Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2009, claimant sought workers' compensation benefits for a work-related injury. Claimant had preexisting multilevel degenerative disc disease and a history of intermittent low back pain with some bilateral radiation to his legs. SAIF, the employer's workers' compensation insurer, accepted a claim for a lumbar strain. Claimant subsequently sought acceptance of a combined condition, which SAIF ultimately denied on the ground that the accepted injury was no longer the major contributing cause of the combined condition. The Workers' Compensation Board upheld SAIF's denial, and claimant sought judicial review in the Court of Appeals. On appeal to that court, claimant contended that, in determining the compensability of his claim, the board erroneously had framed the inquiry in terms of whether the accepted condition continued to be the major contributing cause of his disability or need for treatment. In claimant's view, the proper inquiry was whether his accidental injury continued to be the major contributing cause of his combined condition. Claimant contended that there was no evidence that that injury was no longer the major contributing cause of his disability or need for treatment. While judicial review was pending before the Court of Appeals, claimant died of causes unrelated to his workplace injury, without a surviving spouse or other beneficiary entitled to a death benefit. The Court of Appeals held that claimant's estate, through his personal representative, was not authorized to pursue the claim to final determination under ORS 656.218(3) on the grounds that: (1) the estate was not one of the "persons" described in 656.218(5); and (2) the phrase "unpaid balance of the award" in the second sentence of subsection (5) restricted an estate's entitlement to permanent partial disability benefits that were awarded before a worker's death. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court: in the absence of persons who would have been entitled to receive death benefits if the injury causing a deceased worker's disability had been fatal, an award of permanent partial disability benefits that is finally determined after the worker's death pursuant to ORS 656.218(3) is payable to the worker's estate under ORS 656.218(5). The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Sather v. SAIF" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the Marion County Assessor could obtain a correction to the tax rolls concerning the valuation of the real property of taxpayer Willamette Estates II, LLC from the Department of Revenue. The Tax Court concluded that the assessor was authorized by administrative rule to seek such a correction and that the department was authorized by statute to allow it. The taxpayer appealed, arguing the Tax Court's decision essentially sanctioned an assessor's unlawful appeal of his own assessment. In the alternative, taxpayer argued that the Tax Court's decision conflicted with the Oregon Supreme Court's precedents. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Willamette Estates II, LLC v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Powerex Corporation wholesales natural gas and electricity to purchasers throughout the western part of North America. The issue on appeal was how much of Powerex's income was taxable in Oregon. This case turned on whether Powerex’s sales of electricity and natural gas occurred "in this state." The rules for making that determination differed depending on whether the sales are sales of "tangible personal property" or other types of sales. Generally, sales of tangible personal property are "in this state" if "[t]he property is delivered or shipped to a purchaser * * * within this state regardless of the f.o.b. point or other conditions of the sale." In the Tax Court, the parties agreed that natural gas was tangible personal property. They disagreed whether, in selling natural gas, Powerex shipped or delivered natural gas to purchasers "within this state." The Tax Court found that Powerex shipped gas to purchasers in other states through a hub in Malin where two pipelines intersected. It concluded that, in doing so, Powerex had not shipped or delivered gas to purchasers within Oregon. Regarding Powerex’s sales of electricity, the parties disagreed whether electricity is tangible personal property. The Tax Court ruled that electricity is not tangible personal property and that, because the greater part of the activity that produced the income from Powerex’s electricity sales occurred in British Columbia, those sales were not attributable to Oregon. The Tax Court accordingly concluded that, for the tax years at issue here, neither Powerex’s sales of electricity nor its sales of natural gas were "in this state." The Department of Revenue appealed that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Tax Court correctly held that Powerex's natural gas sales were not "in this state." With regard to electricity, the Court reversed the Tax Court, and remanded the case to that court for consideration of whether electric transmission systems functioned in the same way that natural gas pipelines did: "[i]f the Tax Court makes that finding on remand, then our conclusion regarding Powerex’s natural gas sales presumably will control how most of Powerex’s electricity sales will be allocated." View "Powerex Corp. v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

