Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An informant told law enforcement that a person named “Tom Collins” was dealing heroin from a residence in Albany, Oregon. Detectives planned to utilize the informant in executing a controlled buy at the residence. However, rather than relying on the observations and results from that controlled buy to subsequently apply for a warrant, the detectives applied for, and obtained, a search warrant for the residence that anticipated that controlled buy. The State argued that the warrant at issue here was an “anticipatory warrant” of the type approved, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Grubbs, 547 US 90 (2006). Defendant disagreed, arguing that anticipatory warrants were incompatible with Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution. The Oregon Supreme Court did not reach the constitutionality of the issue presented. The Court determined that under ORS 133.555(2), a judge could issue a warrant only when “the basis of the record made before the judge” established that “there is probable cause to believe that the search will discover things specified in the application” and the warrant application satisfies the requirement in ORS 133.545(6) that it “particularly set[ ] forth the facts and circumstances tending to show that the objects of the search are in the places, or in the possession of the individuals, to be searched.” The affidavit in support of the warrant here failed to comply with the requirements of ORS 133.545(6). As a result, the warrant issued in defendant’s case did not comply with ORS 133.555(2), and the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress, pursuant to ORS 133.673(1). Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. The judgment of the circuit court was reversed, and this case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Lee" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Oregon Supreme Court. Under Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA), a person who suffers an “ascertainable loss of money or property” as a result of another person’s violation of the UTPA may maintain a private action against that person. The Ninth Circuit's question required a determination of whether a consumer could suffer an “ascertainable loss” under the UTPA based on a retailer’s misrepresentation about price history or comparative prices. More specifically, the Oregon Court had to consider whether a consumer suffered a cognizable “ascertainable loss” under ORS 646.638(1) when she buys items at an outlet store that have been advertised as being sold at a substantial discount but that have never been sold at that or any other location at the “list,” or non-sale price. To this, the Oregon Court responded in the affirmative. View "Clark v. Eddie Bauer LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant Ahmed Turay, Jr. was convicted of compelling prostitution, based in part on incriminating images and text messages that law enforcement found pursuant to a warrant to search his cell phone for nine categories of information (search categories). Defendant challenged the warrant, and his challenge presented an opportunity for the Oregon Supreme Court to consider the constitutional requirement that search warrants “particularly describe” the place to be searched or thing to be seized in the context of warrants that authorize law enforcement to search for digital data. It was undisputed the warrant in this case contained some search categories that failed to particularly describe the evidence sought; the Supreme Court also considered whether and to what extent those unlawful search categories require suppression of evidence obtained through the search of defendant’s phone. The Court concluded here that five of the nine search categories set out in the warrant to search defendant’s cell phone failed to satisfy the constitutional particularity requirement and, thus, those categories failed to authorize a lawful search. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the inclusion of those unlawful search categories in the warrant did not necessarily require suppression of all evidence found on defendant’s phone: (1) defendant has established a minimal factual nexus between a constitutional violation and the challenged evidence; and (2) that minimal factual nexus undermined the presumption of validity that ordinarily attends warrant-based searches and therefore required suppression unless the State could establish the challenged evidence was not tainted by the constitutional violation. The Court remanded the case for the trial court to develop a factual record and for the trial court to make the required factual findings under the correct legal standard. View "Oregon v. Turay" on Justia Law

Defendant John Haley was convicted under ORS 164.215 after he entered a university administrator’s office and stole a briefcase. The issue presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review in this case was whether a college administrator’s office within a university building was a “separate unit” in the building, thereby making the office a “separate building” for purposes of ORS 164.215. The Court of Appeals concluded that the office was not a “separate unit,” and thus not a “building” as defined in ORS 164.205(1), because the administrator shared the room’s “function and occupation” with the university. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court's interpretation and application of the statute: "Whether a space within a building is considered a 'separate unit' as defined in ORS 164.205(1) depends on the structure, occupancy, function, physical layout, and appearance of both the building as a whole and the space at issue." Here, the Court found sufficient evidence in the record for a factfinder to find, based on those factors, that the administrator’s office was a “separate unit.” The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on that charge. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Oregon v. Haley" on Justia Law

A.R.H. challenged a juvenile court order directing him to report as a sex offender. At issue was the meaning and application of ORS 163A.030, which directs a juvenile court to conduct a hearing at which the youth bears the “burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence” that the youth “is rehabilitated and does not pose a threat to the safety of the public.” If the court finds the youth has not met that burden, then the court must enter an order requiring the youth to report as a sex offender. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded the inquiry assigned to the juvenile court (clear and convincing evidence) is a factual inquiry. Finding that the evidence presented in this case permitted the juvenile court to find that the youth failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was “rehabilitated” and not “a threat to the safety of the public,” the Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court’s order. View "Oregon v. A. R. H." on Justia Law

