Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Fernando Clemente-Perez was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm. At the close of the state’s case, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state had not presented sufficient evidence that he had “[p]ossesse[d] a handgun that is concealed and readily accessible to the person within any vehicle,” within the meaning of ORS 166.250(1)(b). Alternatively, defendant argued that he qualified for an exception under ORS 166.250(2)(b), which provided a person may possess a handgun at the person’s “place of residence.” The trial court rejected those arguments, and a jury found defendant guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that defendant failed to preserve his argument that he had not been “within any vehicle” at the time that he possessed a handgun, and that he did not meet the “place of residence” exception. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Oregon v. Clemente-Perez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by jury on one count of sodomy, one count of rape, and one count of unlawful sexual penetration. On appeal of that conviction, he argued that the trial court erred in failing to give his requested jury instruction that ten jurors had to agree on what factual occurrence constituted each of the offenses. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly declined to give the requested instruction. On review, defendant argued that the circumstances of this case fell within the rule providing that, when a single crime has been charged but the evidence is sufficient for the jury to find that there were multiple, separate occurrences of the charged crime involving the same victim and the same perpetrator during the period of time alleged in the indictment, the state either must elect which occurrence constituted the charged crime or, alternatively, the defendant is entitled to an instruction that ten or more jurors must concur on which occurrence constituted that crime. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in failing to give defendant's proposed concurrence instruction. However, the Court concluded that the error was harmless, and therefore affirmed defendant's convictions. View "Oregon v. Ashkins" on Justia Law

Defendants were in the business of processing and selling industrial wood products and maintained a large inventory at numerous distribution centers throughout the United States. In 2002, defendants and plaintiffs entered into an asset purchase agreement (PA), which provided for the merger of the two companies, changes in personnel, and until plaintiffs' purchase of an inventory unit, plaintiffs, for a fee, would provide defendants with "all management and administrative services associated with purchasing, processing, and maintaining [defendants'] inventory." In 2003, plaintiffs' books were audited by a certified public accountant, Schmidt. Schmidt found unusual entries in the books and many entries that did not appear to be related to normal inventory activity. After Schmidt completed his work on defendants' books, the bookkeeper who was employed by plaintiffs but was providing inventory-related services to defendants, was discovered to have embezzled at least $360,000 from defendants' accounts. Three legal actions (including this case) ensued. The issue on review in this case was whether the trial court erred in denying defendants' motion for a new trial under ORCP 64 (B)(4),2 based on the asserted ground of newly discovered evidence. The trial court determined that defendants' proffered evidence did not satisfy the legal standard for granting a new trial under that rule. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that defendants' post-trial proffer qualified as newly discovered evidence, that the evidence was material for defendants, and that defendants exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to produce the evidence at trial. Because the Supreme Court concluded that, irrespective of whether the proffered evidence was newly discovered and material for defendants, defendants failed to exercise reasonable diligence to produce the evidence at trial. Ultimately, the Court concluded the trial court did not err in denying defendants' motion for a new trial. View "Greenwood Products v. Greenwood Forest Products" on Justia Law

Appellant AT&T (together with subsidiaries) appealed a Tax Court judgment that denied AT&T's claim for a refund of a portion of the Oregon corporate excise taxes it paid for tax years 1996 through 1999. The dispute centered on AT&T's sale of interstate and international phone and data transmissions. The issue this case presented on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether those sales were counted in determining the fraction of AT&T's income that Oregon can tax. AT&T presented a cost study that purported to show that Oregon did not have the greatest share of the "costs of performance." The Department of Revenue challenged AT&T's interpretation of "income-producing activity" and attacked the validity of its cost study. The Tax Court ruled in favor of the department. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that AT&T did not use a correct definition of "income-producing activity [:] AT&T's proposed interpretation [was] network-based; it focused on the operation of its network as a whole. The correct understanding, however, is transaction-based; it examines individual sales to customers. AT&T thus failed to meet its burden of proof, because it did not correctly calculate the 'costs of performance' for the correct 'income-producing activities.'" View "AT&T Corp. v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Appellants were three municipal corporations located in Washington State: The City of Seattle, the City of Tacoma, and Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County (taxpayers). Each taxpayer owned an interest in electrical transmission capacity that was purchased from the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and was used for transmitting electricity over the Northwest's federally-administered power transmission grid. Together, the taxpayers appealed the grant of summary judgment in which the OregonTax Court, citing "Power Resources Cooperative v. Dept. of Rev.," (996 P2d 969 (2000)), concluded that taxpayers' interest in electrical transmission capacity could (because much of that grid was located in Oregon) be taxed by the department as a property interest "held" by taxpayers, under ORS 307.060. On appeal, taxpayers argued that: (1) "Power Resources" was wrongly decided; (2) the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in "Pacificorp Power Marketing v. Dept. of Rev.," (131 P3d 725 (2006)) did not apply in this case; and (3) the Oregon legislature's repeal of the 2005 property tax exemption benefitting out-of-state power-generating municipalities was enacted in violation of Article IV, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution, a provision that required bills for raising revenue originate in the House of Representatives. The Oregon Court rejected the taxpayers' arguments and affirmed the Oregon Tax Court. View "City of Seattle v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

