Justia Oregon Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Taxpayers, who did not dispute that they had in fact been paid substantial wages in tax years 2016-18, contended at Tax Court that they owed no Oregon income tax for those years. The Tax Court concluded their arguments in support of that contention were frivolous and therefore warranted a penalty under ORS 305.437. Accordingly, the court ordered taxpayers to pay the Department of Revenue (department) a penalty of$4,000. Taxpayers appealed, challenging only the penalty award. Finding no reversible error, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Tax Court’s judgment. View "Jimenez v. Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

In 2014, wife filed for dissolution of her marriage to husband. At the trial to divide the parties’ assets and establish support awards for both wife and a child, wife requested, in relevant part, $750 per month in transitional spousal support for 60 months and $750 per month in maintenance spousal support for an indeterminate period. The trial court entered a general judgment (the “original 2014 judgment”) awarding wife $750 per month in transitional spousal support for 60 months, to begin on the date of the 2014 judgment (May 1, 2014), and $500 per month in maintenance spousal support for an indefinite period to begin immediately after the transitional support ended (June 1,2019). Wife appealed, challenging both the monthly amount and the delayed commencement of the maintenance support. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding the trial court misapplied ORS 107.105(1)(d)(C) and thus incorrectly calculated wife’s maintenance support and postponed the maintenance support payments until after the transition support ended. On remand, the trial court increased the maintenance support award to $1,000 per month for 60 months, after which time the maintenance award would decrease to $750 per month. The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court’s review centered on whether interest accrued on the support payments that were increased retroactively following the husband’s appeal. The Court of Appeals held that the award of interest was improper. The Supreme Court concluded wife was entitled to statutory interest at nine percent per annum on the additional amount that the trial court added to the monthly support award in the original judgment, calculated from the dates that those payments would have been due. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals, affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court, and remanded this case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Skinner & Skinner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lindsay Buero brought a class action against defendants Amazon.Com Services, Inc. and Amazon.com, Inc. in Oregon state court, alleging, among other things, that defendants had violated Oregon’s wage laws by failing to pay employees for time spent in mandatory security screenings at the end of their work shifts. Defendants removed the case to federal court and moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that the time spent in the security screenings was not compensable. In support of that argument, defendants cited Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, (574 US 27), a case involving a similar claim against defendants, in which the United States Supreme Court held that, under federal law, time spent in the security screenings at issue in that case was not compensable. The district court agreed with defendants, noting the similarities between Oregon administrative rules enacted by the state’s Bureau of Labor and Industries (BOLI) and federal law. Plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit and filed a motion asking that court to certify a question to the Oregon Supreme Court on whether time spent in security screenings is compensable under Oregon law. The Ninth Circuit granted the motion. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded Oregon law aligned with federal law regarding what activities were compensable. Therefore, under Oregon law, as under federal law, time that employees spend on the employer’s premises waiting for and undergoing mandatory security screenings before or after their work shifts is compensable only if the screenings are either: (1) an integral and indispensable part of the employees’ principal activities or (2) compensable as a matter of contract, custom, or practice. View "Buero v. Amazon.com Services, Inc." on Justia Law

This case concerned a driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) conviction following the termination of a diversion agreement. Defendant Rhonda Colgrove pled guilty to misdemeanor DUII and petitioned to enter diversion. Defendant’s diversion petition stated, in part, that she had “read and underst[ood] all of the information in the attached Explanation of Rights and DUII Diversion Agreement” and “agree[d],” among other things, to “[a]ttend a victim impact panel as ordered by the court.” Defendant failed to pay $335 in fees and to attend a victim impact panel within the diversion period. The trial court thereafter terminated the diversion agreement and entered a judgment of conviction, and defendant appealed. As pertinent here, defendant challenged her conviction on the ground that the trial court had erroneously terminated her diversion agreement either because the agreement had not set a deadline to attend the victim impact panel or because the trial court had discretion to waive the attendance requirement. The Court of Appeals assumed that defendant’s challenge was reviewable under ORS 138.105(5), but concluded that it failed on the merits. The Oregon Supreme Court allowed defendant’s petition for review to address the reviewability issue that the Court of Appeals did not: whether ORS 138.105(5) precluded a defendant who pleads guilty or no contest from obtaining appellate review of legal challenges to the conviction in the judgment entered in the trial court. The Supreme Court concluded that such challenges were not reviewable under ORS 138.105(5). Accordingly, it affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals on different grounds. View "Oregon v. Colgrove" on Justia Law

Defendant Patrick Fox and the victims were involved in a property dispute, and the victims hired a civil attorney to assist them in that matter. During an incident regarding the property dispute, defendant struck the victims with a metal chain causing them significant injury. The state charged defendant with one count each of second- and third-degree assault, and defendant eventually pleaded guilty to both counts. During defendant’s prosecution, the victims retained the attorney who was representing them in the civil case to represent their interests in that criminal proceeding. At sentencing, the victims’ attorney argued against the state’s recommended prison sentence and advocated for a probationary sentence to increase the likelihood that defendant could pay restitution to the victims. After defendant’s guilty plea and sentencing, the state sought restitution for the medical expenses that the victims had incurred as a result of the assault and the attorney fees that the victims had incurred in the criminal proceeding. Defendant conceded that the claimed attorney fees resulted from defendant’s criminal activities but objected to their recovery, arguing that neither the medical expenses nor the attorney fees were reasonable or necessary and that the attorney fees did not constitute “economic damages” recoverable as restitution. The trial court awarded the full amount of the medical expenses. The trial court also awarded $3,200 in attorney fees. The Court of Appeals reversed the award for the medical expenses incurred by one of the two victims but affirmed as to those incurred by the other. With respect to the victims’ attorney fees, the court affirmed the award for the attorney fees incurred in the criminal case, determining that “it is reasonably foreseeable that a victim would hire an attorney to advise them about their rights in a criminal case,” and that, “because a victim is entitled to seek separate representation, the services provided by [the victims’ attorney] that were directly related to the criminal case were necessarily incurred by the victims.” Defendant appealed both decisions by the appellate court. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding the trial court erred in awarding the resulting attorney fees from the victims' counsel in defendant's criminal proceedings as restitution. View "Oregon v. Fox" on Justia Law

