Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that certain taxicab drivers performed services for Broadway Cab LLC for remuneration and were not independent contractors. Therefore, the ALJ concluded, Broadway was liable for unemployment insurance taxes on the drivers’ wages. The Court of Appeals agreed with the ALJ and affirmed. Broadway appealed, and after its review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and also affirmed. View "Broadway Cab LLC v. Employment Dept." on Justia Law

TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., and its directors were defendants in two consolidated shareholder derivative suits filed in Washington State. TriQuint moved to dismiss those suits on the ground that its corporate bylaws establish Delaware as the exclusive forum for shareholder derivative suits. The trial court denied TriQuint’s motion to dismiss, and the Supreme Court allowed TriQuint’s petition for an alternative writ of mandamus. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that, as a matter of Delaware law, TriQuint’s bylaw was a valid forum-selection clause and bound its shareholders. The Court also concluded that, as a matter of Oregon law, the bylaw was enforceable. The Court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the trial court to grant TriQuint’s motion to dismiss. View "Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue presented in this case was one of first impression: to what extent do the confidentiality provisions of Oregon’s mediation statutes (ORS 36.100 to 36.238) prevent a client from offering evidence of communications made by his attorney and others in a subsequent malpractice action against that attorney? Plaintiff retained defendant, an attorney specializing in employment law, to pursue discrimination and retaliation claims against plaintiff’s former employer. In the course of that representation, defendant filed administrative complaints with the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries and thereafter a civil action against the former employer for damages on plaintiff’s behalf. After limited discovery, plaintiff, represented by defendant, and plaintiff’s former employer entered into mediation under the terms and conditions set forth in the mediation statutes. Before meeting with the mediator and plaintiff’s former employer, defendant advised plaintiff about the potential value of his claims and the amount for which he might settle the lawsuit. Plaintiff and his former employer, along with their respective lawyers and the mediator, attended a joint mediation session and attempted to resolve the dispute. However, no resolution was reached. After the session ended, the mediator proposed a settlement package to the parties. In the weeks that followed, defendant provided advice to plaintiff about the proposed settlement. At defendant’s urging, plaintiff accepted the proposed terms and signed a settlement agreement with his former employer. One of the terms to which plaintiff agreed was that the settlement agreement would be confidential. After the parties signed the agreement, defendant continued to counsel plaintiff and provide legal advice regarding the settlement. Some months after the mediation ended, plaintiff concluded that defendant’s legal representation had been deficient and negatively affected the outcome of his case. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to strike certain allegations in plaintiff’s complaint and then dismissed the complaint with prejudice under ORCP 21 A(8) for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that ORS 36.220 and 36.222 barred some, but not all, of plaintiff’s allegations, and that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice before a responsive pleading had been filed. The Supreme Court agreed that ORS 36.220 and 36.222 limited the subsequent disclosure of mediation settlement terms and certain communications that occur in the course of or in connection with mediation. The Court disagreed, however, as to the scope of communications that are confidential under those statutes. Furthermore, the Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals as to whether the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice because no responsive pleading had been filed. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alfieri v. Solomon" on Justia Law

