Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners' contention that Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife's (ODFW) approval of "channel-spanning fishways" associated with two small, privately maintained dams downstream from their property violated state law, including ODFW's own rules, pertaining to fish passage for native migratory fish. Petitioners argued that the approvals were inconsistent with administrative rules and statutes that, in their view, required that fish passage be provided whenever water is flowing past the dams, whether over the tops of the dams or through outlet pipes required by the state Water Resources Department (WRD). The Court of Appeals held that ODFW had plausibly construed its own rules as requiring passage only when water is flowing over the dams, and that the rules, as interpreted, were not inconsistent with the controlling statutes. Petitioners sought review and the Supreme Court granted their petition. The Supreme Court concluded that ODFW's interpretation of the rules was implausible. The case was remanded to the agency for further action under a correct interpretation. View "Noble v. Dept. of Fish & Wildlife" on Justia Law

Defendants held an around-the-clock vigil on the steps of the state capitol to protest the deployment of Oregon National Guard troops to Iraq and Afghanistan. During that vigil, the state police cited defendants for second-degree criminal trespass when they remained on the capitol steps after 11:00 p.m., in violation of a Legislative Administration Committee (LAC) guideline. Defendants challenged those citations, arguing that the LAC guideline was unconstitutional under Article I, section 8, and Article I, section 26, of the Oregon Constitution. Defendants also argued that the LAC guideline violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial court rejected those arguments and found defendants guilty of second-degree criminal trespass. On appeal, the Court of Appeals similarly rejected defendants' facial challenges to the guideline under the Oregon Constitution, but remanded defendants' as applied challenges to allow defendants to question the legislator co-chairs of the LAC about enforcement of the guideline. Because defendants' state constitutional challenges were unresolved, the Court of Appeals did not reach defendants' First Amendment argument. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals: the LAC guideline, on its face, did not violate Article I, section 8, or Article I, section 26, of the Oregon Constitution. However, the Court remanded the case to permit defendants to question the legislator co-chairs of the LAC about their involvement, if any, in enforcement of the guideline against defendants. Likewise, the Supreme Court did not reach defendants' First Amendment argument. View "Oregon v. Babson" on Justia Law

The City of Milwaukie used highly pressurized water to clean sewer lines adjacent to plaintiff's house, causing sewage to back up through toilets and bathroom fixtures. Plaintiff sued the city seeking compensation for the damage to her home on two theories, negligence and inverse condemnation. The trial court dismissed the negligence claim before trial as barred by the statute of limitations. The inverse condemnation claim went to trial before a jury. At the close of plaintiff's case, the city moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the evidence did not establish a compensable taking of property under the Oregon Constitution. The trial court denied the city's motion, and the jury found for plaintiff, awarding $58,333 in damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. On the facts before it, the Supreme Court concluded that the city's actions did not give rise to a compensable taking. The Court therefore reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Dunn v. City of Milwaukie" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Linda Two Two and Patricia Fodge filed a complaint against defendant that included claims for negligence and strict liability. Plaintiffs alleged that they had been injured in separate incidents in 2008 when an elevator in the building in which they worked dropped unexpectedly and stopped abruptly. In their negligence claim, plaintiffs alleged that defendant had negligently designed, installed, and maintained that elevator and that defendant's negligence was the direct and proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. In their strict liability claim, plaintiffs alleged that defendant had designed, installed, and constructed the elevator and that the elevator was defective and dangerous. Defendant sought summary judgment on both claims. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on both claims. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court decided that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' negligence claim, but did not err in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' strict liability claim. View "Two Two v. Fujitec America, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the ballot title for Initiative Petition 38 (2014) (IP 38), arguing that the ballot title does not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2). IP 38, if adopted, would alter the Oregon primary election process for certain partisan offices, denominated "voter choice offices" (United States Senator, Congressional Representative, Governor, Secretary of State, State Treasurer, Attorney General, state Senator, state Representative, and any state, county, city, or district partisan office for which the law currently authorizes political party nominations to the general election). In addition, IP 38 would have modified the process for filling vacancies in partisan offices. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the ballot title did not satisfy the requirements of ORS 250.035(2), and referred the title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Dixon v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the ballot title for Initiative Petition 44 (2014) that if adopted, would have enacted statutory provisions to impose certain requirements on food manufacturers and retailers concerning the labeling of genetically engineered foods. The Supreme Court considered the various challenges to the certified ballot title that each petitioner advanced and concluded that only one had merit. The ballot title error that the Court identified in this proceeding was an acknowledged scrivener's error, the correction of which was straightforward and ministerial. The Supreme Court corrected the error and certified the corrected ballot title to the Secretary of State. View "Bates v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