In 2006, plaintiff was injured while riding his motorcycle on a private road that provided access to several pieces of property. On the upper part of the access road, a cable had been stretched across the road to prevent entrance to a quarry at the end of the access road. Plaintiff failed to see the cable in time to stop and was injured when his motorcycle hit the cable. Plaintiff brought this action for negligence against Rick and Sherry Matthews, doing business as Mountain View Rock, who had placed the cable across the access road where the road crossed onto their property. Plaintiff joined Re/Max Ideal Properties, Inc. (Re/Max), as a defendant in the action, on the theory that Re/Max, by advertising property along the access road as "for sale," was at least partly responsible for causing plaintiff to ride his motorcycle up the access road (since he had been interested in properties in the area served by the road). The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants, concluding as a matter of law that plaintiff was "100% responsible for his injuries and no reasonable juror could find otherwise." A majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed on the alternative grounds that Mountain View, as a matter of law, did not breach any duty of care that it owed to plaintiff and that Re/Max, as a matter of law, could not be found by a reasonable jury to have caused plaintiff’s injuries. The Supreme Court did not accept the trial court's conclusion that plaintiff was "100% responsible" for his injuries, and reversed the grant of summary judgment as to Mountain View; the Court affirmed as to Re/Max. View "Towe v. Sacagawea, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought damages for damage to its real property. As an affirmative defense, Jefferson County, one of the defendants in this case, alleged that plaintiff was negligent and was itself responsible for the damages that it had suffered. The county also filed a cross-claim against a codefendant (the contractor) seeking common-law indemnity. Plaintiff’s negligence claim was tried to a jury, which found that plaintiff was more than 50 percent at fault. Therefore, under ORS 31.600, neither the county nor the contractor were liable to plaintiff. Nevertheless, the county had incurred costs in defending against plaintiff’s claim, and it pursued its cross-claim for indemnity to collect those costs from the contractor. The trial court denied the county’s indemnity claim, the county appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed. View "Eclectic Investment, LLC v. Patterson" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree sexual abuse for conduct involving a five-year-old child. The state offered evidence that defendant possessed two pairs of children’s underwear at the time that he committed the charged acts. Defendant opposed the admission of the evidence as irrelevant under Oregon Evidence Code (OEC) 401 and unfairly prejudicial under OEC 403. The trial court admitted the evidence under OEC 404(3) to show that defendant had touched the victim with a sexual purpose rather than accidentally. A jury convicted defendant on both counts. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the underwear evidence was not logically relevant to any disputed issue and thus was inadmissible under OEC 401. The State appealed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting the underwear evidence, and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Oregon v. Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree criminal mischief after aiding and abetting his son to shoot two state-owned deer decoys that they believed to be deer. Oregon’s criminal mischief statute prohibits persons from intentionally damaging “property of another.” The issue in this case was whether wild deer were “property of another” for purposes of that statute. Defendant appealed his criminal mischief conviction, arguing that the trial court had erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because wild deer do not become property until reduced to physical possession. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed: because the state, as a trustee, holds a legal interest in wildlife, the Court concluded that the state has a “legal * * * interest” in wildlife, as that phrase is used in ORS 164.305(2). Therefore, wild deer are “property of another,” for purposes of ORS 164.354 (1)(b) and ORS 164.305(2), and that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the second-degree criminal mischief count. View "Oregon v. Dickerson" on Justia Law

A police officer stopped defendant Dina Mazzola for two traffic violations. The officer observed signs of intoxication and developed probable cause to arrest defendant for driving under the influence of one or more controlled substances. The officer then asked defendant to perform several field sobriety tests (FSTs). After performing them, defendant was arrested for controlled-substance DUII. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the results of certain of the FSTs. The trial court denied that motion. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether, in denying defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial court erred in concluding that exigent circumstances had existed that, when coupled with probable cause to arrest defendant for driving under the influence of a controlled substance, justified the warrantless administration of the FSTs under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. Finding that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court and the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Oregon v. Mazzola" on Justia Law

Defendant Arnold Nix was found guilty of 20 counts of second-degree misdemeanor animal neglect. The state asked the trial court to impose sentence on 20 separate convictions. Defendant objected, arguing that the violations “merged” into a single conviction under Oregon’s anti-merger statute, ORS 161.067, when there were multiple violations of a single statute and only one victim. In this case, defendant argued animals were not “victims” within the meaning of that statute, so the trial court should have imposed a sentence on a single, merged, conviction. The trial court agreed and did just that. The state appealed, challenging the lawfulness of the sentence. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for resentencing. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. Shortly after the Supreme Court's opinion was published, however, the state filed a motion to stay the issuance of the appellate judgment and a motion to determine jurisdiction; the state noted that, although it had prevailed on its appeal, it perhaps had lacked authority to file an appeal in the first place, because no statute authorized it to appeal a judgment of conviction for a misdemeanor. Defendant responded by moving to vacate both opinions and dismiss the appeal. The Supreme Court, after review of the state's motion and defendant's response thereto, concluded that the State lacked authority to appeal the judgment of conviction in this misdemeanor case. Both the Court of Appeals and Supreme Courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. As a result, the Court vacated both opinions and dismissed the appeal. View "Oregon v. Nix" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 8 (2016), arguing that the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). IP 8 would alter the authority of metropolitan service districts in Oregon by eliminating the authority of a metropolitan service district to engage in various planning functions related to land use, urban growth, air and water quality, and transportation. The Attorney General did not dispute that the reference in the results statements to a “regional plan for managing urban growth” was too broad to apprise potential petition signers and voters of the effect of the elimination of districts' authority to engage in those planning functions; it necessitated assuming that they would readily understand all that was entailed in a regional plan under current state law. Moreover, it failed to cover the role of a metropolitan service district as the federally mandated metropolitan planning organization charged with carrying out federal air and water quality planning responsibilities. The Supreme Court therefore referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Schoenheit v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law