Father challenged a juvenile court’s order requiring him to undergo a psychological evaluation and follow its recommendations. ORS 419B.387 authorized a juvenile court, following an evidentiary hearing, to “order [a] parent to participate in the treatment or training” that “is needed by [the] parent to correct the circumstances that resulted in wardship or to prepare the parent to resume the care of the ward” and that “is in the ward’s best interests.” Father contended the psychological evaluation did not qualify as “treatment” and that, even if it did, it was not “needed” by father. Thus, the issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Courr’s review centered on the meaning of those terms in ORS 419B.387 and whether that statute authorized the juvenile court to order the psychological evaluation here. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the juvenile court’s order was authorized under ORS 419B.387. View "Dept. of Human Services v. F. J. M." on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Ralston was arrested, booked, and charged by district attorney’s information with misdemeanor driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) and reckless driving. Five days later, the prosecutor dismissed the misdemeanor charges to investigate whether defendant had predicate convictions that would have elevated the charge to felony DUII. Six weeks later, a grand jury indicted defendant on a charge of felony DUII. By that time, video footage from the jail on the night that defendant was arrested and booked had been overwritten automatically. When defense counsel later learned that the booking video had been overwritten, defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him on the ground that his right to a speedy trial under Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution had been violated, arguing that his inability to use the video of his booking at trial was prejudicial to him. The trial court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which held defendant did not establish prejudice resulting from the delay so as to warrant dismissal of the charges against him. The trial court judgment was affirmed in part and remanded to that court for further proceedings. View "Oregon v. Ralston" on Justia Law

Relator petitioned for a restraining order against her husband (respondent) under the Family Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA), ORS 107.700-107.735. During a hearing on her petition, relator offered as exhibits six videos from a dash-mounted camera in the parties’ car in connection with an alleged incident of abuse. One of the videos showed relator speaking on a cell phone to a “certified advocate.” That video exhibit was offered to support relator’s testimony about her fear for her physical safety. Relator also indicated that she had sometimes texted that advocate. Respondent requested production of the entire memory card from the dash-mounted camera, as well as “[a]ll correspondence, memoranda, e-mail, text messages, recordings of any kind, and any other documents from any advocate assisting [relator] in this case to [relator] or from [relator to her] advocate relating to the alleged events in this case.” Relator refused to produce those items, arguing, as relevant here, that respondent’s request for the entire memory card violated ORCP 36 because it was oppressive, overly broad, and unduly burdensome, and was not “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Relator also argued that her communications with her certified advocate were privileged under OEC 507-1. Relator petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus seeking to vacate the trial court’s discovery order, and concurrently moved for a stay of the discovery order at the trial court. The trial court denied the stay, citing OEC 507-1(3), which limited the applicability of the certified advocate-victim privilege in certain circumstances. Relator continued to refuse to produce the memory card and her communications with her advocate, and, on respondent’s motion, the trial court dismissed the FAPA proceeding as a sanction. The Supreme Court determined the trial court was presented with “no meritorious argument to support compelling production.” Without such an argument, and with no alternative explanation from the court for its ruling, the Supreme Court found the court’s order to produce the memory card was legally unsupported and therefore could not stand. Mandamus relief was granted. View "I. H. v. Ammi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Gregory Chaimov made a public records request in July 2018, seeking copies of completed request forms used by state agencies to propose legislation for the 2019 legislative session. Individual state agencies had completed approved blank forms and then submitted them to the Oregon Department of Legislative Services (DAS) for the Governor to decide whether to request that the Office of Legislative Counsel prepare draft bills. The issue presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review was whether completed request forms from the Office of Legislative Counsel were subject to disclosure under Oregon’s Public Records Law. DAS contended the requested forms fell within the attorney-client privilege under OEC 503 and were thus exempted from disclosure under ORS 192.355 (9)(a). The trial court granted summary judgment for plaintiff, holding that the request forms were not exempt and ordering their disclosure. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that they were subject to the attorney-client privilege. On review, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reversed the judgment of the trial court. View "Chaimov v. Dept. of Admin. Services" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the suspension of petitioner’s driver’s license for refusing a breath test was valid when, in addition to providing petitioner with the statutorily required information regarding rights and consequences, the arresting officer also told petitioner that she would seek a search warrant for a blood draw if petitioner refused the test. The Department of Transportation, Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Division (DMV) suspended petitioner’s driving privileges, but, after petitioner sought judicial review from the circuit court, the circuit court set aside that suspension, a decision that the Court of Appeals later affirmed. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that DMV properly suspended petitioner’s driving privileges, therefore reversing the Court of Appeals’ and the circuit court’s judgments. View "Murdoch v. DMV" on Justia Law