Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In a forceable entry and detainer (FED) action, the Oregon Supreme Court was asked to determine the proper calculation of damages that could be awarded to a tenant, following multiple instances of landlord noncompliance with certain utility billing requirements that repeated each month, over a series of months. After plaintiff (landlord) brought an FED action against defendant (tenant) to recover possession of the landlord’s premises, tenant alleged a counterclaim that landlord had failed to comply with certain utility billing requirements found in ORS 90.315(4)(b). The trial court agreed with tenant, concluding that landlord had committed 12 separate violations—one per month over the 12 months within the one-year statute of limitations that governed Oregon Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (ORLTA) actions, and awarded tenant statutory damages in an amount equal to 12 months of rent. On landlord’s appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the plain text of ORS 90.315(4)(f) showed that the legislature had not intended for each landlord billing violation to be subject to a separate sanction. The Oregon Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court and affirmed. View "Shepard Investment Group LLC v. Ormandy" on Justia Law

An informant told law enforcement that a person named “Tom Collins” was dealing heroin from a residence in Albany, Oregon. Detectives planned to utilize the informant in executing a controlled buy at the residence. However, rather than relying on the observations and results from that controlled buy to subsequently apply for an "anticipatory warrant" to search the residence that anticipated that controlled buy. Before trial, defendant Aaron Lee moved to suppress evidence derived from the search warrant, relying on ORS 133.545 as well as the state and federal constitutions. The Oregon Supreme Court declined to reach the constitutional question that the parties presented, because the Court concluded that Oregon’s statutory warrant requirements, including ORS 133.555(2) and ORS 133.545(6), permitted it us to resolve this case without reaching that question. The Court found the affidavit in support of the warrant here failed to comply with the requirements of ORS 133.545(6). As a result, the warrant issued in defendant’s case did not comply with ORS 133.555(2), and the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress, pursuant to ORS 133.673(1). Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. The judgment of the circuit court was reversed, and this case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Lee" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question of law to the Oregon Supreme Court. Defendants Eddie Bauer LLC and Eddie Bauer Parent, LLC, operate the Eddie Bauer Outlet chain of stores, where they sell branded clothing. More than 90 percent of the products offered at the outlet stores are manufactured solely for sale at the outlet stores and were not sold elsewhere. Defendants advertised clothing at the Eddie Bauer Outlet stores as being sold at a substantial discount; with limited exceptions, the clothing was never sold at the “list” price. In 2017, plaintiff Susan Clark purchased two articles of clothing from one of defendants’ outlet stores in Oregon. Plaintiff filed a complaint in federal district court, alleging that defendants had violated multiple provisions of the UTPA, including, among others, ORS 646.608(1)(j) (making false or misleading representations of fact concerning the reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions), and ORS 646.608(1)(ee) (advertising price comparisons without conspicuously identifying the origin of the price the seller is comparing to the current price). Plaintiff alleged she had been fraudulently induced to buy those garments by defendants’ false representation that she was buying them at a bargain price. Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that it failed to allege an “ascertainable loss of money or property,” as required of a complainant pursuing a private right of action under the UTPA. The federal appellate court asked the Supreme Court whether a consumer suffered an "ascertainable loss" when the consumer purchased a product that the consumer would not have purchased at the price that the consumer paid but for a violation of [ORS] 646.608(1)(e), (i), (j), (ee), or (u), if the violation arose from a representation about the product’s price, comparative price, or price history, but not about the character or quality of the product itself. The Oregon Court answered the Ninth Circuit's question in the affirmative. View "Clark v. Eddie Bauer LLC" on Justia Law

