Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After defendant Ema Ramos set fire to her restaurant and filed a fraudulent claim with her insurance company for damage to restaurant equipment, she was convicted of second-degree arson and attempted first-degree aggravated theft. The trial court ordered defendant to pay restitution and included in its restitution award to one of the victims, defendant’s insurer, fees that the victim had paid to attorneys and investigators for their time spent in investigating defendant’s claim for benefits and in providing grand jury and trial testimony. Defendant challenged that award on appeal, claiming that it was improper to include those investigation and witness fees in the award. The Court of Appeals affirmed the restitution award, and finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed too. View "Oregon v. Ramos" on Justia Law

In July 2010, defendant Roman Suppah was driving his girlfriend’s car. Deputy Sheriff Hulke stopped defendant for a traffic violation. After being stopped, defendant “told [the deputy that] his name was Harold Pennington, born in 7/21/64.” Defendant said that he lived in Warm Springs but that he did not “have a physical address or a mailing address.” The deputy contacted the dispatcher to check the name and date of birth that defendant had given him. The dispatcher told him that “Pennington was driving while suspended,” and defendant did not offer any proof of insurance. The deputy cited defendant (as Pennington) for driving while suspended and driving without insurance. The deputy did not cite defendant for the traffic violation that had led him to stop defendant in the first place, nor did he make a written record of the reason why he had stopped defendant. As the deputy later explained, the traffic violation that had led him to stop defendant was one for which he normally gives drivers a warning but no citation. The state charged defendant with giving false information to a deputy sheriff. Later, at a hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress, the deputy could not remember the specific traffic violation that had led him to stop defendant. The trial court found that the state’s inability to establish the reason for the stop rendered it unlawful, but it denied defendant’s motion to suppress the statements that defendant had made following the stop. Focusing on defendant’s reasons for giving the deputy false information, the trial court found that defendant’s decision to do so was independent of the illegality. The en banc Court of Appeals reversed. The Oregon Supreme Court allowed the state’s petition for review and reversed the Court of Appeals decision. "[F]rom a temporal perspective, the illegality did not become apparent until months later at the suppression hearing when the officer could not remember which traffic violation had led him to stop defendant. The trial court correctly concluded that the stop had no appreciable effect on defendant’s decision to give the deputy a false name and date of birth. Because that decision attenuated the taint of the unlawful stop, the trial court correctly denied defendant’s motion to suppress his statements." View "Oregon v. Suppah" on Justia Law

Defendant was a general contractor that builds “spec” houses (houses built without pre-existing construction contracts in anticipation of eventual sale to the public). On May 30, 2000, defendant and plaintiff entered into a purchase and sale agreement for a house. Although most of the construction had been completed, the agreement specified that defendant would make changes to the interior of the house. Specifically, defendant agreed to upgrade some of the flooring, install an air conditioning unit, and install a gas dryer in the laundry room. After defendant made those changes and the parties conducted a walk-through inspection, the sale closed on July 12, 2000. The primary question in this construction defect case was which of two statutes of repose applied when a buyer enters into a purchase and sale agreement to buy an existing home. Although each statute provided for a 10-year period of repose, the two periods of repose ran from different dates. One runs from “the date of the act or omission complained of;” the other ran from the date that construction is “substantial[ly] complet[e].” In this case, the trial court found that plaintiff filed her action more than 10 years after “the date of the act or omission complained of” but less than 10 years after the construction was “substantial[ly] complet[e].” The trial court ruled that the first statute, ORS 12.115(1), applied and accordingly entered judgment in defendant’s favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After review of the parties' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed. View "Shell v. Schollander Companies, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Alen Simonov and his brother, Vadim, talked to their neighbor about purchasing a 1983 Datsun pickup truck. The neighbor testified that she agreed to allow the brothers to take the truck to a car wash to check for an oil leak. The neighbor watched the brothers drive away. Because the brothers failed to return the truck when she expected them to, the neighbor reported the truck stolen. Defendant later left a voicemail message stating, “I’m in Portland. We’re bringing the truck back.” The neighbor saw Vadim pull the truck into her driveway several hours later, with defendant in the passenger seat. Defendant appealed his conviction for unauthorized use of a vehicle (UUV), a felony offense committed when a person “takes, operates, exercises control over, rides in or otherwise uses another’s vehicle * * * without consent of the owner.” At trial, defendant requested an instruction that, to reach a guilty verdict, the jury must find that he knew that the use of the vehicle was without the owner’s consent; instead, the trial court instructed the jury that it could convict defendant if it found that he was criminally negligent with regard to whether the owner had consented. The Court of Appeals reversed defendant’s conviction on the ground that the charged offense required that the person riding in the vehicle knew that the vehicle was being used without the owner’s consent, the trial court therefore improperly instructed the jury, and the error was reversible. After review of this case, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, reversed the judgment convicting defendant, and remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Simonov" on Justia Law

As part of a highway improvement project, plaintiff Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT or the state), brought a condemnation action against defendant Alderwoods (Oregon), Inc., seeking to acquire "[a]ll abutter’s rights of access, if any," between defendant’s property and Highway 99W. The improvement project involved rebuilding the sidewalk along Highway 99W and eliminating two driveways that previously had allowed direct vehicular access from defendant’s property to the highway. Defendant’s property retained access to the highway, however, by means of two driveways onto a city street that ran perpendicular to and intersected the highway. Before trial, the state moved in limine to exclude as irrelevant evidence of any diminution in value of defendant’s property as a result of the loss of the two driveways. The trial court concluded that the elimination of those driveways had not effected a taking of defendant’s right of access to the highway and granted the state’s motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court that there was no taking in this case, and affirmed. View "ODOT v. Alderwoods" on Justia Law

