Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Bruce Pipkin was charged with first-degree burglary. At trial, defendant argued that the state should have been required to elect whether it intended to proceed on the theory that he entered the victim's home unlawfully or on the theory that he remained in her home unlawfully. Alternatively, relying on "Oregon v. Boots," (780 P2d 725 (1989), cert den, 510 8 US 1013 (1993)), defendant requested an instruction that at least 10 jurors had to agree on one (or both) of those theories. The trial court denied both requests, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court allowed defendant's petition for review and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision and the trial court's judgment. View "Oregon v. Pipkin" on Justia Law

In 2006, the Department of Revenue issued a notice of deficiency against Tektronix, Inc. for $3.7 million in additional tax for the 1999 tax year. Tektronix contended that: (1) the statute of limitations barred the department from assessing that deficiency; and (2) the department had incorrectly calculated its tax liability. The Tax Court granted partial summary judgment for Tektronixs on both grounds. The Department appealed that decision. Finding that the Department indeed incorrectly calculated taxpayer's tax liability, and the Supreme Court affirmed the Tax Court. View "Tektronix, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Two law enforcement officers, believing that defendant was being assaulted, responded to an incomplete 9-1-1 call that had been traced to defendant's home. One officer took defendant's husband into custody, while the other officer proceeded to interview defendant on the porch of her home. While interviewing defendant, the officer made an observation that caused him to reasonably believe defendant might be in possession of drugs. The officer asked defendant if he could search her, and she agreed. During the search, the officer discovered a glass pipe with drug residue on it. Defendant was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case was whether the officers' actions, commands, and inquiries in investigating the possible domestic assault resulted in a seizure of defendant within the meaning of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution and, if so, whether that seizure was constitutionally permissible. The Court concluded that defendant was seized for constitutional purposes, but the Court further concluded that the seizure was lawful. The Court accordingly reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgment.View "Oregon v. Fair" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether a taxpayer could satisfy its obligation to "pay annually to the state" the $75,000 corporate minimum tax under ORS 3 317.090(2), by claiming on its corporate excise tax return a $75,000 "Business Energy Tax Credit" (BETC) under ORS 315.354. The Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer, Con-Way, could satisfy its tax liability under ORS 317.090(2) by claiming a BETC on its return. The Department of Revenue (department) appealed, arguing that the Tax Court's conclusion was inconsistent with ORS 317.090(2), on the ground that a tax credit cannot be used to pay or otherwise satisfy the minimum tax imposed under ORS 2 317.090(2). Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Con-Way Inc. & Affiliates v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of felony driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). At trial, defendant sought to introduce evidence that he suffered from a sleepwalking disorder and was "sleep driving" at the time he was stopped in his vehicle. Defendant argued he did not voluntarily drive his vehicle, an element of proof necessary to establish criminal liability for DUII. The trial court excluded defendant's proffered evidence, concluding it was not relevant because DUII is a strict-liability offense. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed that DUII is a strict-liability offense and affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant's proffered evidence was indeed relevant to the driving element of the DUII charge, and accordingly reversed.View "Oregon v. Newman" on Justia Law

This case concerned a month-to-month tenancy pursuant to a written rental agreement. After the landlord gave the tenants a 30-day no-cause notice of termination of tenancy and the tenants failed to vacate the premises, the landlord filed an action for possession. The tenants filed an answer denying that the landlord was entitled to possession and alleging that the landlord had given notice of termination because of the tenants' legitimate complaints. The trial court rejected the tenants' defense and made written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that to prove retaliation under ORS 90.385, a tenant must establish that the landlord served the notice of termination because of the tenant's complaint. The tenant need not prove, in addition, that the complaint caused the landlord actual or perceived injury or that the landlord intended to cause the tenant equivalent injury in return. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision and the judgment of the circuit court, and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.View "Elk Creek Management Co. v. Gilbert" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the legal standard for what constitutes a seizure under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. Police witnessed defendant and a companion "milling around" his car one evening in an area known for drug activity. The officer spoke briefly with defendant and asked him if he was "still on probation." Defendant told the officer he was not; the officer then asked both defendant and a companion whether they had their identification on them and whether the officer could look at that identification. Both defendant and the companion handed the officer their licenses. The officer estimated that he had the licenses for "at the most" between 30 seconds and a minute before returning them back. Defense counsel did not dispute that defendant's consent to search was voluntary or that the officers acquired sufficient cause to seize defendant when a plastic baggie concealed in defendant's hand was uncovered. Defendant argued only that before defendant gave his consent to search, the officer had unlawfully detained him by asking him for his identification and taking possession of that license, however briefly, and by asking for consent to search. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the seizure was supported by a reasonable suspicion, and that the seizure ended when the officer handed back the licenses. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant, but the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court: "Defendant's claim that [the officer] exploited an illegal stop of defendant to obtain his voluntary and otherwise valid consent falls with our conclusion that [the officer] did not seize defendant at any point before defendant gave his consent to search." View "Oregon v. Highley" on Justia Law

In prior cases, the Oregon Supreme Court has held that officers who had lawfully seized individuals for purposes of investigation also could, consistently with the Oregon Constitution, request and verify the individuals' identifications. This case presented another variation on the issues pertaining to asking for identification: whether an officer's request for and verification of a person's identification, in and of itself, convert an encounter that is not a seizure for constitutional purposes into one that is. The Supreme Court responded with a "no." Consequently, in this case, whereby Defendant challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence following an officer's request for his identification, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court's denial of that motion to suppress. View "Oregon v. Backstrand" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the legal standard for what constitutes a seizure under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. Defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress evidence officers obtained following a search. At the outset of the contact, the officers asked for identification. The officers did not seize defendant and his companion by asking them for identification. The Supreme Court found that the actions that the officers took after asking for that identification did result in seizing defendant and his companion. Defendant did not dispute, that by then the officers had reasonable suspicion for his seizure. The trial court concluded that the initial contact was "not a stop." The trial court further concluded that, once defendant gave the officers a false name, the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant, "given the circumstances which took the officers to the location[.]" Based on those findings and conclusions, the court denied the motion. The case went to trial, and a jury found defendant guilty as charged. The Court of Appeals reversed, but the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Oregon v. Anderson" on Justia Law

In 2007, the decedent allegedly sustained personal injuries while disembarking from a bus operated by [defendant]. Decedent died a year later from causes unrelated to the bus accident. In 2009, more than two years, but less than three years, after the bus incident -- plaintiff, decedent's personal representative, filed a complaint alleging that [defendant] had negligently injured decedent and sought damages for the alleged personal injuries. The question before the Supreme Court in this case was whether plaintiff's survival action against a public body should have been brought within two years or three years of the alleged injury. One of two statutes provided the applicable statute of limitations. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that ORS 30.075(1) was the governing statute that triggered a two-year limitation period of ORS 30.275(9).View "Bell v. Tri-Met" on Justia Law