In 2014, decedent Aaron Martineau, age 28, arrived at the McKenzie-Willamette Hospital emergency room, complaining of sudden onset chest pain, shortness of breath, and other symptoms. He was seen by a physician assistant and by a physician, defendant Gary Josephsen, M.D.; both worked for defendant Doctor’s Emergency Room Corporation, P.C. (collectively, the ER defendants). Defendants did not adequately review the x-ray or refer decedent for further imaging or other tests to rule out or confirm the presence of serious cardiovascular or cardiopulmonary conditions. Instead, they diagnosed him with noncardiac chest pain and discharged him from the hospital. Approximately 24 hours after being discharged, decedent died from an aortic dissection in his heart. In this wrongful death action, two issues were presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review: (1) whether the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that physicians “are not negligent merely because their efforts were unsuccessful” and that a physician “does not guarantee a good result by undertaking to perform a service;” and (2) whether plaintiff had alleged a lost chance claim under Oregon’s survival statute, ORS 30.075, that was separately cognizable from her wrongful death claim under ORS 30.020. The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s lost chance claim before trial. Later, when submitting the wrongful death claim to the jury at the close of trial, the court included the challenged instruction—which was taken from Uniform Civil Jury Instruction (UCJI) 44.03 at defendants’ request—in its instructions to the jury. After the jury returned a verdict in defendants’ favor, plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the trial court had erred in dismissing plaintiff’s lost chance claim and by including UCJI 44.03 in the jury instructions. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded plaintiff did not allege a lost chance claim that was cognizable under Oregon law, and, further, the trial court did not err when it included UCJI 44.03 in the jury instructions. The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court. View "Martineau v. McKenzie-Willamette Medical Center" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the Oregon legislature intended to create an exception to ORS 656.018, the so-called “exclusive remedy” provision of the Workers’ Compensation Law, for injured workers whose claims have been deemed noncompensable on “major contributing cause” grounds. While employed by defendant Shore Terminals, LLC as a terminal operator, plaintiff Danny Bundy was assigned to stay and monitor the air quality from malfunctioning machinery without being given safety equipment, and he was exposed to dangerous levels of diesel, gasoline and ethanol fumes. After that incident, defendant initially accepted a workers’ compensation claim for "non-disabling exposure to gasoline vapors." Later, plaintiff asked defendant to accept and pay compensation for additional conditions arising out of the same incident, including "somatization disorder" and "undifferentiated somatoform disorder." Defendant specified that it was treating each of plaintiff’s subsequent requests as a "consequential condition claim" and was denying those claims on the basis that plaintiff’s work exposure was not the major contributing cause of the subsequent conditions. Plaintiff challenged those denials through the workers’ compensation system, but he was unable to establish that the work incident was the major contributing cause of his somatoform disorders. The Workers’ Compensation Board ultimately issued a final order determining that the disorders were not compensable conditions because plaintiff failed to establish that his work-related incident was the major contributing cause. Plaintiff acknowledged that the Workers’ Compensation Law generally immunized covered employers against civil liability for injuries arising out of a worker’s employment. Plaintiff argued, however, that his case fell within a statutory exception to that rule and that the trial court and Court of Appeals, both of which ruled in defendant’s favor on that legal question, erred in concluding otherwise. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff’s statutory argument failed, and that the trial court and Court of Appeals therefore did not err. View "Bundy v. NuStar GP LLC, et al." on Justia Law