Police officers entered a residence without a warrant and opened a wooden box that they found in a bedroom, believing that they had lawful consent to take each of those actions. Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance based on evidence found in the box, and moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the persons who had given consent to the home entry and the search of the box were not authorized to give consent. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant appealed her conviction, arguing that there was no evidence that she had consented to the home entry or the search of the box. The state replied that, for purposes of Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution, the persons who gave consent to the entry and search had actual authority to do so. The Court of Appeals reversed. Focusing specifically on the search of the box, that court rejected the state’s argument that the person who had consented to the search had actual authority to give consent, based on her shared possession and control of the room in which the box was located. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the warrantless search of the wooden box in this case was not authorized under the consent exception to the warrant requirement. Furthermore, the Court concluded the state’s alternative argument (that the search was lawful because it was reasonable) was essentially a request to overturn the Court's longstanding construction of Article I, section 9. The Court declined the state's argument, affirmed the Court of Appeals, reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Bonilla" on Justia Law

Defendant and her five-year-old daughter were passengers in a borrowed car driven by defendant’s 17-year-old daughter. A police officer stopped the car for a traffic violation and, during the stop, noticed objects in defendant’s open purse that appeared to be drugs. The officer asked for consent to search the car, which defendant gave. As a result of the consent search, the officer confirmed that defendant’s purse contained drugs. Based on those facts, defendant was charged with unlawful possession of heroin (ORS 475.854), unlawful possession of methamphetamine (ORS 475.894), unlawful possession of a controlled substance (ORS 475.752(3)(b)), and two counts of child endangerment (ORS 163.575). The issue in this case was whether ORS 163.575 was violated when a person knowingly possesses drugs in a container (here, a purse) while in a car with two children. The Supreme Court concluded that a person in that circumstance can be found to have engaged in unlawful “activity” involving controlled substances. The Court agreed with defendant, however, that when, as here, the possession of the drugs in the car is a brief isolated incident of illegal drug activity, the car is not, within the meaning of the statute, “a place” where unlawful activity involving controlled substances “is maintained or conducted.” The Court therefore concluded that defendant was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the charges of child endangerment, and reversed the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals which held to the contrary. View "Oregon v. Gonzalez-Valenzuela" on Justia Law

In this case, an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that certain taxicab drivers performed services for Broadway Cab LLC for remuneration and were not independent contractors. Therefore, the ALJ concluded, Broadway was liable for unemployment insurance taxes on the drivers’ wages. The Court of Appeals agreed with the ALJ and affirmed. Broadway appealed, and after its review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and also affirmed. View "Broadway Cab LLC v. Employment Dept." on Justia Law

TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., and its directors were defendants in two consolidated shareholder derivative suits filed in Washington State. TriQuint moved to dismiss those suits on the ground that its corporate bylaws establish Delaware as the exclusive forum for shareholder derivative suits. The trial court denied TriQuint’s motion to dismiss, and the Supreme Court allowed TriQuint’s petition for an alternative writ of mandamus. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that, as a matter of Delaware law, TriQuint’s bylaw was a valid forum-selection clause and bound its shareholders. The Court also concluded that, as a matter of Oregon law, the bylaw was enforceable. The Court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the trial court to grant TriQuint’s motion to dismiss. View "Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue presented in this case was one of first impression: to what extent do the confidentiality provisions of Oregon’s mediation statutes (ORS 36.100 to 36.238) prevent a client from offering evidence of communications made by his attorney and others in a subsequent malpractice action against that attorney? Plaintiff retained defendant, an attorney specializing in employment law, to pursue discrimination and retaliation claims against plaintiff’s former employer. In the course of that representation, defendant filed administrative complaints with the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries and thereafter a civil action against the former employer for damages on plaintiff’s behalf. After limited discovery, plaintiff, represented by defendant, and plaintiff’s former employer entered into mediation under the terms and conditions set forth in the mediation statutes. Before meeting with the mediator and plaintiff’s former employer, defendant advised plaintiff about the potential value of his claims and the amount for which he might settle the lawsuit. Plaintiff and his former employer, along with their respective lawyers and the mediator, attended a joint mediation session and attempted to resolve the dispute. However, no resolution was reached. After the session ended, the mediator proposed a settlement package to the parties. In the weeks that followed, defendant provided advice to plaintiff about the proposed settlement. At defendant’s urging, plaintiff accepted the proposed terms and signed a settlement agreement with his former employer. One of the terms to which plaintiff agreed was that the settlement agreement would be confidential. After the parties signed the agreement, defendant continued to counsel plaintiff and provide legal advice regarding the settlement. Some months after the mediation ended, plaintiff concluded that defendant’s legal representation had been deficient and negatively affected the outcome of his case. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to strike certain allegations in plaintiff’s complaint and then dismissed the complaint with prejudice under ORCP 21 A(8) for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that ORS 36.220 and 36.222 barred some, but not all, of plaintiff’s allegations, and that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice before a responsive pleading had been filed. The Supreme Court agreed that ORS 36.220 and 36.222 limited the subsequent disclosure of mediation settlement terms and certain communications that occur in the course of or in connection with mediation. The Court disagreed, however, as to the scope of communications that are confidential under those statutes. Furthermore, the Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals as to whether the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice because no responsive pleading had been filed. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alfieri v. Solomon" on Justia Law