In the underlying lawsuit, the Oregon Supreme Court was asked to consider challenges to legislative amendments aimed at reducing the costs of the Public Employee Retirement System (PERS). Those challenges were brought by petitioners, who were active and retired members of PERS. The Supreme Court rejected petitioners’ challenge to the elimination of income tax offset benefits for nonresident retirees but agreed in part with petitioners’ claim that modifications to the PERS cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) formula impaired petitioners’ contractual rights and therefore violated the state Contract Clause, Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution. Although petitioners had argued that the state could not change the COLA formula for any current PERS member, the Court held that the COLA amendments impaired the PERS contract only insofar as the amendments applied retrospectively to benefits earned before the effective dates of the amendments. Claimants, who were pro se petitioners and attorneys representing the original petitioners, sought fees and costs. The Supreme Court remanded this case to a special master to make findings and recommend a reasonable amount of fees and costs. View "Moro v. Oregon" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with the aggravated murder of a prison inmate while he himself was an inmate. Defendant's case came before the Oregon Supreme Court on automatic review because defendant was sentenced to death. Defendant raised 29 assignments of error relating to his conviction and sentence. After careful consideration of each, the Supreme Court concluded that "many of them are not well taken" and did "not merit further discussion." View "Oregon v. Agee" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, petitioners sought review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petitions 45 and 46 (2016) (IP 45 and IP 46), contending that the caption, the “yes” results statements, and the summaries did not comply with requirements set out in ORS 250.035(2). IP 46 was an alternative proposal to IP 45. Both Initiative Petitions would have amended aspects of a bill that the legislature enacted during the 2015 legislative session, Senate Bill (SB) 324 (Or Laws 2015, ch 4). SB 324 made changes to a 2009 state law that permitted the Oregon Environmental Quality Commission (EQC) to adopt standards and requirements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and to adopt low carbon fuel standards for gasoline, diesel, and alternative fuels, as well as a schedule to reduce by 2020 the average amount of greenhouse gas emissions by 10 percent below 2010 levels. IP 46 would change parts of the original 2009 law and SB 324, repeating some (but not all) of the changes contained in IP 45, and making other changes. After review of petitioners’ arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that text of the Initiative Petitions did not substantially comply with that statutory standard. The Supreme Court therefore referred both ballot titles to the Attorney General for modification of the caption, the “yes” result statements, and the summaries. View "Blosser v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition (IP) 40 (2016), contending that the caption, the “yes” result statement, and the summary did not comply with requirements set out in ORS 250.035(2). IP 40 was a proposed statute that would make several changes to state law relating to the use and speaking of the English language. Section 1 declared English to be the official language of the State of Oregon and then required that official state actions be taken in English. Section 1 further provided that, with exceptions, persons who spoke only English must be eligible for all programs, benefits, and opportunities of the state and its subdivisions, including employment; and that English-only speakers may not be penalized, or have their rights or opportunities impaired, solely because they speak only English. Section 2 set out exceptions to certain aspects of section 1, detailing purposes for which the state and its “political subdivisions” may use a language other than English. Section 5 granted standing to any resident or person doing business in Oregon to seek a declaratory judgment as to whether a violation of the proposed statute has occurred and, if so, to obtain injunctive relief, with costs and reasonable attorney fees awarded to the prevailing party. After review of the initiative petition, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the “yes” result statement did not substantially comply with that statutory standard. The Attorney General was ordered to modify the “yes” result statement to more clearly and accurately describe two significant components of IP 40 not already captured in that statement. View "Kendoll v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder in 1988. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed those convictions in 1990, but vacated defendant’s death sentence three times and remanded each time for new penalty-phase trials. This case was an automatic and direct review of defendant’s fourth death sentence. Defendant raised 87 assignments of error. The Supreme Court found that only 13 merited discussion, and even then, found no error in the trial court’s handling of his case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed defendant’s death sentences. View "Oregon v. Guzek" on Justia Law

A condominium homeowners association sued a contractor for negligence. The contractor’s insurer refused to defend the contractor against the action, and the contractor and the homeowners association thereafter entered into a settlement that included a stipulated judgment against the contractor, a covenant by the homeowners association not to execute that judgment, and an assignment to the homeowners association of the contractor’s claims against its insurer. When the homeowners association then initiated a garnishment action against the insurer, however, the trial court dismissed the action on the ground that, under “Stubblefield v. St. Paul Fire & Marine,” (517 P2d 262 (1973)), the covenant not to execute had released the contractor from any obligation to pay the homeowners association and, in the process, necessarily released the insurer too. The homeowners association appealed, arguing that “Stubblefield” either was distinguishable on its facts or had been superseded by statute. In the alternative, it argued that Stubblefield should have been overruled. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that, although Stubblefield was not distinguishable and had not been superseded by statute, it was wrongly decided. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Brownstone Homes Condo. Assn. v. Brownstone Forest Hts." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that, after being served alcohol at defendant’s bar when he was visibly intoxicated, a patron, Mayfield, walked down the street to another business location and, without intending to do so, fired a gun through the doorway, causing injuries to plaintiffs. The trial court granted defendant’s summary judgment motion, concluding that plaintiffs had presented insufficient evidence to permit an inference that the type of harm that plaintiffs suffered was reasonably foreseeable to defendant when it served alcohol to Mayfield while he was visibly intoxicated. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the ensuing judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ claim against defendant. On review, the Supreme Court concluded plaintiffs’ evidence was not sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find that the harm that plaintiffs suffered was a reasonably foreseeable risk of defendant’s conduct. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Chapman v. Mayfield" on Justia Law