Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs had been firefighters for the city of Portland when they suffered disabling injuries. The city's charger required it to provide disability benefits to its police and fire employees who suffer injuries in the course of their employment that render them “unable to perform [their] required duties,” with a minimum disability benefit of 25 percent of the employee’s base pay, “regardless of the amount of wages earned in other employment.” The city originally determined that plaintiffs’ disabilities made them unable to perform their “required duties” and paid them disability benefits. Years later, however, the city created new job assignments that included some of the duties within the job classifications that plaintiffs had held when they were injured. Because the city gave the new job assignments the same job classifications that plaintiffs had previously held, the city maintained that plaintiffs were no longer disabled. The city therefore required plaintiffs to return to work and discontinued paying them the minimum disability benefit. Plaintiffs sued the city for breach of contract, and the circuit court granted summary judgment for the city. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the city charter’s use of the term “required duties” meant core duties. Because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the duties of plaintiffs’ new job assignments were the “required duties” for the job classifications that plaintiffs previously held, the Court further concluded that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the city. View "Miller v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

This case was a direct appeal of an Oregon Tax Court Regular Division decision to set aside an Opinion and Order issued by the Director of the Department of Revenue. The primary issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether either Comcast's cable television service or internet access service qualified as "communication" under ORS 308.515(1)(h) and was, therefore, subject to central assessment by the department. In this case, whether Comcast's cable television service or internet access service qualified as a "communication" service or business depended on whether either service was a "data transmission service." The Tax Court concluded that Comcast's internet access service, but not its cable television service, was a data transmission service. Furthermore, the Tax Court concluded that Comcast's cable television service was the primary use of the property that Comcast uses for both. Consequently, pursuant to ORS 308.510(5), the Tax Court determined that the property that Comcast used for the two services was not subject to central assessment for the 2009-2010 tax year, contrary to the department's determination. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court held that both the cable television and internet access services qualified as data transmission services and were, therefore, communication services subject to central assessment under ORS 308.515(1)(h). View "Comcast Corp. v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for a lumber mill, Sun Studs, LLC. One evening while walking from one area of the mill to another, a forklift hit and severely injured him. After receiving workers' compensation benefits, plaintiff brought suit against Swanson Group, Inc., owner of Sun Studs, as well as other defendants. Plaintiff alleged that Swanson was liable for negligently failing (or for negligently failing to require Sun Studs) to provide a safe workplace and for failing to provide competent safety personnel. Plaintiff also alleged that Swanson was liable under the Employers Liability Law (ELL), which required employers to take certain safety measures. Swanson moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted its motion on the ground that the workers' compensation statutes provided the exclusive remedy for plaintiff's injuries. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment regarding plaintiff's ELL claim, reversed its judgment regarding plaintiff's negligence claim, and remanded the negligence claim for further proceedings. The court held that neither the workers' compensation statutes nor a statute immunizing limited liability company members and managers barred plaintiff's claims against Swanson. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that the allegations in plaintiff's complaint stated a negligence claim but that plaintiff did not have a claim against Swanson under the ELL. After review of the parties' cross-petitions for review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, and reaffirmed the trial court's judgment regarding plaintiff's negligence claim, reversed the appellate court's judgment regarding plaintiff's ELL claim, and remanded the ELL claim to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Cortez v. Nacco Material Handling Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The issues this case presented for the Supreme Court were whether ORS 243.303(2) (which requires local governments to make available to retired employees, "insofar as and to the extent possible," the health care insurance coverage available to current officers and employees of the local government,) created a private right of action for the enforcement of that duty; or, if not, whether the Court should (under its common-law authority) provide such a right of action. The Court of Appeals held that the statute did not expressly or impliedly create a private right of action, and it considered that conclusion to be dispositive of plaintiffs' claim for relief. The Supreme Court also concluded that the statute did not expressly or impliedly create a private right of action for its enforcement. However, where a statute imposes a legal duty, but there is no indication that the legislature intended to create (or not to create) a private right of action for its enforcement, courts must (if such relief is sought) determine whether the judicial creation of a common-law right of action would be consistent with the legislative provision, appropriate for promoting its policy, and needed to ensure its effectiveness. Analyzing the duty imposed on local governments by ORS 243.303(2) under that standard, the Court declined to create an additional common-law right of action for its enforcement because: (1) plaintiffs failed to identify a cognizable common-law claim for relief whose creation is appropriate and necessary to effectuate the legislature's purpose; (2) a declaratory judgment and supplemental relief were adequate to enforce the statutory duty; and (3) a significant change in existing law would result from judicial creation of a tort claim permitting the recovery of noneconomic damages in the circumstances here, and there is no other need to create a common-law tort claim. View "Doyle v. City of Medford" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was an order of the Public Utility Commission (PUC) that addressed Portland General Electric's (PGE) recovery of its capital investment in the Trojan nuclear generating facility after that facility was retired from service. To determine whether a legal error that the PUC had made in an earlier rate case had affected rates that the PUC had authorized PGE to charge, the PUC reexamined those earlier rates. In that reexamination, the PUC determined that PGE had been required to recover its capital investment over time, and that the rates therefore should have included interest to account for the time value of money. Despite the legal error, the rates that the PUC authorized for 1995 to 2000 were just and reasonable, but that to make the post-2000 rates just and reasonable, it was required to order a refund to the post-2000 ratepayers. In affirming the PUC order, the Court of Appeals concluded the PUC had not erred in making those three determinations. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed both the Court of Appeals and the PUC's order. View "Gearhart v. PUC" on Justia Law