Elkside Development, LLC (Elkside) owned and operated the Osprey Point RV Resort in Lakeside, Oregon. Part of Elkside’s business model involved selling membership contracts that conferred free use of the campground, among other benefits. In April 2017, Barnett Resorts LLC, an Oregon limited liability company operated by member-managers Stefani and Chris Barnett, purchased Elkside. Shortly after the purchase, the Barnetts sent a letter to all campground members, identifying them as “owners” of the resort, and indicating that they would not honor Elkside’s membership contracts. Plaintiffs, a group of 71 people who, collectively, were party to 39 membership contracts with Elkside, brought suit alleging a variety of claims against Stefani and Chris Barnett individually, and against the company, Barnett Resorts LLC. On appeal, this case raised three issues relating to: (1) a breach of contract claim; (2) an intentional interference with contract claim; and (3) a statutory claim of elder abuse, based on the fact that the majority of the membership contracts had been held by plaintiffs over the age of 65. As to the claims against the Barnetts individually, the trial court granted summary judgment for defendants, relying on ORS 63.165 and Cortez v. Nacco Materials Handling Group, 337 P3d 111 (2014). Plaintiffs argued, in part, that whether ORS 63.165 shielded the Barnetts from liability required considering whether their actions were entirely in support of the LLC, or whether they were, instead, in furtherance of a non-LLC individual motive. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. The Oregon Supreme Court allowed review and reversed in part the Court of Appeals and the trial court. Specifically, the Supreme Court reversed as to the elder abuse claim, affirmed as to the breach of contract claim, and affirmed the intentional interference claim by an equally divided court. View "Adelsperger v. Elkside Development LLC" on Justia Law

The Oregon Attorney General brought this action against defendants, Living Essentials, LLC and Innovation Ventures, LLC, alleging that they had made representations about their products that violated two different provisions of the Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA). The trial court ruled for defendants, explaining that the relevant provisions of the UTPA required the State to prove that the misrepresentations were “material to consumer purchasing decisions,” and that the State had not done so. The Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. The Oregon Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for review to consider whether the lower courts correctly construed the statute. After such review, the Supreme Court concluded, contrary to the trial court and the Court of Appeals, that the UTPA provisions at issue contained no “material to consumer purchasing decisions” requirement. The Supreme Court also rejected defendants’ argument that, without such a requirement, the provisions facially violated the free speech provisions of the State and federal constitutions. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded to that court for further proceedings. View "State ex rel Rosenblum v. Living Essentials, LLC" on Justia Law

Claimant Hipolito Coria sought review of the Court of Appeals’ decision reversing a penalty that the Workers’ Compensation Board imposed on respondent SAIF for unreasonable claims processing. The board imposed the penalty pursuant to ORS 656.262(11)(a), which provides, in part, that, if an “insurer . . . unreasonably refuses to pay compensation,” the insurer “shall be liable for an additional amount up to 25 percent of the amounts then due,” plus penalty-related attorney fees. On review, the parties disagreed about the board’s reason for imposing the penalty. They also disagreed about many of the procedural and substantive legal requirements for imposing penalties pursuant to ORS 656.262(11)(a). The Oregon Supreme Court concluded the board’s imposition of the penalty was not supported by substantial reason because the board’s order failed to “articulate a rational connection between the facts and the legal conclusions it draws from them.” Consequently, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the board to explain its reasoning; necessarily, the Court did not reach the parties’ arguments about the legal requirements for imposing penalties pursuant to ORS 656.262(11)(a). View "SAIF v. Coria" on Justia Law

The issue defendant's appeal presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's consideration was the nature and scope of the Court of Appeals’ authority to deny an appellant’s motion to dismiss. After that court issued a decision resolving defendant’s criminal appeal, he filed an unopposed motion to dismiss, which the court denied. On review, both parties agreed the Court of Appeals erred in denying defendant’s motion, but they approached the analysis differently. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in denying defendant’s motion in this case. Accordingly, the appellate court's order was reversed and defendant's appeal was dismissed. View "Oregon v. Mott" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought the Oregon Supreme Court's review of an order of the Energy Facility Siting Council (EFSC) that approved an Idaho Power Company (Idaho Power) application for a site certificate to construct a high-voltage electrical transmission line from Boardman, Oregon, to Hemingway, Idaho. Petitioner STOP B2H Coalition (Stop B2H) contended that EFSC erred by : (1) denying Stop B2H’s request for full party status in the contested case proceedings; (2) granting an exception or variance to noise level requirements; (3) modifying the governing rule to limit the noise assessment to landowners within one-half mile of the transmission line; and (4) misapplying EFSC’s rules on the visual impacts from the transmission line. Petitioner Michael McAllister contended EFSC erred by failing to require Idaho Power to include in its application an “environmentally preferable” location for a segment of the transmission line in Union County. Petitioner Irene Gilbert contended EFSC erred by: (1) denying Gilbert’s request for full party status; (2) failing to document the impacts on historic properties and mitigation measures; (3) delegating future approval of mitigation plans to the Oregon Department of Energy (ODOE); (4) relying on federal standards to determine mitigation requirements for historic properties; and (5) modifying a mandatory site certificate condition without rulemaking. Applying the governing standard of review, the Supreme Court affirmed EFSC’s final order approving the site certificate for this transmission line. View "Stop B2H Coalition v. Dept. of Energy" on Justia Law