Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves a review of the Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 54 (2024) (IP 54), which was challenged by the petitioners, Sandy Chung and Yvonne Garcia. IP 54, also known as the "Oregon Crimefighting Act," proposes significant changes to the pretrial release system for individuals charged with felonies and Class A misdemeanors in Oregon. The Act also empowers local governments to pass ordinances to fight local crime and requires the state to pay for jail space for those charged with felonies and Class A misdemeanors who need to be held until trial.The Attorney General prepared a draft ballot title for IP 54 and, after considering public comments, modified the draft and certified the final ballot title. The petitioners, who had submitted comments on the draft, challenged the certified ballot title, arguing that the summary did not comply with the requirements set out in ORS 250.035(2)(d).The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the ballot title to determine whether it substantially complied with the requirements. The court agreed with the petitioners that the summary was deficient. It found that the summary did not adequately convey the breadth of the changes that IP 54 would effectuate, particularly in relation to pretrial release decisions at arraignment. The court concluded that the summary must be modified to clarify that IP 54 would override existing law and to provide a more accurate description of the changes that IP 54 would make to the current law governing pretrial release at arraignment. The court referred the ballot title back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Chung v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

The case involves the State of Oregon and Stephen Andrew Aranda. Aranda was charged with first-degree rape and chose to testify in his own defense. The state sought to impeach his testimony with evidence of his prior felony convictions, including two counts of first-degree sexual abuse and one count of second-degree assault. Aranda argued that the court should weigh the probative value of his conviction history against its potential for unfair prejudice before admitting it as evidence. The trial court denied his motion, and Aranda was subsequently convicted.On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with Aranda's argument and reversed his conviction, holding that due process required the trial court to conduct a balancing test before admitting his prior convictions as impeachment evidence. The state appealed to the Supreme Court of Oregon.The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. The court held that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that due process required a balancing test before admitting a defendant's prior convictions as impeachment evidence. The court found that neither historical practice nor principles of fundamental fairness required such a balancing test. The court noted that while the admission of prior convictions could be prejudicial, it was also highly relevant to a defendant's credibility as a witness. The court concluded that due process did not require a balancing test under Oregon Evidence Code 403 before admitting a defendant's prior convictions as impeachment evidence under Oregon Evidence Code 609. View "State v. Aranda" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the Walton family and the Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority over the installation of sewer lines on the Walton's property. The Waltons claimed that the installation constituted a "taking" under the Oregon Constitution and the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, for which they were entitled to "just compensation". The Sanitary Authority argued that the claim was time-barred under Oregon law, as it was not brought within the six-year limitations period.The trial court granted the Sanitary Authority's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the claim was indeed time-barred. The Waltons appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The Waltons then petitioned for review by the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. The court held that the Waltons' claim was subject to the six-year limitations period established by Oregon law. The court further held that the claim accrued when the sewer lines were installed, which was no later than 1995, and therefore, the six-year limitations period expired in 2001, sixteen years before the Waltons filed their complaint. Consequently, the court concluded that the Waltons' claim was time-barred. View "Walton v. Neskowin Regional Sanitary Authority" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a criminal defendant who was charged with unlawful purchase of a firearm, false information in connection with the transfer of a firearm, and attempted felon in possession of a firearm. The defendant had attempted to buy a firearm and on the required form, he checked "no" to the question of whether he had been convicted of a felony, despite having two previous felony convictions in the State of Washington. At trial, the defendant testified that he had assumed or hoped that his prior felony convictions had been expunged, as he had consulted an attorney and filled out paperwork to that effect.Prior to the closing arguments, the defendant made a preemptive objection to the state's closing argument, arguing that the state should not be permitted to make "burden-shifting" arguments or mention related topics. The trial court engaged in a lengthy discussion on the defendant's objection and largely