An informant told law enforcement that a person named “Tom Collins” was dealing heroin from a residence in Albany, Oregon. Detectives planned to utilize the informant in executing a controlled buy at the residence. However, rather than relying on the observations and results from that controlled buy to subsequently apply for a warrant, the detectives applied for, and obtained, a search warrant for the residence that anticipated that controlled buy. The State argued that the warrant at issue here was an “anticipatory warrant” of the type approved, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Grubbs, 547 US 90 (2006). Defendant disagreed, arguing that anticipatory warrants were incompatible with Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution. The Oregon Supreme Court did not reach the constitutionality of the issue presented. The Court determined that under ORS 133.555(2), a judge could issue a warrant only when “the basis of the record made before the judge” established that “there is probable cause to believe that the search will discover things specified in the application” and the warrant application satisfies the requirement in ORS 133.545(6) that it “particularly set[ ] forth the facts and circumstances tending to show that the objects of the search are in the places, or in the possession of the individuals, to be searched.” The affidavit in support of the warrant here failed to comply with the requirements of ORS 133.545(6). As a result, the warrant issued in defendant’s case did not comply with ORS 133.555(2), and the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress, pursuant to ORS 133.673(1). Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. The judgment of the circuit court was reversed, and this case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Lee" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Oregon Supreme Court. Under Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA), a person who suffers an “ascertainable loss of money or property” as a result of another person’s violation of the UTPA may maintain a private action against that person. The Ninth Circuit's question required a determination of whether a consumer could suffer an “ascertainable loss” under the UTPA based on a retailer’s misrepresentation about price history or comparative prices. More specifically, the Oregon Court had to consider whether a consumer suffered a cognizable “ascertainable loss” under ORS 646.638(1) when she buys items at an outlet store that have been advertised as being sold at a substantial discount but that have never been sold at that or any other location at the “list,” or non-sale price. To this, the Oregon Court responded in the affirmative. View "Clark v. Eddie Bauer LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant Ahmed Turay, Jr. was convicted of compelling prostitution, based in part on incriminating images and text messages that law enforcement found pursuant to a warrant to search his cell phone for nine categories of information (search categories). Defendant challenged the warrant, and his challenge presented an opportunity for the Oregon Supreme Court to consider the constitutional requirement that search warrants “particularly describe” the place to be searched or thing to be seized in the context of warrants that authorize law enforcement to search for digital data. It was undisputed the warrant in this case contained some search categories that failed to particularly describe the evidence sought; the Supreme Court also considered whether and to what extent those unlawful search categories require suppression of evidence obtained through the search of defendant’s phone. The Court concluded here that five of the nine search categories set out in the warrant to search defendant’s cell phone failed to satisfy the constitutional particularity requirement and, thus, those categories failed to authorize a lawful search. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the inclusion of those unlawful search categories in the warrant did not necessarily require suppression of all evidence found on defendant’s phone: (1) defendant has established a minimal factual nexus between a constitutional violation and the challenged evidence; and (2) that minimal factual nexus undermined the presumption of validity that ordinarily attends warrant-based searches and therefore required suppression unless the State could establish the challenged evidence was not tainted by the constitutional violation. The Court remanded the case for the trial court to develop a factual record and for the trial court to make the required factual findings under the correct legal standard. View "Oregon v. Turay" on Justia Law

Defendant John Haley was convicted under ORS 164.215 after he entered a university administrator’s office and stole a briefcase. The issue presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review in this case was whether a college administrator’s office within a university building was a “separate unit” in the building, thereby making the office a “separate building” for purposes of ORS 164.215. The Court of Appeals concluded that the office was not a “separate unit,” and thus not a “building” as defined in ORS 164.205(1), because the administrator shared the room’s “function and occupation” with the university. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court's interpretation and application of the statute: "Whether a space within a building is considered a 'separate unit' as defined in ORS 164.205(1) depends on the structure, occupancy, function, physical layout, and appearance of both the building as a whole and the space at issue." Here, the Court found sufficient evidence in the record for a factfinder to find, based on those factors, that the administrator’s office was a “separate unit.” The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on that charge. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Oregon v. Haley" on Justia Law

A.R.H. challenged a juvenile court order directing him to report as a sex offender. At issue was the meaning and application of ORS 163A.030, which directs a juvenile court to conduct a hearing at which the youth bears the “burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence” that the youth “is rehabilitated and does not pose a threat to the safety of the public.” If the court finds the youth has not met that burden, then the court must enter an order requiring the youth to report as a sex offender. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded the inquiry assigned to the juvenile court (clear and convincing evidence) is a factual inquiry. Finding that the evidence presented in this case permitted the juvenile court to find that the youth failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was “rehabilitated” and not “a threat to the safety of the public,” the Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court’s order. View "Oregon v. A. R. H." on Justia Law