Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with soliciting another person to commit aggravated murder. Evidence presented as trial showed that defendant asked the other person to deliver certain information to a third person which defendant thought would cause that third person to commit the murder. The issue this case presented to the Oregon Supreme Court was whether that evidence was sufficient to establish defendant solicited another to commit aggravated murder. The trial court held that the evidence was sufficient; the Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts and affirmed too. View "Oregon v. Everett" on Justia Law

This case came before the Oregon Supreme Court on automatic appeal. Defendant Michael Washington was sentenced to death for the aggravated murder of Mohammed Jabbie. Defendant raised 22 alleged errors from both the guilt and penalty stages of his trial. The Supreme Court took each in turn, found no reversible error, and affirmed defendant's death sentence. View "Oregon v. Washington" on Justia Law

In October 2009, a jury found petitioner guilty of one count of second-degree assault constituting domestic violence, one count of possession of methamphetamine, and two counts of endangering the welfare of a minor. The trial court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced defendant to 76 months in prison and 36 months of post-prison supervision. A year later, petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court appointed counsel for petitioner. Petitioner's counsel then filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief, in which petitioner alleged that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel in various respects, in violation of the Oregon Constitution and United States Constitution. Specifically, petitioner alleged that his criminal trial counsel had been ineffective in failing to meet with and prepare a witness, who was present during the incident and was interviewed by the police after petitioner's arrest; in failing adequately to "investigate" the victim's hospital records; in failing to offer the victim's medical records into evidence; and in failing adequately to cross-examine the victim's treatment provider. Petitioner attached to the amended petition the indictment, judgment, and trial transcript from his criminal trial. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court for review centered on a provision of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA), The Court concluded that that statute requires a petitioner to attach materials, including the petitioner's own averments of fact, that address each element of each asserted ground for relief and that, if presumed true, would permit the post-conviction court to determine that the petitioner was entitled to post-conviction relief on that ground. The post-conviction court granted the state's motion to dismiss, concluding that the materials that petitioner had attached to his petition were insufficient to meet the statutory requirement. The Supreme Court found that petitioner met the attachment requirement of the Act with respect to his first ground for relief but not with respect to his second, third, and fourth grounds for relief. Therefore, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the post-conviction court for further proceedings. View "Ogle v. Nooth" on Justia Law

The juvenile court took jurisdiction over A.J.C. for conduct that, if committed by an adult, would have constituted possession of a firearm in a public building, unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful use of a weapon, and menacing. The question this case presented to the Supreme Court for review was whether the school-safety exception to the warrant requirement announced in "State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. M. A. D.," (233 P3d 437 (2010)), permitted a school principal to conduct a warrantless search of the youth’s backpack after the principal had seized the backpack from the youth. The juvenile court concluded that the search was permissible under the school-safety exception, and it denied youth’s pretrial motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court also affirmed. View "Oregon v. A. J. C." on Justia Law

In 2002, defendant Gregory Bowen assaulted his ex-girlfriend and, in a different incident the same day, killed a friend and committed theft from that victim. Defendant was charged with two alternative counts of aggravated felony murder and one count of intentional murder, along with 15 other felony and misdemeanor charges. Defendant pled guilty to the several charges that arose from his assault of his ex-girlfriend. The remaining charges, which arose from the murder of the friend, went to a jury trial. The jury found defendant guilty on all those charges. Defendant was ultimately sentenced to death on the two aggravated murder charges. The trial court subsequently imposed a sentence of death on each of the two aggravated murder convictions and also sentenced defendant on the intentional murder conviction, as well as each of the other felony and misdemeanor charges. This case went before the Supreme Court on automatic and direct review for the third time following a remand to the trial court. The principal issue that defendant raised was whether, on remand, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for resentencing on his noncapital felony convictions. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Oregon v. Bowen" on Justia Law