agreed with the legal principles that he had articulated. The state delivered its closing argument without objection from the defendant.On appeal, the defendant assigned error to a purportedly impermissible burden-shifting argument the prosecution made in closing. The Court of Appeals treated the defendant's assignment as preserved, relying on the defense counsel's preemptive objection made before closing arguments, and reversed the decision.However, the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon concluded that the defendant's assignment of error was not preserved. The court noted that the defendant did not object to the trial court's ruling on his preemptive objection or to the actual statements made in the prosecutor's closing argument. The court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "State v. Skotland" on Justia Law

The case involves Carlos Alberto Quebrado, who was charged as an accomplice to second-degree assault and unlawful use of a weapon. The charges stemmed from an incident where Quebrado's co-defendant fired a shotgun from the passenger window of the car Quebrado was driving, hitting a passenger in another car. Prior to trial, the co-defendant entered a plea deal with the state in return for her testimony against Quebrado. However, the state did not call her as a witness during the trial, instead introducing several of her statements through other witnesses. Quebrado's defense counsel filed a motion for a mistrial, arguing that the state's failure to call the co-defendant as a witness violated Quebrado's confrontation rights under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution.The trial court denied the motion, ruling that no confrontation violation had occurred. Quebrado was subsequently convicted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, reasoning that Quebrado's motion had been untimely and therefore not preserved as error on appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that Quebrado's motion for a mistrial was timely and therefore preserved the issue for appeal. The court reasoned that a confrontation challenge under Article I, section 11, is not the direct equivalent to a challenge to the admission of evidence. Instead, it looks to the co-occurrence of two events at trial: the state’s introduction of hearsay statements, and the state’s failure to call the declarant without a showing that the declarant is unavailable. The court concluded that the practical purposes of preservation were served by defendant’s objection at the close of the state’s case, rather than at the time when the hearsay statements were admitted. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration. View "State v. Quebrado" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the ballot title for Legislative Referral 403 (2024) (LR 403), which was referred for voters' consideration at the upcoming November 2024 General Election. The petitioner, James Sasinowski, challenged all parts of the ballot title, asserting non-compliance with requirements set out in ORS 250.035(2). LR 403 would amend ORS chapter 254 to require "ranked choice voting" for certain elections and would permit local governments to adopt ranked-choice voting in their elections.The ballot title for LR 403 was prepared by a joint legislative committee and filed with the Secretary of State. The petitioner challenged all parts of the ballot title, arguing that the word "majority" was used inaccurately and without proper context. He contended that "majority of votes" suggests that a candidate has received the majority of total votes cast, but in operation, ranked-choice voting can produce a winner who does not receive that type of "majority" vote.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon agreed with the petitioner in part. The court found that the caption of the ballot title for LR 403 did not reasonably identify the subject matter of the measure and required modification. The court also agreed that the "yes" result statement in the ballot title for LR 403 did not substantially comply with ORS 250.035(2)(b) and required modification. However, the court disagreed with the petitioner that the "no" result statement and the summary in the ballot title for LR 403 required modification. The court concluded that the caption and "yes" result statement in the joint legislative committee’s ballot title for LR 403 required modification and referred the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification. View "Sasinowski v. Legislative Assembly" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was found guilty of driving under the influence of intoxicants. After his conviction, the defendant fled the state, delaying his sentencing and the entry of a judgment of conviction for over ten years. Upon his return to Oregon, the trial court imposed a sentence and entered a judgment of conviction, which the defendant appealed. The defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to caution the jury that a defendant’s decision not to testify cannot be considered evidence of guilt.The Court of Appeals dismissed the defendant's appeal based on the "former fugitive doctrine," which presumes that an appellate court has inherent authority to dismiss a criminal defendant’s direct appeal if the defendant was formerly a fugitive from justice and the flight significantly interfered with the appellate process. The state argued that the defendant's decade-long absence would prejudice the state in any retrial due to the passage of time and difficulty in locating witnesses.