Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintifff Pattyann Larsen filed employment discrimination and other claims against her former employer shortly after her debts had been discharged by the federal bankruptcy court, but she had failed to list those claims as assets in her bankruptcy case. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the bankruptcy trustee—not plaintiff— was the real party in interest. The court then denied plaintiff’s motion to substitute the bankruptcy trustee as plaintiff and dismissed the case based on its conclusion that plaintiff’s attempt to pursue this action in her own name was not an “honest and understandable mistake.” The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying substitution. THe Oregon Supreme Court reversed: under ORCP 26 A, a motion to substitute the real party in interest as the plaintiff, if granted, would require plaintiff to amend the complaint under ORCP 23 A. “We have interpreted the standard specified in that rule—leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when justice so requires’—to mean that leave to amend should be granted absent any unfair prejudice to the nonmoving party. The text, context, and legislative history of ORCP 26 A confirm that the standards governing leave to amend the pleadings under ORCP 23 A also apply in deciding whether to allow substitution of the real party in interest under ORCP 26 A.” Defendant did not contend that it would be unfairly prejudiced if the bankruptcy trustee were to be substituted as the plaintiff in this case. The Supreme Court concluded that, because the trial court applied the wrong legal standard, it abused its discretion in denying substitution and dismissing this case. View "Larsen v. Selmet, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Matthew Ingle waived his right to a jury trial and raised an insanity defense. The trial court found petitioner “guilty except for insanity” on all charges and placed him under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board and committed him to the Oregon State Hospital. More than eight years after his convictions became final, petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner requested and received court-appointed counsel, who amended the petition. In the operative petition, petitioner acknowledged that the limitations period had run but asserted that an “escape clause” applied. Specifically, he asserted that the escape clause applied because, during the limitations period, he was disabled by “diagnosed schizophrenia” and the “forced consumption of extremely powerful psychotropic medications” and that those conditions “deprived him of the ability” to file a timely petition. The State moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that petitioner’s mental impairments were irrelevant to whether the escape clause applied. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded petitioner’s allegations were sufficient to raise a triable issue on the applicability of the escape clause. Consequently, the post-conviction court erred in granting the State’s motion to dismiss on the pleadings. That judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Ingle v. Matteucci" on Justia Law

While on juvenile parole related to a commitment to Oregon Youth Authority (OYA) in an earlier case, B.Y. was adjudicated to be within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for interfering with a peace officer. Based on that conduct, the juvenile court imposed a new disposition, which also committed B.Y. to OYA custody, to commence at the conclusion of his existing commitment. B.Y. challenged that order, contending that the juvenile court lacked authority to impose consecutive commitments. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals agreed with B.Y. and reversed the juvenile court. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the appellate court: “the statutory text neither expressly permits nor expressly prohibits the imposition of consecutive commitments. The statutory scheme does, however, confer broad authority on the juvenile court to fashion appropriate dispositions; that stands in contrast to the criminal code, where courts’ sentencing authority is more circumscribed. Given that contrast, the fact that the legislature did not explicitly provide for consecutive commitments in a circumstance such as this is unsurprising. In light of the wide latitude that the legislature has chosen to give juvenile courts, it is more reasonable to expect that if the legislature had intended to limit the juvenile court’s ability to impose consecutive commitments in this circumstance, the legislature would have indicated as much.” View "Oregon v. B. Y." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the Oregon Department of Revenue erred in declining to reduce the assessed value of taxpayer’s property for tax years 2018-2019 and 2019-2020. After persuading the Department that the valuation methodology it used to assess the property in 2020-2021 was flawed, the taxpayer asked the Department to use the corrected methodology to re-assess the two previous tax years. The Department denied the request, finding the statute the taxpayer used as grounds, ORS 306.115, did not authorize the Department to change its value opinion for the earlier tax years because another statute, ORS 308.624(4), expressly precluded the Department from making that change. The Oregon Tax Court agreed with the Department, and the taxpayer appealed, contending the Department and Tax Court misinterpreted the applicable statutes. The Oregon Supreme Court found no misinterpretation and affirmed. View "D. E. Shaw Renewable Investments, LLC v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

A trial court convicted defendant Brian Hubbell of delivery under ORS 475.752 based on evidence that defendant’s extended-stay hotel room contained a large quantity of fentanyl, a portion of which was packaged in a manner consistent with an intent to sell it to individual users or dealers. Over defendant’s objection, the trial court ruled that that evidence was sufficient to convict him of delivery under Oregon v. Boyd, 756 P2d 1276 (1988). In Boyd, the Court of Appeals construed the phrase “attempted transfer” in ORS 475.005(8) by applying principles of liability for the inchoate crime of attempt, ORS 161.405(1), whereby a person who intentionally takes a “substantial step” toward committing a crime is liable for attempting the crime. Boyd held that possessing a controlled substance in a quantity too large to be consistent with personal use, combined with evidence of an intent to transfer that substance, constitutes a substantial step toward transferring it and hence is sufficient to show an “attempted transfer.” On appeal in this case, defendant argued the evidence was insufficient to show delivery even under Boyd. The Court of Appeal, on its own initiative, re-examined Boyd, overruled it, and held that possession plus an intent to deliver, without more, was insufficient to show an “attempted transfer” for purposes of the completed crime of delivery of controlled substances, though it could establish a “substantial step” for purposes of the inchoate crime of attempt. To this, the Oregon Supreme Court concurred and affirmed the appellant court. View "Oregon v. Hubbell" on Justia Law

