Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was found in what appeared to be an unconscious state, sitting in his stopped car with the engine running in the left turn lane of a public road. When police arrived, they conducted field sobriety tests, which defendant failed. The police then arrested defendant. At the police station, defendant agreed to take an Intoxylizer alcohol breath test and was found to have a blood alcohol level of 0.30. At his trial for reckless driving under ORS 811.140, defendant requested "a minimum of a ten-person jury, under Article 1, section 11 of the Oregon Constitution[.]" The trial court refused, instead empanelling a six-person jury that unanimously found defendant guilty. Defendant renewed his objection to the jury size before and after the verdict, as well as at sentencing. After its review, the Court of Appeals concluded that the intended effect of Article I, section 11, was to permit nonunanimous jury verdicts in felony cases in circuit court, but not to create a right to a jury of a particular size. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to empanel a six-person jury. The Supreme Court affirmed (but using slightly different reasoning). View "Oregon v. Sagdal" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review centered on two issues: whether the legal presumption described in "Troxel v. Granville," (530 US 57 (2000) (plurality opinion)), that a fit parent acts in the best interests of her child, applied to a modification proceeding in which petitioner-mother sought to modify a stipulated dissolution judgment that granted legal custody to respondent-grandmother; and (2) whether mother had to demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances to modify the dissolution judgment. Daughter, who was approximately seven years old at the time of the hearing on mother's motion, lived with her paternal grandmother for her entire life. Mother and father lived with grandmother in Oregon when daughter was born in 2003. When daughter was approximately six months old, mother and father separated, father left Oregon, and mother and daughter continued to live with grandmother. Three months after the separation, mother moved out of grandmother's residence and left daughter in grandmother's sole care. In the months that followed, mother struggled with depression, started drinking alcohol heavily, and was unable to maintain steady employment. Mother then decided to move to Virginia. Before mother moved, father and grandmother engaged legal counsel, who prepared the marital settlement agreement. Mother first filed a motion to modify custody in 2006 but voluntarily dismissed that motion. Two years later, in 2008, she filed a second motion to modify custody and, in the alternative, to modify parenting time and child support. That 2008 motion is the filing at issue in this case. The trial court denied mother's motion to modify the judgment and grant custody to her based on the change-in-circumstances rule and the best interest of the child, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, but based on different reasoning. The Court concluded that: (1) mother was not entitled to the Troxel presumption that her custody preference was in the child's best interest; and (2) mother was not prejudiced when she was held to the substantial change-in-circumstances rule. Ultimately, the Court affirmed the trial court's determination that a modification of the custody provisions of the judgment was not in the best interest of the child. View "Epler v. Epler" on Justia Law

This case presented the question of what standard applied to determine whether an unequivocal invocation of the right against self-incrimination was made and the particular question of whether, in the context in which they were communicated, defendant's words, "I won't answer any questions," constituted an unequivocal invocation of that right. The trial court found, in light of contextual indicia on which it relied, that defendant's words did not amount to an unequivocal invocation and denied his motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals reversed that ruling and remanded to the trial court. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court, reversed, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Avila-Nava" on Justia Law