The Department of Revenue appealed a Tax Court decision that accepted the property valuation proposed by taxpayer Hewlett-Packard (HP). In reaching that conclusion, the Tax Court held that the highest and best use of HP's property was a continuation of its current use as a single-tenant, owner-occupied research and manufacturing facility. The Tax Court also held that, of the numerous buildings on the campus, a potential owner would anticipate using only certain "core" buildings and would not anticipate using the "non-core" buildings. As a result, those non-core buildings were components of the property that prevented it from cost-effectively serving its highest and best use. The Tax Court, therefore, assessed the value of the loss caused by the presence of the non-core buildings. To do so, the Tax Court calculated the additional operating expenses that an owner would incur while operating the subject property as compared to the operating expenses that an owner would incur while operating a cost-effective version of the property consisting of only the core space. On appeal, the department raised the narrow issue of whether the Tax Court properly applied the administrative rule defining the value of the loss, OAR 150-308.205-(F)(3)(k). The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the Tax Court properly identified the value of the loss as the additional operating expenses that an owner would incur to operate the subject property compared to a more cost-effective option. View "Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Benton County Assessor" on Justia Law

Oregon's sentencing guidelines provided that, if a defendant with multiple terms of probation commits a single probation violation, any resulting terms of incarceration must be imposed concurrently, not consecutively. The state argued that, in consequence of the probation violation, the trial court should revoke probation and impose consecutive sentences of incarceration on each count in defendant David Lane's case, in light of the fact that the original charges involved four different victims. Defendant objected, arguing that, under the applicable provision of the sentencing guidelines, any terms of incarceration imposed as a result of a single probation violation must be served concurrently. In response, the state argued that, notwithstanding the guidelines, the court had authority to impose consecutive sentences under Article I, section 44(1)(b). The trial court agreed with the state, concluding that, under Article I, section 44(1)(b), it was "allowed to give consecutive sentences in this case, based upon the fact that there were four separate victims." The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that, because the imposition of terms of incarceration as a sanction for probation violation is not "sentenc[ing] * * * for crimes" within the meaning of Article I, section 44(1)(b), there was no conflict, so the guidelines provision validly prohibited the imposition of consecutive sentences. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the trial court correctly determined that the guidelines provision conflicted with Article I, section 44(1)(b). "Imposing terms of incarceration as a sanction upon probation revocation amounts to 'sentenc[ing] * * * for crimes' within the meaning of the constitution. Article I, section 44(1)(b), therefore controls, and the conflicting provision of the guidelines is invalid." View "Oregon v. Lane" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review was whether discovery of the parties’ assets had to be provided in a marital dissolution action after the parties entered into a settlement agreement, but before the trial court has ruled on a contested motion to enforce the agreement. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court in this case did not satisfy its duty under ORS 107.105(1)(f)(F) to ensure that the parties had fully disclosed their assets before it decided the husband’s motion to enforce a mediated agreement and entered a judgment of dissolution based on that decision. Accordingly, the Court reversed that portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals that upheld the trial court’s discovery ruling, vacated the remainder of the Court of Appeals’ decision, and reversed the judgment of dissolution. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Pollock v. Pollock" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a citizen of Mexico and, until 2006, was a permanent legal resident of the United States. In 2003, the state charged him with possession and distribution of a controlled substance after police officers found him in possession of five pounds of marijuana. The presumptive sentence on the distribution charge was 19 to 20 months in prison. Petitioner explained to his defense counsel that his primary goal was to avoid serving time in prison so that he could continue his job and education. Given the likelihood of conviction and petitioner’s stated goal of avoiding prison time, his defense counsel negotiated a plea deal with the prosecutor, which the trial court tentatively approved. Pursuant to that deal, petitioner agreed to plead guilty to distribution of a controlled substance, and the state agreed to dismiss the possession charge and recommend probation. In discussing the case with petitioner, defense counsel told him, as she told all her clients who were not United States citizens, that “the Federal Government can do whatever [it] wants to do and so [you] need to understand that [you] could be deported” as a result of pleading guilty. She later characterized her advice “as something more than ‘may’ be deported, but something less than ‘will’ be deported” as a result of a guilty plea. After petitioner’s conviction became final, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) did not seek to remove petitioner from the U.S. Rather, petitioner continued to live and work in this country until 2005, when he went on a personal trip to Mexico. When petitioner attempted to return to the U.S., federal immigration officials detained him at the border and then admitted him in January 2006 for a “deferred inspection” so that they could determine the effect of his state conviction. Slightly less than two years after his state conviction became final, petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, alleging his defense counsel for the 2003 conviction gave him ineffective assistance of counsel, and that his plea was not knowing because the trial court did not inform him of the consequences that faces him if he signed the plea. Petitioner was ultimately denied post-conviction relief. While the case made its way through the Oregon courts, the federal Supreme Court decided "Padilla v. Kentucky," (555 US 1169 (2009)). In light of "Padilla," petitioner brought a second petition for post-conviction relief, which was again denied. The Supreme Court affirmed denial of post-conviction relief, finding that ORS 138.550(3) barred the grounds for relief alleged in petitioner’s second post-conviction petition. View "Verduzco v. Oregon" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted on a single count of first-degree sex abuse. On appeal of his sentence, he argued the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude expert testimony concerning a diagnosis of child sexual abuse, in addition to the evaluative criteria underlying that diagnosis. Defendant contended that the testimony impermissibly commented on the credibility of the complaining witness in this case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. And finding no reversible error in either the trial or appellate courts' judgments, the Supreme Court affirmed too. View "Oregon v. Beauvais" on Justia Law