Taxpayer Walter Woodland appealed the Oregon Department of Revenue’s assessment of $116 in interest for unpaid estimated taxes in 2019. During the pendency of that appeal, the department invalidated the assessment and agreed that taxpayer did not owe that interest. The Regular Division of the Oregon Tax Court accordingly dismissed taxpayer’s appeal as moot. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed. View "Woodland v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

While being held pending trial for aggravated murder, Defendant Lynn Benton lived in the same unit as another adult in custody, Layman. Layman hoped to be an informant for the State and to pass on information about Defendant in exchange for a benefit in his own cases. Layman spoke with Defendant about his case and learned incriminating information. Layman ultimately signed a cooperation agreement to testify against Defendant. Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress Layman’s testimony, arguing that Layman acted as a state agent in questioning Defendant, thereby violating Defendant’s right to counsel. The trial court denied the suppression motion, citing insufficient evidence that Layman acted as a state agent. Layman testified; a jury ultimately convicted Defendant of aggravated murder. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding Layman was indeed a state agent by the time of his second proffer meeting because, by that point, the State’s involvement in Layman’s questioning of Defendant was sufficient to bring into effect constitutional protections. To this, the Oregon Supreme Court agreed: Defendant’s admissions to Layman made after a second proffer meeting should have been excluded. Defendant’s convictions were reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "Oregon v. Benton" on Justia Law

In a forceable entry and detainer (FED) action, the Oregon Supreme Court was asked to determine the proper calculation of damages that could be awarded to a tenant, following multiple instances of landlord noncompliance with certain utility billing requirements that repeated each month, over a series of months. After plaintiff (landlord) brought an FED action against defendant (tenant) to recover possession of the landlord’s premises, tenant alleged a counterclaim that landlord had failed to comply with certain utility billing requirements found in ORS 90.315(4)(b). The trial court agreed with tenant, concluding that landlord had committed 12 separate violations—one per month over the 12 months within the one-year statute of limitations that governed Oregon Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (ORLTA) actions, and awarded tenant statutory damages in an amount equal to 12 months of rent. On landlord’s appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the plain text of ORS 90.315(4)(f) showed that the legislature had not intended for each landlord billing violation to be subject to a separate sanction. The Oregon Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court and affirmed. View "Shepard Investment Group LLC v. Ormandy" on Justia Law

An informant told law enforcement that a person named “Tom Collins” was dealing heroin from a residence in Albany, Oregon. Detectives planned to utilize the informant in executing a controlled buy at the residence. However, rather than relying on the observations and results from that controlled buy to subsequently apply for an "anticipatory warrant" to search the residence that anticipated that controlled buy. Before trial, defendant Aaron Lee moved to suppress evidence derived from the search warrant, relying on ORS 133.545 as well as the state and federal constitutions. The Oregon Supreme Court declined to reach the constitutional question that the parties presented, because the Court concluded that Oregon’s statutory warrant requirements, including ORS 133.555(2) and ORS 133.545(6), permitted it us to resolve this case without reaching that question. The Court found the affidavit in support of the warrant here failed to comply with the requirements of ORS 133.545(6). As a result, the warrant issued in defendant’s case did not comply with ORS 133.555(2), and the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress, pursuant to ORS 133.673(1). Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. The judgment of the circuit court was reversed, and this case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Lee" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question of law to the Oregon Supreme Court. Defendants Eddie Bauer LLC and Eddie Bauer Parent, LLC, operate the Eddie Bauer Outlet chain of stores, where they sell branded clothing. More than 90 percent of the products offered at the outlet stores are manufactured solely for sale at the outlet stores and were not sold elsewhere. Defendants advertised clothing at the Eddie Bauer Outlet stores as being sold at a substantial discount; with limited exceptions, the clothing was never sold at the “list” price. In 2017, plaintiff Susan Clark purchased two articles of clothing from one of defendants’ outlet stores in Oregon. Plaintiff filed a complaint in federal district court, alleging that defendants had violated multiple provisions of the UTPA, including, among others, ORS 646.608(1)(j) (making false or misleading representations of fact concerning the reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions), and ORS 646.608(1)(ee) (advertising price comparisons without conspicuously identifying the origin of the price the seller is comparing to the current price). Plaintiff alleged she had been fraudulently induced to buy those garments by defendants’ false representation that she was buying them at a bargain price. Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that it failed to allege an “ascertainable loss of money or property,” as required of a complainant pursuing a private right of action under the UTPA. The federal appellate court asked the Supreme Court whether a consumer suffered an "ascertainable loss" when the consumer purchased a product that the consumer would not have purchased at the price that the consumer paid but for a violation of [ORS] 646.608(1)(e), (i), (j), (ee), or (u), if the violation arose from a representation about the product’s price, comparative price, or price history, but not about the character or quality of the product itself. The Oregon Court answered the Ninth Circuit's question in the affirmative. View "Clark v. Eddie Bauer LLC" on Justia Law