In a consolidated ballot title case, three sets of petitioners have petitioned the Supreme Court to review the ballot title for Initiative Petition 58. Initiative Petition 58 (IP 58), essentially identical to Initiative Petition 47 (IP 47), would change the way that liquor is sold in Oregon by “eliminat[ing] the current system of state-licensed liquor stores” and allowing "'holders of distilled liquor self-distribution permits' (essentially wholesalers) to distribute liquor to 'qualified retailers,' who would, in turn, sell the liquor to the public." The Attorney General certified the ballot title for IP 58 before we issued the Supreme Court issued its opinion regarding IP 47, and two petitioners argued that the phrase "wholesale sales tax" did not avoid the problem that the Court noted in the IP 47 opinion. As noted in the IP 47 case, the phrase “sales tax” had more potential to confuse voters than to describe IP 47, and by extension IP 58, accurately. "[W]e cannot overlook [petitioners'] point that the phrase 'sales tax' is so commonly associated with a tax imposed at the point of a retail sale that the use of the phrase 'wholesale sales tax' may do more to confuse matters than clarify them." Accordingly, the Court referred the ballot title for IP 58 back to the Attorney General for modification. View "McCann v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the owners of real property in Linn County, brought an inverse condemnation action against the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT). Plaintiffs alleged that ODOT, by repeatedly making representations to others about its intention to landlock their property and initiate a condemnation action, created a nuisance that "blighted" plaintiffs' property, resulting in a compensable taking of the property under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution. A jury agreed and awarded plaintiffs more than $3,000,000 in damages. ODOT appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that no taking had occurred. The Supreme Court allowed plaintiffs’ petition for review, and agreed with the Court of Appeals decision. Therefore the Court affirmed the appellate court, reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hall v. Oregon" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Marion County Circuit Court to issue a protective order with respect to documents and communications subject to the lawyer-client privilege. Petitioner’s proposed protective order sought to prevent the State (the superintendent of the Oregon State Penitentiary) from disclosing such information to third parties unrelated to the underlying post-conviction case. Upon review of the facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the post-conviction court’s order denying petitioner’s motion for a protective order was erroneous, and the Court mandated the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring the post-conviction court to vacate its order and issue a protective order. View "Longo v. Premo" on Justia Law

Petitioner, the petitioner in the underlying post-conviction case, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Marion County Circuit Court to issue a protective order with respect to documents and communications subject to the lawyer-client privilege. Petitioner’s motion for a proposed protective order sought to prevent the State (who is the superintendent of the Oregon State Penitentiary and the defendant in the underlying post-conviction case) from disclosing such information to third parties unrelated to the post-conviction case. In "Longo v. Premo," (355 Or 525 (2014)), the construed OEC 503(4)(c) to be a limited exception permitting disclosures of confidential information only as necessary for a lawyer to defend against allegations of breach of duty, and the Court directed the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring a post-conviction court to issue a protective order. Similarly, in this case, the Court granted mandamus relief. View "Brumwell v. Premo" on Justia Law

Davis Wright Tremaine LLP ("DWT") challenged a trial court order compelling production of certain materials that, in DWT’s view, were protected under the attorney-client privilege. The trial court issued the order in the context of a legal malpractice action against DWT by a former client. The materials that are the subject of the order are communications between DWT’s designated in-house counsel and the lawyers in the firm who had represented the former client, and concern how actual and potential conflicts between the lawyers and the former client should have been handled. The trial court concluded that all but three of the communications with the firm’s in-house counsel ordinarily would have been covered by the attorney-client privilege, but the court recognized a “fiduciary exception” to the attorney-client privilege, which arose out of the fact that the firm was attempting to shield its internal communications from a former client. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly determined that the attorney-client privilege as defined in OEC 503 applied to communications between lawyers in a firm and in-house counsel. However, the trial court erred in recognizing an exception to OEC 503 that the legislature did not adopt in the terms of that rule. Accordingly, the Supreme Court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to vacate its order compelling production of materials related to those communications that it determined were otherwise subject to the attorney-client privilege. View "Crimson Trace Corp. v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP" on Justia Law