This case centered on the interpretation and application of two statutes, ORS 144.335(3) and ORS 144.135, to a final order of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision that postponed petitioner’s release date from prison. The threshold question presented to the Oregon Supreme Court was whether, by amending ORS 144.335(3) in 1999, the legislature intended to exempt the board from the substantial reason standard that this court had identified and applied in "Martin v. Board of Parole," (957 P2d 1210 (1998)). If the legislature did not intend to exempt the board from the substantial reason standard, the second question was whether the board’s order in this case satisfied the substantial reason standard. The third question is whether the board’s order complied with ORS 144.135. The Court concluded that ORS 144.335(3) (1999) did not eliminate the substantial reason requirement that inheres in the substantial evidence standard of review to which the board’s orders are subject. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the board’s final order in this case satisfied that requirement and satisfied ORS 144.135. The Court affirmed the board’s final order postponing petitioner’s release date. View "Jenkins v. Board of Parole" on Justia Law

In consolidated property tax appeals, taxpayers challenged the valuation of their real property by the Clackamas County Assessor. In their appeals to the Magistrate Division of the Tax Court, they challenged only the valuation of the improvements on their land, not the valuation of the land itself. The Magistrate Division affirmed. Taxpayers then appealed to the Regular Division of the Tax Court, again challenging only the valuation of their improvements. In the pendency of that appeal, the legislature had enacted ORS 305.287. Under that new statute, even if a taxpayer challenged only one aspect of a property tax assessment, any other party to an “appeal” may challenge other aspects of the assessment as well. Relying on that statute, the county asserted for the first time before the Regular Division of the Tax Court that it had erroneously undervalued taxpayers’ land. The Tax Court concluded, however, that challenges before the Regular Division were not “appeals” for the purposes of that statute. As a result, the court ruled that the county could not challenge the valuation of taxpayers’ land. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Tax Court correctly concluded that ORS 305.287 did not apply to appeals to the Regular Division of the Tax Court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Tax Court erred in ruling that the statute did not apply and that the county could not challenge its own land valuations. View "Village at Main Street Phase II v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

The state charged defendant with manufacture of cocaine and endangering the welfare of a minor, among other things. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress physical evidence and statements obtained by detectives after they knocked on the back door of defendant’s house and obtained defendant’s consent to enter and then to search the house. Defendant argued both that his consent had not been voluntary and that the detectives had exploited their unlawful conduct to obtain his consent in violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, and a jury convicted defendant as charged. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that, under the "Oregon v. Hall" exploitation analysis, the detectives’ unlawful entry into defendant’s backyard to reach his back door had “tainted [defendant’s] subsequent consent.” Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, modifying in part, the exploitation analysis announced in Hall. Specifically, the Court "disavowed" the minimal factual nexus test described in Hall. Hall considered only the temporal proximity between the unlawful police conduct and the consent and mitigating or intervening circumstances. "Rather, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances, [. . .] including the nature of the illegal conduct and its purpose and flagrancy, without unduly emphasizing any single consideration." View "Oregon v. Unger" on Justia Law

In this case, defendant challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a voluntary consent search, which had followed an officer reaching into defendant’s apartment to knock on his bedroom door. The trial court concluded that the officer’s entry into defendant’s apartment had been lawful and that there was no basis for suppression. Defendant was convicted at a bench trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the officer’s conduct constituted an unlawful search and that the state had not proved that the subsequent consent was independent of or only tenuously related to that prior illegality. Upon review of the trial and appellate court records, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, finding that based on the totality of the circumstances, the state had shown that defendant’s consent was not the result of police exploitation of their unlawful conduct. View "Oregon v. Lorenzo" on Justia Law

In this case, a police officer on patrol encountered defendant at 10:00 p.m. in an area behind a shopping center where criminal activity frequently occurred. The officer stopped defendant and obtained her consent to search pouches that he saw inside her purse, as well as the remainder of her purse. During those searches, the officer found drugs and drug paraphernalia. Defendant sought to suppress that evidence at trial, arguing, among other things, that the stop had been unlawful and that defendant’s consent had been derived from the unlawful stop in violation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied that motion, and defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of methamphetamine at a stipulated facts trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the officer had stopped defendant unlawfully and that the incriminating evidence had derived from that stop. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision: based on the facts of this case, the police improperly exploited their unlawful stop of defendant to obtain her consent to the search. View "Oregon v. Musser" on Justia Law