At issue in this case is what ORS 654.086(2) means when it says that an employer "could not with the exercise of reasonable diligence know" of a violation. Employer CBI Services, Inc. performed work on a water treatment tank that was under construction. At that time, the tank consisted of a 32-foot-high wall that created a circular enclosure about 130 feet in diameter. It did not yet have a roof. Around the inside of the tank, there was a carpenter's scaffold, about four feet below the tank's top edge. The scaffold would prevent falls to the inside of the tank. There was no such scaffolding on the outside of the tank. An Oregon Occupational Safety and Health Division (OR-OSHA) safety compliance officer, Brink, conducted a safety inspection of the construction site. As he approached the water tank, he saw a worker sitting on its top rim. The worker, later identified as Crawford, was welding and did not appear to be using fall protection. Brink took several pictures. He then approached the site supervisor, Vorhof, who was working at ground level, inside the entrance to the tank, rigging anchor cables. Brink and Vorhof were about 65 feet from Crawford, who was visible from where they stood. Brink told Vorhof what he had seen. Vorhof looked up at Crawford, who was still sitting on the rim of the tank. Crawford was not wearing a safety harness and lanyard. Vorhof told Crawford to get down. While Brink was talking to Vorhof, he noticed a second worker, Bryan, also working without required fall protection. Brink later issued employer a citation and notification of penalty for two "items" (two serious safety violations). Employer disciplined Crawford, Bryan, and Vorhof as a result of the citation. At the time, employer had in place safety rules, precautions, and training mechanisms (including fall-protection training) and mandatory worksite safety meetings. The Court of Appeals held that the statutory phrase referred not to whether an employer "could" know (in the sense of being capable of knowing) of the violation; rather, the phrase referred to whether, taking into account a number of specified factors, an employer "should" know of the violation. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in its construction of ORS 654.086(2), but affirmed on other grounds. View "OR-OSHA v. CBI Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review was whether an anticipatory release of a ski area operator’s liability for its own negligence in a ski pass agreement was enforceable. Plaintiff suffered serious injuries while snowboarding over a jump in defendant ski area operator’s “terrain park,” and filed suit alleging that defendant (the ski operator) was negligent in the design, construction, maintenance, and inspection of the jump. Defendant moved for summary judgment based on an affirmative defense of release; plaintiff filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the ground that the release was unenforceable as a matter of law. The trial court granted defendant’s summary judgment motion and denied plaintiff’s cross-motion. Plaintiff appealed, arguing, among other arguments, that the trial court erred in concluding that the release did not violate public policy and that it was neither substantively nor procedurally unconscionable. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Because the Supreme Court concluded that enforcement of the release would have been unconscionable, it reversed and remanded. View "Bagley v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant drove through a stop sign and collided with a car in which plaintiff was a passenger. Plaintiff filed a negligence action, which was tried to a jury of twelve. The trial court instructed the jury that defendant had “admitted liability so that the only issue to be decided by you [. . .] is the amount of the damages to be awarded to the plaintiff.” The court defined both economic and noneconomic damages for the jury. The court told the jury that it should answer the questions on the verdict form “according to the directions on the form and all the instructions of the court.” The court then explained that “[a]t least the same nine jurors must agree on each answer unless the verdict form instructs you otherwise as to a particular question.” After deliberations, the jury returned its verdict. The trial court read the verdict form to the parties and asked the presiding juror whether at least nine jurors had answered Question 2; she answered, “yes, sir.” Defendant asked that the jury be polled. When the court asked each juror whether the vote of $65,386 in economic damages was “your vote,” ten jurors said “yes.” Jurors one and three said “no.” When the court asked whether the vote of $300,000 was “your vote,” nine jurors said “yes”; jurors two, three, and twelve said “no.” The court indicated that it would accept the verdict and thanked the jurors for their service. Defendant then asked the court to wait, stating, “I don’t think there’s nine agreeing, if I counted right.” The court stated that it counted ten jurors agreeing on economic damages and nine agreeing on noneconomic damages. After the jury was discharged, defendant took exception for the record: looking for nine common people on economic and noneconomic, I add that up as only being eight people who agree." The trial judge replied: I agree with you that there were only eight that answered yes to the same—for the economic and noneconomic damages that answered the same way, and if your theory is that the same nine had to vote on both, then that will have to go up for the appeal…" Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the jury's verdict met the requirements of Oregon law. The Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court. View "Kennedy v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

Taxpayer Erma Glasgow challenged the Tax Court’s jurisdiction, its conclusion that she was liable for personal income taxes based on wages that she earned in tax years 2007 through 2010, and its assessment of a penalty for pursuing a frivolous appeal. Finding no reversible error, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed. View "Glasgow v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Police officers unlawfully detained defendant when he was a passenger in a car. During that detention, the officers ascertained defendant’s identity, ran a warrant check, and discovered defendant was the subject of an outstanding arrest warrant. The officers arrested defendant and, during a search incident to arrest, discovered that he was in possession of illegal drugs. Based on that evidence, the state prosecuted defendant for various drug offenses. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence under the state and federal exclusionary rules, which, subject to certain exceptions (including the attenuation exception) prohibit the state from using at trial evidence that was obtained as a result of an unreasonable search or seizure. The circuit court and the Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s arguments and applied a per se rule to the attenuation analysis: The discovery and execution of a valid arrest warrant necessarily break the connection between preceding unlawful police conduct and a search incident to the arrest. The Court of Appeals drew that rule from this court’s decision in "Oregon v. Dempster," (434 P2d 746 (1967)). Upon review of the matter, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that Dempster’s per se rule was inconsistent with the subsequent development of the Fourth Amendment attenuation exception set out in "Brown v. Illinois," (422 US 590 (1975)), where the United States Supreme Court rejected such an approach. Applying those factors in this case, the Oregon Court concluded that the circuit court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress. View "Oregon v. Bailey" on Justia Law

The State charged defendant with one count of aggravated murder for the starvation, neglect and abuse of her daughter, "Jeanette," and one count of tampering with physical evidence. She moved to suppress statements she made to detectives who responded to a 911 call when the girl fell asleep on the floor and was thereafter unresponsive. The jury unanimously returned a guilty verdict to each charge, and the trial court sentenced defendant to death. On automatic review, defendant raised eighteen alleged errors in connection with her conviction, trial and sentence. Reviewing each, but finding no reversible error, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Oregon v. McAnulty" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs had been firefighters for the city of Portland when they suffered disabling injuries. The city's charger required it to provide disability benefits to its police and fire employees who suffer injuries in the course of their employment that render them “unable to perform [their] required duties,” with a minimum disability benefit of 25 percent of the employee’s base pay, “regardless of the amount of wages earned in other employment.” The city originally determined that plaintiffs’ disabilities made them unable to perform their “required duties” and paid them disability benefits. Years later, however, the city created new job assignments that included some of the duties within the job classifications that plaintiffs had held when they were injured. Because the city gave the new job assignments the same job classifications that plaintiffs had previously held, the city maintained that plaintiffs were no longer disabled. The city therefore required plaintiffs to return to work and discontinued paying them the minimum disability benefit. Plaintiffs sued the city for breach of contract, and the circuit court granted summary judgment for the city. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the city charter’s use of the term “required duties” meant core duties. Because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the duties of plaintiffs’ new job assignments were the “required duties” for the job classifications that plaintiffs previously held, the Court further concluded that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the city. View "Miller v. City of Portland" on Justia Law