Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted for the 1989 killing of the Department of Corrections director. At the time, Oregon law provided two sentencing options for aggravated murder: death or life with the possibility of parole (ordinary life). Petitioner contended that he received inadequate assistance of counsel at the time of his criminal trial, specifically that he was not told he had the right to object to a new sentencing law to his case on ex post facto grounds. The post-conviction court found that as a matter of fact, petitioner did not established that the advice would have made a difference. The appellate court and Supreme Courts affirmed that decision.View "Gable v. Oregon" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on what constitutes a reprieve under the Oregon Constitution. After the Court affirmed Plaintiff-Respondent Gary Haugen's aggravated murder conviction and death sentence, he dropped all appeals, and the trial court set an execution date. The Governor subsequently issued a reprieve suspending Defendant's sentence for the duration of the Governor's term. Defendant purported to reject the reprieve, and sought to have it declared ineffective and invalid. The trial court held that a reprieve must be accepted to be effective and ruled the Governor's reprieve ineffective. The Governor appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the reprieve was valid and effective regardless of whether Defendant rejected it, and accordingly reversed the trial court.View "Haugen v. Kitzhaber" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for resisting arrest, raising, among other issues, two claims that the trial court erred in instructing the jury. The Court of Appeals concluded that it was barred from reviewing those claims by ORCP 5 59 H. The Supreme Court allowed defendant's petition for review to consider whether ORCP 59 H applied to and controlled appellate court review of claims of instructional error, including claims of "plain error." Finding that it does not, the Court reversed and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Vanornum" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a dispute over a cell phone. The victim sold defendant a cell phone with prepaid minutes. Defendant made a down payment when he got the phone and agreed to pay the balance in the future. When defendant failed to pay the balance owed, the victim contacted the cell phone provider and caused the remaining prepaid minutes to be cancelled. A jury found defendant guilty of third-degree assault. The trial court's instructions permitted the jury to find defendant liable for that crime either as the principal or as an accomplice. Throughout the litigation, defendant argued that, as a matter of statutory and constitutional law, the jurors had to agree on which role he played in the assault: Did he hit the victim, or did he aid and abet the person who did? The trial court declined to give defendant's requested instruction on that issue, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court found it was harmless error to decline defendant's jury instruction. . View "Oregon v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Claimant injured his low back while at work in April 2008, and his employer accepted his subsequent claim for a lumbar strain. Claimant was taken off work after his injury and, during the next several months, received an extensive course of chiropractic care. In An examining physician declared claimant medically stationary and released him to regular work without restriction. Based on the physician's findings, the employer issued a notice of closure that did not award benefits to claimant. Claimant was unsuccessful in his request for reconsideration. The Supreme Court, after its review of this case, concluded that the Department of Consumer and Business Services (DCBS) erred in its interpretation of the rules with regard to claimant's injury and determination for benefits. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the board for further proceedings. View "Schleiss v. SAIF Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Oregon resident, sustained injuries in a motorcycle accident that occurred in Wyoming. She filed an action in Oregon seeking damages for her injuries, naming as a defendant Grand Teton Cycles, LLC, a Harley-Davidson franchisee with a physical presence in Idaho and Wyoming. The trial court determined that it lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant and granted defendant's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court allowed plaintiff's petition for review to determine whether defendant had sufficient contacts with Oregon for a court in this state to exercise specific jurisdiction over it. The Supreme Court concluded that this litigation did not arise out of or relate to defendant's activities in Oregon. However, the Court affirmed for different reasons than the Court of Appeals, and disavowed the substantive relevance test to the extent that it was advanced in "State ex rel Michelin v. Wells," (657 P2d 207 (1982)). View "Robinson v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co." on Justia Law

Four certified questions of law from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon went before the Oregon Supreme Court. All centered on the mortgage finance industry's practice of naming the Mortgage Electronic Recording System, Inc. (MERS) rather than the lender, as a security instrument's mortgagee or beneficiary and the Oregon Trust Deed Act (OTDA). The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that under Oregon Law, an entity like MERS cannot be a trust deed's beneficiary; ORS 86.735(1) does not require recordation of "assignments" of a trust deed by operation of law that results from the transfer of the secured property; MERS cannot hold or transfer legal title to the trust deed; and MERS' authority to foreclose must derive from the original beneficiary and successors in interest.View "Brandrup v. ReconTrust Co." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on nonjudicial foreclosure of trust deeds under the Oregon Trust Deed Act (OTDA) and the mortgage finance industry's practice of naming the Mortgage Electronic Recording System, Inc., (MERS), rather than the lender, as a trust deed's "beneficiary." Plaintiff argued that, although the trust deed identified MERS as the beneficiary of the trust deed, neither MERS nor any of the other entities involved in the foreclosure had any legal or beneficial interest in the trust deed that would allow them to foreclose. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether all of the requirements for nonjudicial foreclosure set out in the OTDA had been satisfied. The Supreme Court, after its review, also concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed, but for a different reason than the one the Court of Appeals identified.View "Niday v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, plaintiff sought immediate release from prison. In his case against the superintendent of the institution in which he was incarcerated, plaintiff sought habeas corpus relief on the ground that the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision set a release date for him in 2018, but, when his earned sentence reduction credits were taken into account, his release date has passed; therefore, his continued incarceration was unlawful. In his administrative rule challenge, plaintiff argued that, to the extent that certain Department of Corrections (DOC) rules pertaining to the granting of earned-time sentence reductions are construed to exclude him from eligibility for such reductions, they are invalid. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff was entitled to have his term of incarceration reduced by earned-time credits, but he was not entitled to habeas corpus relief, because the board had not yet performed its prerelease functions under ORS 144.125. The Court found it unnecessary to address plaintiff's rule challenge. Accordingly, the Court dismissed plaintiff's petitions in both cases. View "Engweiler v. Persson" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with criminally negligent homicide after he allegedly drove while under the influence of intoxicants and struck another vehicle, killing one of its occupants. During the investigation of the crime, a police officer read defendant the statutory implied consent warnings and defendant agreed to provide blood and urine samples. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the test results from those samples, arguing that his consent was involuntary because it was obtained after he had been warned of the legal consequences he would suffer if he refused consent. The trial court, following "Oregon v. Machuca," concluded that defendant's consent was involuntary. Accordingly, the trial court suppressed the blood and urine evidence because it was obtained in violation of defendant's constitutional rights. The state filed an interlocutory appeal of that pretrial order, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant's consent was voluntary; the police officer did not unconstitutionally coerce defendant's consent to the test of his blood and urine by reading him the statutory implied consent warnings. Therefore the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and the ruling of the trial court. View "Oregon v. Moore" on Justia Law