 C. Taxpayer opposed the department’s motion and submitted a declaration by his counsel that, according to counsel’s recollection, he had printed and assembled a packet for mailing to the Tax Court that included a complaint, a declaration of mailing, a motion for a stay, a hardship declaration, and a filing fee. Ultimately, the Tax Court granted the department’s motion. The Supreme Court reversed. "We hesitate to deem as jurisdictional a statutory requirement that is designed to allow someone without funds access to the courts to pursue their statutory appeal rights. […] what makes the taxpayer’s complaint subject to dismissal is the failure to establish undue hardship, not the failure to file an affidavit with the complaint." The Supreme Court concluded the Tax Court erred in dismissing taxpayer’s appeal on that ground. View "Scott v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

At issue before the Oregon Supreme Court in this matter was ORS 471.565(2), which provided an independent statutory right of action against a social host who served alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest, who in turn caused injuries to a third party. Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued the driver of the other vehicle, Defendant Diana Bunch, and the social host who served that driver, defendant Jeffrey King. Plaintiff asserted two claims against the social host: (1) for common-law negligence; and (2,at issue in this appeal) statutory liability. In the common-law negligence claim, plaintiff alleged that King was negligent in serving alcohol to his visibly intoxicated guest at his home when it was reasonably foreseeable that she would drive her vehicle and cause injury to persons on the roadway. In his statutory liability claim, plaintiff alleged that defendant was statutorily liable for serving alcohol to the guest in violation of ORS 471.565(2) Defendant filed a pretrial motion to dismiss plaintiff’s statutory liability claim for failure to allege ultimate facts sufficient to state a claim for relief. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and the case was tried solely on the common-law negligence claim, resulting in a jury verdict for defendant. Plaintiff appealed, arguing it was error to dismiss the statutory liability claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that in enacting ORS 471.565(2), the legislature intended to impose statutory liability on social hosts for serving visibly intoxicated guests. The appellate court also rejected defendant’s argument that any error in dismissing the statutory liability claim was rendered harmless by the jury instructions that the trial court gave. The Supreme Court concluded that ORS 471.565(2) does not provide a statutory liability claim against alcohol providers that exists independently from a claim for common-law negligence. Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the circuit court. View "Deckard v. Bunch" on Justia Law