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that while the Court of Appeals may have inherent authority to dismiss an appeal when the defendant's former fugitive status significantly interferes with the appellate process, this authority does not extend to dismissing a direct appeal to address the appellant’s flight from the jurisdiction of the trial court. The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant's former fugitive status did not interfere with the appellate court’s ability to address the merits of the appeal. The court held that concerns about potential prejudice that would arise in the trial court in relation to a retrial are most appropriately left for the trial court to address on any remand. View "State v. Satter" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Terri Lee Brown, was incarcerated due to an order from Governor Tina Kotek that revoked a previous conditional commutation of one of Brown's sentences. Brown had received the commutation in December 2020 from then-Governor Kate Brown and completed all her sentences by February 2023. Governor Kotek's revocation order was issued in December 2023. Brown petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the Governor lacked authority to revoke the commutation after she had finished serving all her sentences.In the lower courts, the state argued that the Governor had the authority to revoke Brown's commutation after her sentence had expired. The state also contended that Brown, in accepting the previous Governor's conditional commutation, had waived her right to seek habeas relief or otherwise challenge the revocation. Brown countered that the purported waiver in the acceptance agreement she signed was invalid or unenforceable.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon concluded that when the Governor revoked Brown's conditional commutation, she lacked the authority to do so under the terms of the commutation. The court also rejected the state's argument that Brown waived her right to challenge her present imprisonment. The court found that Brown's imprisonment was unlawful and ordered her immediate release from custody. The court further waived otherwise applicable appellate rules relating to reconsideration and the issuance of the appellate judgment, directing the State Court Administrator to issue the appellate judgment immediately. View "Brown v. Kotek" on Justia Law

HotChalk, LLC filed a lawsuit against the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod and 22 other defendants, alleging breach of contract and fraud in relation to the closure of Concordia University - Portland. HotChalk claimed that the Synod orchestrated the university’s closure to financially benefit itself and its affiliates while leaving the university’s creditors out in the cold. During discovery, the Synod sought a protective order to prevent the disclosure of certain documents related to internal religious matters. The trial court granted the protective order, effectively denying a motion to compel discovery of those documents. HotChalk then filed a petition for mandamus.The trial court's decision to grant the protective order was based on an in-camera review of the documents in question. The court equated the Synod's motion to a motion to restrict discovery to protect a party from embarrassment. After completing its final in-camera review, the trial court granted the Synod's motion for a protective order. HotChalk then filed a timely petition for mandamus in the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon issued an alternative writ of mandamus, directing the trial court to either vacate its order or show cause why it should not do so. The trial court declined to vacate its order, leading to arguments in the Supreme Court. The Synod argued that the writ should be dismissed because HotChalk has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. The Supreme Court agreed with the Synod, stating that HotChalk had not established that the normal appellate process would not constitute a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in this case. Therefore, the Supreme Court dismissed the alternative writ as improvidently allowed. View "Hotchalk, Inc. v. Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over whether a hospital that supplies and administers a drug that causes harm can be considered a "seller" under Oregon's strict product liability statute, ORS 30.920(1). The plaintiffs, Brown and Gomez, are the parents of a child who suffered irreparable heart defects as a result of in utero exposure to the drug Zofran, which Providence Health System - Oregon administered to Gomez. The plaintiffs sued Providence, asserting a claim for strict liability under ORS 30.920, alleging that Providence was a "seller" of Zofran and that the drug was "unreasonably dangerous and defective."The trial court granted Providence's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the statute was inapplicable under the circumstances. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, disagreeing with the trial court’s interpretation of the statute. The Supreme Court of Oregon granted review.The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court concluded that the legislature did not intend to exclude hospitals from the scope of ORS 30.920(1); a hospital that supplies and administers a dangerously defective drug in conjunction with providing a healthcare service can be a "seller" that is "engaged in the business of selling" for purposes of liability under ORS 30.920; and, consequently, the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Brown v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC" on Justia Law