The issue in this mandamus proceeding was whether the trial court correctly denied defendants' motion to change venue. Plaintiffs, a husband and wife, initiated a medical malpractice action against defendants in Multnomah County. Defendants argued that venue was in Clackamas County, because that was where the clinic was located, where the doctor who provided the husband's medical services resided, and where the husband received treatment. Plaintiffs argued that venue is proper in Multnomah County, because defendants solicited patients who lived in that county, referred patients to imaging facilities in that county, used medical education programs in that county, and "identified" the clinic's location in its website as the "Portland area." The trial court denied defendants' motion, explaining that defendants, by soliciting patients in Multnomah County, "purposely availed themselves of the court's jurisdiction" in that county. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court mistakenly conflated personal jurisdiction considerations with the statutory requirements for venue and erred in denying defendants' motion. The Court therefore granted defendants relief and granted the writ. View "Kohring v. Ballard" on Justia Law

Defendant general contractor Super One, Inc., and various subcontractors, including defendant subcontractor T. T. & L. Sheet Metal, Inc., contracted with VIP's Industries, Inc. and VIP's Motor Inns, Inc. (VIP's) to build a hotel. Defendants began work in 1996. In early 1997, VIP's posted a "completion notice" pursuant to ORS 87.045. On or about that same date, VIP's also obtained a certificate for temporary occupancy and began accepting paying guests. However, a Certificate of Substantial Completion was not issued by the architect or accepted by VIP's as had been contemplated by the contract between the parties. After the date on which VIP's posted the completion notice, defendants continued to perform construction work. The county issued a certificate of final occupancy later that year. In 2006, plaintiff purchased the hotel and soon thereafter allegedly discovered damage. Plaintiff filed an action against defendants for negligence, nuisance, and trespass in 2007, a date more than 10 years after the posting of the completion notice but less than 10 years after the issuance of the certificate of final occupancy. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff's claims were barred by ORS 12.135. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was the meaning of the term "substantial completion" as used in ORS 12.135. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "PIH Beaverton, LLC v. Super One, Inc." on Justia Law

In a consolidated ballot title case, three sets of petitioners asked the Supreme Court to review the ballot title for Initiative Petition 47 (2014). Initiative Petition 47 (IP 47), if enacted, would have changed the way that liquor was sold in Oregon. IP 47 would eliminate the current system of state-licensed liquor stores and allow "holders of distilled liquor self-distribution permits" (wholesalers) to distribute liquor to "qualified retailers," who would, in turn, sell the liquor to the public. In this case, if the Attorney General had used the word "fee" to describe the "revenue replacement fee," her use of that word would have raised substantial questions. In addition, petitioners challenged the AG's use of language in the "yes" vote result statement. Finding "difficulties" that the Attorney General faced in trying to describe accurately and succinctly the extensive changes that IP 47 would effect, the Court could not say that the remainder of the ballot title did not substantially comply with her statutory obligations. View "McCann v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

Mother and father are the parents of eight children, who ranged in age from one to ten years old when this case began. After a neighbor notified DHS about the conditions in parents' home, a DHS caseworker checked on those conditions, spoke with parents, and also spoke with the children. DHS filed a petition with the juvenile court, alleging that the children were within the court's jurisdiction because the "condition or circumstances [of the children were] such as to endanger [the children's] welfare or others[' welfare]." The juvenile court took jurisdiction over parents' children and appointed DHS as the children's legal custodian and guardian while the children were wards of the court. The question before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the legislature gave DHS, in its capacity as either the children's custodian or their guardian, authority to have the children immunized against common childhood diseases. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that the legislature gave DHS that authority. The Court allowed parents' petition for review and affirmed the Court of Appeals' and trial court's judgments. View "Dept. of Human Services v. S. M." on Justia Law